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Abstract 
Recent widespread turmoil in the banking sector has renewed the notion that improper credit 
risk management continues to be the catalyst for serious banking problems. The Australian 
banking sector emerged relatively unscathed from recent global turmoil, providing an 
interesting setting for research. This thesis investigates the credit risk management practice of 
Australian banks’ loan portfolios from a regulatory perspective by examining regulatory 
loan-loss provisioning, regulatory capital, and regulatory stress-testing in Australia. 
Findings suggest the potential for Australian banks to under-provision when faced with 
pressure to raise capital ratios. IRB banks, on the other hand, report regulatory provisions in 
line with expected loss estimates as intended under the Basel II capital framework. Australian 
bank supervisors are encouraged to remain vigilant when assessing bank capital adequacy by 
paying particular attention to the sufficiency of bank regulatory provisioning practices as a 
reserve against expected credit losses. 
This thesis finds Australian banks target a level of regulatory capital above the imposed 
regulatory minimum, with quarterly speed of adjustment coefficients of 19 and 15 per cent 
for total and tier 1 capital ratios, respectively. Bank risk, size and ROE are found to be 
significant determinants of Australian bank capital buffers and Basel II is found to have 
increased bank capital buffers. Findings suggest a positive relationship exists between the 
business cycle and Australian bank capital buffers, interpreted to be a countercyclical effect 
and results indicate bank-specific regulatory imposed PCRs are having their intended effect 
on capital ratios.  
An investigation into current regulatory stress-testing practice reveals that variation in the 
performance between banks is widely disregarded. A simulation experiment suggests that 
viii 
once key stress-testing variables are decomposed from mean values into their empirically 
fitted distributions, the increase in average banking system losses is substantial. Both the 
average and worst performing group of banks suffer a significantly greater magnitude of loss. 
Under a severe stress scenario of a 30 per cent decline in the property index and a 10 per cent 
default rate, failing to decompose the mean results in an underestimation of average bank 
losses of 1.86 per cent of total assets. The worst performing group of banks have losses 
underestimated by a total of 2.32 per cent of total assets, a substantial amount of loss with 
significant implications for current regulatory stress-testing practice. 
This thesis provides insights into the credit risk management practices of a banking sector 
which, in recent times, has outperformed global counterparts. The final implication of the 
findings of this thesis is relevant for all authorities with vested interest in the resilience of 
worldwide banking systems. For proper management of credit risk, regulatory provisioning, 
regulatory capital and regulatory stress-testing cannot be assessed in isolation, a simultaneous 
assessment is essential. This thesis provides an essential step in promoting a greater 
awareness of the interrelations between these three components in the Australian banking 
system. 
  
ix 
Table of Contents 
Statement of Originality i 
Acknowledgements ii 
List of Acronyms iv 
Abstract vii 
Table of Contents ix 
List of Figures xii 
List of Tables xiv 
Chapter 1 – Introduction 1 
1.1. Objectives of this Thesis 5 
1.2. Structure of this Thesis 7 
Chapter 2 – Introduction to the Banking Sector and Regulation 9 
2.1. The Economic Role of Banks 9 
2.2. Rationale for Regulation of Banks 13 
Chapter 3 – ‘Expected Loss’: The Provisioning Framework 21 
3.1. Bank Loan-Loss Provisioning 21 
3.2. Distinguishing Regulatory and Accounting Provisioning 22 
3.3. Reconciling Australian Bank Accounting and Regulatory Provisioning 24 
3.4. Literature Review: Obstacles to Adequate Provisioning Practice 25 
Chapter 4 – ‘Unexpected Loss’: Economic and Regulatory Capital 41 
4.1. Regulating the Australian Banking Sector 42 
4.2. The Basel Capital Framework 44 
4.3. The Basel II IRB Framework 47 
4.4. Implementation of Basel II in Australia 50 
x 
4.5. Literature Review: Determinants of Bank Capital Ratios 53 
4.6. Literature Review: Summary of Criticisms of the Regulatory Capital Framework 59 
4.7. Basel III Framework Overview 65 
Chapter 5 – ‘Intolerable Loss’: Regulatory Stress-Testing 67 
5.1. Typical Stress-Testing Design 68 
5.2. Current Stress-Testing Practice 69 
5.3. Stress-Testing in APRA 75 
5.4. Limitations of Current Stress-Testing Practice 78 
Chapter 6 – Effect of new Basel capital requirements on the loan-loss provisioning 
practices of Australian banks 81 
6.1. Introduction 81 
6.2. Regulatory Treatment of Provisions 84 
6.3. Data and Sample Selection 86 
6.4. Hypothesis Development 89 
6.5. Descriptive Statistics 98 
6.6. Methodology 107 
6.7. Results 111 
6.8. Conclusion 123 
Chapter 6 Appendix 125 
Chapter 7 – The Behaviour and Determinants of Australian  Bank Capital Buffers 127 
7.1. Introduction and Motivations 127 
7.2. Evolution of Regulatory Capital Ratios in Australia 132 
7.3 Methodology and Variable Definitions 136 
7.4. Variable Definitions and Hypothesis Development 138 
7.5. Data and Descriptive Analysis 148 
xi 
7.6. Empirical Model Estimation 152 
7.7. Econometric Issues and Estimation Framework 154 
7.8. Empirical Results 156 
7.9. Conclusion 166 
Chapter 7 Appendix 168 
Chapter 8 – Stress-Testing Bank Residential Mortgage Portfolios by Decomposing the 
Mean 169 
8.1. Introduction 169 
8.1. Residential Mortgages Exposure and the Australian Banking System 172 
8.2. Decomposing the Mean 173 
8.3. Methodology: Simulating the Effect of Decomposing the Mean 185 
8.4. Simulation Results 189 
8.5. Discussion and Conclusion 210 
Chapter 8 Appendix 215 
Chapter 9 – Conclusion 217 
References 221 
  
xii 
List of Figures 
Figure 1.1: Bank Credit Loss Distribution 2 
Figure 3.1: EL and Provisioning in the Credit Risk Loss Distribution 21 
Figure 3.2: AIFRS and Regulatory Reporting of Provisions 23 
Figure 4.1: UL and Regulatory Capital in the Credit Risk Loss Distribution 41 
Figure 5.1: Intolerable loss and Stress-Testing in the Credit Risk Loss Distribution 67 
Figure 5.2: Typical Stress-Testing Design 68 
Figure 6.1: IRB banks: Regulatory loan-loss provisions by type 99 
Figure 6.2: Standardised banks: Regulatory loan-loss provisions by type 100 
Figure 6.3: IRB banks: Relation between provisions and bank capital ratios 101 
Figure 6.4: Standardised banks: Relation between provisions and bank capital ratios 102 
Figure 6.5: Eligible provisions of IRB banks under Basel II 103 
Figure 6.6: Relation between IRB-eligible provisions and bank capital ratios 104 
Figure 7.1: GDP growth and the aggregate risk-based capital adequacy ratio 135 
Figure 8.1: Losses at 30% Property Value Decline 174 
Figure 8.2: Portfolio Losses at 30% Property Value Decline 174 
Figure 8.3: Portfolio Loss Function 175 
Figure 8.4: Stress of 30% Fall in Property Index 176 
Figure 8.5: Portfolio Losses – Decomposing the mean LVR 177 
Figure 8.6: Portfolio Losses – Decomposing the Property Index 179 
Figure 8.7: Decomposing the Index 179 
Figure 8.8: Australian Bank Quarterly Average Credit Losses 183 
Figure 8.9: Quarterly Average Bad Debts Expense 184 
Figure 8.10: Simulation Design 188 
xiii 
Figure 8.11: Portfolio Loss Function: Deterministic LVR = 63% 190 
Figure 8.12: Line of Failure: Deterministic LVR = 63% 191 
Figure 8.13: Portfolio Loss Function: Decomposed LVR 192 
Figure 8.14: Line of Failure: Decomposed LVR 193 
Figure 8.15 - 1: Default Rate Histogram: Decomposed Default Rate 195 
Figure 8.15 - 2: Loss Histogram: Decomposed Default Rate 195 
Figure 8.16: Portfolio Loss Function: Decomposed Default Rate 196 
Figure 8.17: Line of Failure: Decomposed Default Rate 197 
Figure 8.18: Observed Yearly House Price Returns: Fitted Distributions 200 
Figure 8.19: Loss Histogram: Decomposed Property Index 201 
Figure 8.20: Portfolio Loss Function: Fitted Property Distribution 202 
Figure 8.21: Line of Failure: Fitted Property Distribution 203 
Figure 8.22: Loss Histogram: Added Default Discount 206 
Figure 8.23: Portfolio Loss Function: Fitted Property Distribution with Default Discount 206 
Figure 8.24: Line of Failure: Fitted Property Distribution with Default Discount 207 
Figure 8.25: Loss Histogram: Added Interaction PD-LVR 208 
Figure 8.26: Portfolio Loss Function: Added PD-LVR Interaction 209 
Figure 8.27: Line of Failure: Added PD-LVR Interaction 210 
Figure 8.28: Simulation Results for Decomposing the Mean 212 
Figure 8.A1: Average House Price Returns by Statistical Division (SD) 216 
Figure 8.A2: Average House Price Returns by Statistical Sub-Division (SSD) 216 
  
xiv 
List of Tables 
Table 6.1: Effect of a $1 change in Provisions on Regulatory Capital 91 
Table 6.2: Descriptive statistics for sample bank-observations 105 
Table 6.3: Pearson correlation coefficients for key variables 106 
Table 6.4: The effect of bank capital ratios on bank provisioning practices 112 
Table 6.5: The effect of bank capital ratios on the loan-loss provisioning practices of 
standardised banks, Tobit regression analysis 115 
Table 6.6: The effect of the revised Basel capital framework on the loan-loss  
provisioning practices of IRB banks, Tobit regression analysis 117 
Table 6.7: The effect of bank capital ratios on eligible provisions under the IRB  
approach, Tobit regression analysis 119 
Table 6.8: The effect of IRB-bank capital ratios on eligible provisions after the bank 
estimates expected losses, Tobit regression analysis 121 
Table 6.A: Descriptive statistics for segmented sample bank-observations 125 
Table 7.1: Variable Definitions and Expected Sign 147 
Table 7.2: Descriptive statistics for sample bank-observations 149 
Table 7.3: Pearson correlation coefficients for key variables 151 
Table 7.4: Speed of adjustment to Targeted Capital Buffer for Australian Banks 156 
Table 7.5: The determinants of total capital buffers for  Australian authorised  
deposit-taking institutions (ADIs), GMM analysis 158 
Table 7.6: The determinants of tier 1 capital buffers for  Australian authorised  
deposit-taking institutions (ADIs), GMM analysis 161 
Table 7.7: The effect of bank-specific regulatory capital requirements on Australian  
bank total capital ratios, GMM analysis 164 
xv 
Table 7.A: The determinants of capital buffers for Australian authorised deposit-taking 
institutions (ADIs), fixed-effects panel regression analysis 168 
Table 8.1: Distribution of Bank Credit Losses (Sept 2003 - March 2012) 181 
Table 8.2: Distribution of Quarterly Average Bank Credit Losses (2003 - 2012) 183 
Table 8.3: Descriptive Statistics for Australian Property Price Returns 198 
Table 8.4: Australian Property Price Returns (Sep 2010 - Sep 2011) 199 
Table 8.5: Default Discount in Australia 204 
Table 8.6: Simulation Results for Regulatory Stress-Testing after Decomposing  
the Mean 212 
Table 8.A: Australian Property Price Returns by Geographical Division 215 
 
 
  
1 
CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
Banks provide a vital function within the economy through a process of asset transformation 
which provides efficiencies in the allocation of scarce resources. They invest in risky and 
illiquid loans and finance them with riskless and liquid deposits (Diamond, 1984; 
Ramakrishnan and Thakor, 1994). In doing so, they expose themselves to a number of risks, 
most notably ‘credit risk’ and ‘liquidity risk’. Left unregulated, a bank would typically 
choose to hold a positive capital ratio to safeguard against risks to solvency. From an 
economic point of view, such a capital ratio will depart from that which is socially optimal1. 
Capital regulation can be viewed as the means to correct this market failure, properly aligning 
banks’ capital ratios to a level that is socially desirable.  
Whilst banks face a number of risks, the major cause of serious banking problems continues 
to be “lax credit standards for borrowers and counterparties, poor portfolio risk 
management... [and] lack of attention to changes in economic or other circumstances that can 
lead to a deterioration in the credit standing of a bank’s counterparties” (BCBS, 2000, p.1). In 
many ways, the recent 2008 financial crisis and the ongoing European sovereign debt crisis 
have provided striking examples of how severe and far reaching such a mismanagement of 
bank credit risk and overall banking sector undercapitalisation can be. 
This thesis is concerned with the credit risk management practice of Australian banks’ loan 
portfolios from a regulatory perspective. This thesis aims to provide insight for bank 
supervisors and contribute to past literature which examines bank and regulatory practices to 
                                                 
1 This is in part because banks do not account for negative externalities and systemic effects on the wider 
economy when determining the level of economic capital to guard against the risk of solvency. 
2 
account for credit risk in the banking book. The issues examined are predominantly focused 
on regulatory provisioning, regulatory capital and regulatory stress-testing of the banking 
system. Together these three components can be considered a regulatory safeguard against 
banking sector credit loss, and the potential negative externalities that large banking sector 
credit losses can have on taxpayers and the wider economy. The primary objective of this 
thesis is to provide an overall examination of these three safeguards, not only as isolated 
components, but in the way they coordinate to manage credit risk.  
Figure 1.1: Bank Credit Loss Distribution 
The starting point for a discussion of credit risk in the banking book is the credit loss 
distribution presented in Figure 1.1. This figure is the best representation of the connection 
between banks’ portfolio credit loss uncertainty and the practices used to manage such 
uncertainty from both bank and regulatory perspectives. The curve illustrates bank credit loss 
outcomes and the corresponding probabilities of occurrence. The shape of the curve is not 
symmetric2, such that extreme credit losses illustrated in the long tail of the distribution hold 
                                                 
2 The shape of the credit loss distribution is known to be non-normal with long tails. In modelling these 
distributions, credit portfolio managers focus on these areas in the tail of the distribution since small errors in the 
3 
a small but still positive probability of occurrence. Past financial crises have demonstrated 
that the banking sector is particularly exposed to potential realisations of large credit losses, 
known as tail losses. It is thus understandable that tail losses are the focus of bank risk 
management, banking sector regulation and a considerable degree of past credit risk 
literature. Figure 1.1 distinguishes three types of bank credit losses relevant to the issues 
explored in this thesis: ‘expected losses’ (EL), ‘unexpected losses’ (UL) and ‘intolerable 
losses’ (IL). 
Expected loss is the mean of the credit loss distribution. Since the distribution is not 
symmetric, the mean of the distribution is to the right of the peak, rather than the centre of the 
distribution. Expected loss is not regarded as a risk, but a cost of doing business (Smithson, 
2003). The price of a bank loan must cover its expected loss, or the transaction is considered 
too costly to the bank. This is usually conducted at the loan portfolio level, with banks pricing 
loans based on the expectation (calculated historically or otherwise) that a certain percentage 
of loans will default and result in an expected loss. Expected losses are covered by loan loss 
reserves3. To ensure Australian banks adequately account for expected losses, APRA requires 
that banks maintain eligible provisions4 to a level consistent with expected losses, or a capital 
charge is enforced5.  
Unexpected loss is referred to by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) as 
“the risk against which economic capital is allocated ... defined as the volatility of earnings 
                                                                                                                                                        
tail have a large impact. The credit loss distribution presented in Figure 1.1 can be thought of as the output of a 
credit portfolio model such as: Moody’s KMV Portfolio Manager and RiskMetrics Group’s CreditManager. 
3 Loan-loss reserves are created through loan-loss provisions. 
4 Total eligible provisions include all credit related provisions (i.e. specific provisions and the general reserve 
for credit loss), partial write-offs and any discounts on defaulted assets. 
5 This is one of the motivations for an investigation of Australian bank loan-loss provisioning in Chapter 3, and 
an empirical study of Australian bank loan-loss provisioning in regards to capital management in Chapter 5. 
4 
and value – the degree of fluctuation away from an expected level” (Smithson, 2003, p.9). 
Unexpected loss is not considered to be a cost of doing business like expected loss. Instead, 
unexpected loss represents a risk to the bank for being engaged in the business of banking. 
Banks hold economic capital to reduce the threat to solvency from unexpected losses. The 
amount of economic capital that is held depends on the bank’s target insolvency rate. As 
mentioned, if banks are left to their own devices, they will typically hold capital levels below 
that which is socially optimal. Capital regulation is imposed to properly align banks’ capital 
ratios with that which is socially desirable. To do so, APRA requires banks to abide by risk-
based capital regulation in line with the current evolution of harmonised capital standards 
developed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). 
Intolerable losses represent extreme losses that, despite being unlikely to occur, are very 
much within the realm of plausibility. Such losses are illustrated in Figure 1.1 as those in 
excess of UL for which a probability of occurrence still exists. A realisation of an intolerable 
loss would present a serious threat to bank solvency. It may be too costly for a bank to hold 
capital against the risk of intolerable losses, so a bank must settle on a defined level of 
tolerance, or targeted insolvency rate. Where a bank does hold excess capital, such a capital 
buffer reduces the risk of intolerable losses. Impetus from the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and World Bank designed to reduce the impact and severity of such intolerable 
banking system losses has led to the implementation of BCBS principles requiring banks to 
have in place sound stress-testing practices to assess resilience in the banking system to 
possible adverse economic developments. Regulatory stress-testing is designed to ensure the 
banking system has sufficient capital to withstand a severe yet plausible shock to 
macroeconomic conditions. In Australia, regulatory stress-testing is conducted using a 
macroeconomic scenario developed by the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) in coordination 
with the supervisory assessment of APRA. 
5 
From a regulatory vantage point, what Figure 1.1 makes clear is that the effectiveness of 
regulatory capital to adequately account for unexpected losses rests on the sufficiency of 
loan-loss reserves to account for expected losses. Similarly, the effectiveness of stress-testing 
to adequately assess exposure to intolerable loss in the banking sector is reliant on the 
sufficiency of regulatory capital and loan-loss reserves together to account for expected and 
unexpected losses. This concept provides the underlying motivation for the focus of this 
thesis in providing an examination of credit risk management from a regulatory perspective 
in Australia. The remainder of this introductory chapter details the objectives of this thesis 
and outlines the structure of this thesis.  
1.1. Objectives of this Thesis 
This primary aim of this thesis is to examine Australian bank credit risk management 
practices and provide insightful research that contributes to an enhanced assessment of the 
adequacy of banks’ regulatory loan-loss provisioning, regulatory capital, and overall 
regulatory stress-testing to properly account for credit risk in the banking book. This primary 
aim is based on a regulatory perspective. To accomplish this primary aim, this thesis follows 
three objectives. 
The first objective of this thesis is an examination of the supporting role of regulatory loan-
loss provisioning in accounting for banks’ expected losses, and providing support for 
regulatory capital requirements in the Australian banking sector. Particular emphasis is given 
to a finding in past literature that bank managers have used provisioning for capital 
management incentives (Moyer, 1990; Beatty et al. 1995; Anandarajan, Hasan and 
McCarthy, 2007). Past research has examined whether the inclusion of loan-loss provisions 
as Tier 2 regulatory capital has resulted in provisioning being used to manage banks’ capital 
ratios. This thesis aims to extend this research to the Australian banking sector, which has not 
6 
been studied in this way previously, and provide one of the first empirical investigations to 
focus on regulatory provisioning instead of the widely used accounting provisions. In 
addition, this thesis provides one of the first empirical examinations of bank loan-loss 
provisioning under the enhanced Basel II framework. Particular emphasis is placed on an 
investigation of banks reporting under the internal ratings based (IRB) approach to Basel II.  
The second objective of this thesis is to empirically examine the regulatory capital ratios of 
Australian banks. In doing so, this thesis focuses on whether Australian banks target a level 
of regulatory capital above minimum capital requirements, investigates the determinants of 
Australian bank capital buffers, and determines whether the behaviour of bank capital buffers 
is procyclical, with potential amplified effects on the economic cycle. An additional focus is 
placed on investigating the degree of influence individual bank-specific capital requirements 
have on banks’ regulatory capital ratios. This thesis builds on past literature that has 
examined optimal bank capital structure, capital buffer determinants and procyclicality in 
bank capital ratios. This thesis is the first to extend such literature to the Australian banking 
sector, providing interesting insights for a domestic banking sector that fared remarkably well 
during recent global financial turmoil.  
Finally, the third objective of this thesis is to examine current practices in the stress-testing of 
the banking system by regulatory authorities and propose a framework for ‘decomposing the 
mean’ of key inputs to regulatory stress-testing. This thesis argues that the majority of current 
regulatory stress-testing practice neglects the crucial dimension of variation in the 
performance between banks. It is unrealistic to assume all banks suffer an identical default 
rate, or the same fall in collateral value during times of stress. Instead, differing risk appetite 
and strategies cause each bank to suffer unique loss reactions. Regulatory stress-tests seldom 
result in bank failures, yet banks do fail and this thesis proposes a possible explanation by 
7 
focusing on Australian banks’ residential mortgage portfolios. Instead of relying on mean 
estimates for portfolio default rate, LVR and underlying property values, this paper 
‘decomposes the mean’, providing a more realistic setting by allowing for variation between 
banks.  
The intention of this thesis is to consider these three objectives not only in isolation, but also 
the way in which they collectively fulfill the primary aim of examining Australian bank credit 
risk management practices. The next section provides a summary of the structure of this 
thesis. 
1.2. Structure of this Thesis 
This section details the structure for the remainder of this thesis. Chapter 2 provides an 
introduction to the banking sector, the theoretical basis for the role and importance of banks 
to the economy, and the rationale for regulating the banking sector. The chapter concludes 
with a section describing the history and structure of the Australian banking sector.  
Chapter 3 summarises the concept of expected loss and the accounting and regulatory 
provisioning framework in Australia. It provides a summary of previous literature, examining 
the use of bank loan-loss provisioning for alternative incentives, such as: earnings, capital 
and signal management. A summary of such literature sets the stage for an empirical study 
conducted in Chapter 6 regarding whether Australian bank regulatory loan-loss provisioning 
is adequate in the context of current Australian regulatory requirements and capital 
management incentives.  
Chapter 4 examines the concept of banks’ unexpected losses and the evolution of the 
regulatory capital framework for credit risk in the Australia banking sector. Relevant past 
literature is summarised, examining banks optimal capital ratios and the determinants of bank 
8 
capital buffers as well as past research relating to the potential for procyclicality in bank 
capital buffers. Such literature provides the basis for an empirical investigation included in 
Chapter 7 which examines the behaviour and determinants of bank capital buffers in 
Australia and their adequacy in accounting for unexpected credit losses. 
Chapter 5 summarises the concept of intolerable loss and the current practice of APRA and 
other authorities in their approach to regulatory stress-testing in the banking sector. In 
addition, the chapter summarises the relevant academic literature that has contributed to 
enhancements in regulatory stress-testing practice. Finally, an examination of the limitations 
of current stress-testing practice is detailed, providing a basis for a simulation analysis in 
Chapter 8 which proposes a framework for ‘decomposing the mean’ of key inputs to 
regulatory stress-testing. 
Finally, Chapter 9 provides a conclusion and suggestions for future research.  
9 
CHAPTER 2 
Introduction to the Banking Sector and Regulation 
In this chapter an introduction to the banking system is presented in the form of a summary of 
past literature which provides a rationale for the importance of banks in the economy and the 
need for regulation in the banking sector. This introductory chapter is included in this thesis 
because it provides an important literary basis for the ‘regulatory perspective’ of banking 
sector credit risk management, a perspective that is adopted throughout this thesis. The 
chapter concludes with a description of the history and structure of the Australian banking 
sector, providing the institutional basis for the research conducted in this thesis. 
2.1. The Economic Role of Banks 
The widely accepted operational definition of a bank, particularly from a regulatory 
viewpoint is “an institution whose current operations consist in granting loans and receiving 
deposits from the public” (Freixas and Rochet, 2008). Merton (1993) explains that “A well 
developed smoothly functioning financial system facilitates the efficient life-cycle allocation 
of household consumption and the efficient allocation of physical capital to its most 
productive use in the business sector”. Banks provide a number of roles within the economy. 
They offer liquidity and payment services and provide maturity transformation. However it is 
their role in solving informational problems and mitigating market failure that forms the main 
argument in favour of bank-based systems. 
Firstly, banks resolve a lender-borrower problem based on the non-transferability of 
entrepreneurial skill. To illustrate this point, consider a situation where an investor must 
decide whether to fund an entrepreneur. The entrepreneur desires funding for a project which 
will provide greater future consumption. Diamond and Rajan (2001) argue that the investor is 
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faced with a problem. Since entrepreneurial skill is non-transferable, the project is illiquid. 
Such illiquidity means the entrepreneur’s assets cannot be borrowed against or sold for the 
full value of resources they will generate in their best use. The entrepreneur’s skills are 
necessary for attainment of the potential ‘full value’ of the project. Someone who learns of a 
good alternative use for the entrepreneur’s assets can lend more because they can use the 
threat to put the assets to alternative use to collect more from the entrepreneur.  
Diamond and Rajan (2001) argue such a ‘skilled lender’ is a bank. But the problem reoccurs. 
Potential lenders to the bank do not have the banker’s skill (which again is non-transferable). 
In this way, the banker’s assets (the loans to projects) are illiquid. The problem is solved by 
‘demandable deposits’. By promising depositors a fixed return and allowing them to 
withdraw their funding (demandable), illiquidity is reduced. In this way, the banker reduces 
illiquidity through a combination of his collection skills and demandable deposits. However, 
this also leaves banks exposed to the possibility that depositors withdraw their money early in 
the event of a mismatch between economy-wide production of resources and the demands of 
depositors.  
Secondly, banks are able to mitigate the information problem between investors and 
borrowers by monitoring and ensuring proper use of the depositors’ funds. This problem 
arises because lenders are unable to observe the borrower’s actions without some 
‘informational’ cost. If this cost is fixed, a free-rider problem results. Each lender would like 
to free-ride, leaving it to someone else to bear the cost of monitoring. As a result, no-one 
monitors. Diamond (1984) shows an intermediatory such as a bank is able to resolve the free-
rider problem. A bank holds a diversified portfolio of projects and commits to monitoring 
borrowers by promising its lenders a fixed return. In this way, the bank holds the incentive to 
monitor its borrowers; if it does not it will be unable to pay the promised return to lenders. 
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Also, a borrower might be prepared to reveal proprietary information to its bank that it would 
be reluctant to reveal to financial markets (Bhattacharya and Chiesa, 1995). Diamond’s 
model shows how banks hold an incentive to act as a delegated monitor and mitigate the 
information problem between investors and borrowers, allowing for a more efficient 
allocation of resources. 
Thirdly, banks are able to accommodate risk sharing by inter-temporal smoothing (Allen and 
Gale, 1995; 1997). Standard financial theory proposes one purpose of financial markets is to 
improve risk sharing. However, empirical studies have shown that despite developed 
financial markets in the US and UK, households are exposed to much more risk than in Japan 
and the Euro area, where households have a majority of their assets in banks and very little in 
financial markets (Allen and Carletti, 2008). Allen and Gale (1997; 2000; 2008) provide an 
explanation for these empirical results. Financial markets are limited in their ability to hedge 
non-diversifiable risk. Portfolio diversification is unable to eliminate macroeconomic shocks 
that affect all assets in a similar way. However, the authors argue these risks can be averaged 
over time to limit their impact on individual welfare through inter-temporal smoothing by 
banks. Banks build up reserves when returns on the banks’ assets are high and run them down 
when they are low. In this way, banks are able to pay a constant amount each period whilst 
imposing very little risk on depositors.  
A fourth important role of banks is in their ability to spur growth. There is a debate in the 
literature as to the relative effectiveness of banks compared to financial markets in this 
respect. Tadesse (2002) finds bank-based systems outperform market-based systems for 
undeveloped financial sectors, but for developed financial sectors, market-based systems 
outperform bank-based systems. Levine and Zeros (1998) provide evidence that financial 
markets and banks are best utilised together. They find higher stock market liquidity or bank 
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development leads to higher growth, regardless of the corresponding level of development of 
the other. Whilst evidence is inconclusive as to the effectiveness of banks and financial 
markets, it is clear that banks have an important role in channelling investment from 
households to efficient projects of entrepreneurs, businesses and to the overall real economy.  
A distinctive feature of bank lending is the close borrower-lender relationship. It has been 
argued that such close relationships help mitigate the information asymmetries that have 
plagued the ‘arms-length’ arrangements in market transactions. A borrower may reveal 
proprietary information to its bank (Bhattacharya and Chiesa, 1995). However it is worth 
noting that this can lead to a ‘hold-up’ problem. This refers to an instance where the bank 
seeks to profit from its relationship privileges by extracting rents from lenders. This has the 
potential to distort entrepreneurial incentives and causes inefficient investment choices 
(Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992; Von Thadden, 1995; Boot, 2000). The threat of being 
‘informationally captured’ (Boot and Thakor, 2008) may dampen loan demand. Ongena and 
Smith (2000) show that multiple competing banks will reduce hold-up problems, however it 
comes at a cost as availability of credit is worsened (Thakor, 1996).  
In the literature, bank intermediation and lending is often contrasted with financial market 
operations and funding. Whilst the literature is far from an agreement over which is 
preferable, it is clear that comparative advantages do exist for the banking sector. Banks are 
considered better at resolving informational problems than markets, they have an important 
role in transforming the risk and liquidity of assets, banks are able to adjust reserves to 
smooth inter-temporal risk, they are pertinent in spurring economic growth and there is 
thought to be advantages in the close proximity of banks’ borrower-lender relationship. 
However, whilst banks are considered to have an essential role in the economy, their 
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operations expose them to a number of risks, particularly ‘credit risk’ and ‘liquidity risk’. The 
following section discusses the rationale for regulation of the banking sector. 
2.2. Rationale for Regulation of Banks 
As explained in the previous section, banks are particularly suited to solving informational 
problems that can result in market failure. Banks are able to make private loans that help 
avoid the free-rider problem. However, this solution creates another asymmetric information 
problem because depositors have little information regarding the quality of banks loans. Such 
asymmetric information is the basis for panics and bank runs, where depositors rush to 
withdraw funds at the hint of distress, the result of which has harmful effects on banks and 
the overall economy.  
Allen and Carletti (2008) explain ‘bank runs’ can involve the withdrawal of funds by 
depositors (retail runs) or the drying up of liquidity in the short term capital market 
(wholesale runs). They can originate spontaneously in a panic resulting from ‘mob 
psychology’ (Kindleberger, 1978) or may arise from fundamental causes that are part of the 
business cycle. The ‘panics view’ is that crises are random events. The seminal papers of 
Bryant (1980) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983) show that bank runs are self-fulfilling 
prophecies. If depositors believe no crisis or panic will occur, only those with genuine 
liquidity needs will withdraw funds. However, if depositors believe a crisis will occur then it 
becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy based on the assumptions of first-come, first-served 
deposit withdrawal and the costly liquidation of bank assets. If depositors believe a crisis is 
imminent, they will rush to withdraw funds to avoid being last in line.  
The BCBS has promoted an international framework for liquidity risk measurement, 
standards and monitoring under Basel III, implementing a Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) 
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and a Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR). These developments have the objective of 
promoting short-term resilience of banks’ liquidity risk profile, ensuring they have sufficient 
high quality liquidity assets to survive a significant stress scenario of one month, and 
secondly have the objective of promoting resilience over a longer time horizon with increased 
incentives for banks to fund their activities with more stable funding on an ongoing basis. In 
addition, deposit insurance in the form of government guarantees have been used in many 
jurisdictions to prevent bank run and liquidity shocks. Whilst bank runs are considered to be 
liquidity events, they are often initially sparked by credit events, or at least the perception of 
an imminent credit event. Whilst this thesis is predominantly concerned with the management 
of credit risk in the banking book, different types of bank risk are inextricably linked, making 
other risks hard to ignore. 
The starting point for this discussion is ‘optimal capital structure’. The seminal result of 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) showed that under an assumption of perfect markets, the 
financing choice between debt and equity has no effect on firm value. This assumption of 
perfect markets, however, is unrealistic. In reality, taxes and bankruptcy are two important 
deviations from a frictionless world. Debt provides a tax shield as interest paid to lenders is a 
tax-deductible expense. However, high levels of debt are associated with an increased 
probability of default, and correspondingly, an increased probability of costs of financial 
distress and bankruptcy. In this situation, optimal capital structure will consist of firm 
borrowings up to the point where marginal benefits from the tax shield equate to the marginal 
expected costs of financial distress.  
In the case of a bank, Bichsel and Blum (2005) point out the attractiveness of bank debt. 
They explain firstly that a significant share of banks’ debt consists of demandable deposits 
and other very short-term liabilities. Depositors value the high liquidity of their claims and so 
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are willing to accept a lower interest rate than they could receive by investing in a less liquid 
asset. This makes banks’ marginal costs of debt much lower than that of other firms. 
Secondly, as explained above, deposit insurance and government guarantees give depositors 
an extensive safety net. Bank debt is perceived to be relatively safe and disconnected from 
the actual risks of the bank. Whilst this has the benefit of reducing the potential for panics 
and bank runs, it also contributes to banks’ preference for higher debt. Despite holding such 
high levels of debt, banks typically have very low capital ratios6, an observation supporting 
the imposition of capital regulation. 
Arguments against capital regulation still remain; Calomiris and Kahn (1991) argue the threat 
of bank-runs should discipline bank managers enough to keep them honest. A diversion of 
bank resources to manager consumption can increase the likelihood of a bank-run. In a 
similar result, Diamond and Rajan (2001) argue that the threat of a bank-run makes banks 
fragile. Such fragility is argued to be essential in inducing banks to create liquidity. They 
conclude that high capital requirements inhibit a banks’ fundamental role in liquidity 
creation.  
In complicating the issue further, there is interplay between banks and financial markets. In 
the theoretical world of Diamond and Dybvig (1983), demandable deposits are modelled as 
‘liquidity insurance’ contracts for risk-averse depositors. But, Von Thadden (1998) shows 
that the existence of financial markets limits the degree of this ‘liquidity insurance’. 
Depositors can withdraw their funds early and invest in the financial market. With 
increasingly developed financial markets, Boot and Thakor (2009) argue that well developed 
capital markets and interbank markets may diminish the need for Central Banks to provide 
                                                 
6 Banks typically have capital ratios well below 15%. In comparison, listed companies typically have capital 
ratios between 30 and 40 percent. 
16 
liquidity as a lender of last resort (LOLR). In the event of a liquidity squeeze, informed 
parties in the repo and interbank market would step in and prevent insolvency.  
The literature suggests two tentative conclusions. First, risk-sharing has improved as a result 
of financial market development, probably decreasing the likelihood of a run on any 
individual bank. Second, since such risk-sharing has resulted from a greater degree of 
integration between banks and markets, increased systemic risk may be a side effect. Both 
conclusions favour greater capital regulation. If fear of bank runs had ever self-regulated 
banks, it is probably less effective now. The interconnectedness between banks and other 
financial intermediaries is at an all-time high, with individual bank solvency and liquidity 
concerns propagating through the banking sector at a rapid pace7.  
When unregulated, banks may voluntarily choose positive capital ratios, but these will always 
fall short of socially optimal and economically desirable levels. In the absence of capital 
requirements, they will never properly account for ‘negative externalities’ and the costs 
imposed on the wider economy if bankruptcy were to occur. These costs can be particularly 
severe: disruptions in the payments system, general loss of confidence in the banking system, 
reduction of credit and thus negative effects on economic growth and contagious effects on 
other banks. Since bank managers are protected by limited liability, they will neglect these 
costs of insolvency, and will understate capital relative to socially optimal levels (John, John 
and Senbet, 1991)8. 
                                                 
7 The recent global financial crisis and ongoing European sovereign debt crisis has perhaps been the best 
evidence to date of severe contagion and systematic risk that exists in the banking sector. 
8 In fact, as argued by John, John and Senbet (1991), deposit insurance represents a put which the bank has 
purchased from the government. It pays for the bank to increase its riskiness, increasing the value of this put. 
Ronn and Verma (1986) have argued riskier banks are able to attract deposits only at higher interest rates, in the 
absence of deposit insurance. This can be considered a form of built-in regulation. However, in the scenario 
with deposit insurance, the bank has purchased the same put option from depositors in the form of limited 
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Similarly, underpriced deposit insurance and government guarantees that make debt cheaper 
for banks than other sectors provides perverse incentives. The cost of debt is not only borne 
by the bank, but it is shared by the government guarantee and so ultimately the taxpayer. This 
gives banks a tendency to borrow more than is socially optimal. If banks select capital 
structures that depart from socially optimal levels, this is considered a market failure. Capital 
regulation is viewed as an intervention to correct this market failure9. The next section 
presents a background for the history and structure of the Australian banking system. 
2.3. History and Structure of the Australian Banking System  
The Australian banking sector is dominated by four major banks: Australia and New Zealand 
Banking Group (ANZ), Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA), National Australia Bank 
(NAB) and Westpac Banking Corporation (WBC). Together they make up almost 80 per cent 
of total banking sector assets10. In addition to the major banks, there are nine other domestic 
banks holding almost 9 per cent of assets. These other Australian-owned banks are sometimes 
referred to as ‘regionals’, reflecting their original focus on retail banking in a specific 
geographic area. Nine foreign-owned subsidiary banks make up 3 per cent of assets and 
thirty-nine branches of foreign banks make up the remaining 8 per cent of banking sector 
assets. For most of the 1990s foreign banks concentrated on wholesale business, but have 
since built up sizable retail businesses (ING, Citibank and HSBC).  
                                                                                                                                                        
liability protection. In a similar way, banks have an incentive to increase the riskiness of their assets to 
maximise the value of this put. 
9 There are other ways to influence bank portfolio risk: investment restrictions, liquidity requirements, interest 
rate ceilings, to name a few (Bichsel and Blum, 2005 pp. 45), see Freixas and Rochet (1997) for a more 
comprehensive discussion. 
10 As of the end of the December quarter, 2011 
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Over the past three decades the Australian financial system has undergone significant change. 
During the late 1970s and early 1980s banks lost market share to less heavily regulated 
institutions. Financial institutions such as trading banks, savings banks, state banks, trust 
banks and building societies were subject to carefully defined legislation. At the time, non-
bank financial institutions subject to less stringent regulation started to move into traditional 
bank business (Hess et al., 2009), and these non-bank financial institutions were able to 
attract depositor funding by offering higher interest rates compared with banks.  This trend 
eventually gave impetus to a move to deregulate (Edey and Gray, 1996). The Campbell 
Inquiry (1981) triggered a period of financial deregulation and the removal of barriers to 
entry for foreign banks. In response, the trends in market share were reversed and the system 
became open to much greater competition.  
The desire of some institutions to grow rapidly took place at a time when asset prices 
(particularly commercial property prices) were increasing quickly (Davis, 2004). As a result, 
large losses and lost public confidence resulted in a banking system crisis that was sufficient 
to result in the failure of the State Banks of Victoria and South Australia11. In the wake of the 
large losses of the early 1990s, the Australian banking market became concentrated, with the 
emergence of the four leading banking groups (ANZ, CBA, NAB and WBC). Between 1991 
and 1995, the share of business loans in bank total lending fell by 15 percent, whilst the share 
of housing lending rose by 16 per cent. Over the 1990s and 2000s, this trend has continued.  
In an address by the Assistant Governor of the Reserve Bank of Australia at the Mortgage 
Innovation Conference in Sydney 2010, Guy Debelle explained that three factors contributed 
to a shift in focus from business to housing lending. Firstly, during the early 1990s recession, 
                                                 
11 The State Bank of Victoria and the State Bank of South Australia were outside the regulatory oversight of the 
RBA. A failure of Pyramid Buiding Society resulted in a loss of confidence and in the Building Societies sector 
resulting in many of the larger Building Societies converting to bank status. 
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banks suffered large losses on their business loan portfolio whilst housing loan losses were 
relatively mild. Second, there were demand-side effects; the corporate sector experienced a 
period of deleveraging, and demand for credit declined. Third, the introduction of the Basel 
Accord (1988) saw a change in the risk weighting in favour of housing assets. The risk 
weighting for housing loans (50 per cent) were half that of business loans (100 per cent), 
providing a shift in incentive to housing loans. 
The early 1990s saw the rise of wholesale lenders. With interest rates falling, banks mortgage 
rates declined slowly, increasing spreads. Wholesale lenders entered the market by 
undercutting banks’ mortgage rates and introducing new products. To remain competitive, 
banks reacted by reducing spreads. Wholesale funded housing lenders increased 
competitiveness with the growth of the residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) 
market. This allowed for an alternative source of funding. In addition, the emergence of 
mortgage brokers who act as intermediaries between lenders and borrowers, and the growing 
acceptance of the use of the internet to apply for loans, made it easier for borrowers to 
compare mortgage products. By 2008, wholesale lenders’ share of housing approvals had 
peaked at around 15 per cent. 
The late 1990s and 2000s saw diverse mortgage product innovation. Lenders introduced 
home-equity loans, redraw facilities, reverse mortgages, interest-only loans and shared-equity 
loans. Such innovation arguably resulted in increased risk with an easing in lending 
standards, but had the overarching effect of opening finance to a broader range of the 
household sector. Non-conforming loans for borrowers who did not meet the standard 
lending criteria increased substantially from 0.5 percent to 2 per cent in 2006 (Debelle, 2010). 
The onset of the financial crisis, beginning around the middle of 2007 had a relatively small 
impact on the quantity of housing credit, but did have material impacts on pricing and the 
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structure of the Australian mortgage market. Fortunately, banks’ lending standards did not 
loosen as dramatically as overseas markets prior to 2007. There was very little sub-prime 
lending and the non-conforming loan market never reached more than 2 per cent.  
The reduced liquidity in the Australian Residential Mortgage-Backed Security (RMBS) 
market as a result of developments in international capital markets, led to support from the 
Australian Government through the Australian Office of Financial Management (AOFM) to 
purchase $8 billion in RMBS to support competition by non-ADI lenders, given their reliance 
on secondary markets as a source of funding. The directive was limited to new issues of AAA 
rated securities, unlike similar US-based initiatives (Swan, 2009). 
In addition to the effect on RMBS funding, wholesale and retail funding costs rose relative to 
the cash rate (Debelle, 2010). In response, all institutions raised their mortgage rates relative 
to the cash rate. The pressure on funding combined with the drop-off in the RMBS market 
changed the dynamics of the mortgage market. Wholesale lenders’ market share fell to 2 per 
cent by early 2009, down from around 15 per cent towards the end of 2007. Several larger 
wholesale lenders were acquired by major banks (CBA bought Aussie, Aussie bought 
Wizard, Westpac bought RAMS distribution business, NAB bought Challenger’s mortgage 
business).  
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CHAPTER 3 
‘Expected Loss’: The Provisioning Framework 
Figure 3.1: EL and Provisioning in the Credit Risk Loss Distribution 
This chapter focuses on expected credit losses in a banks’ loan portfolio and the accounting 
and regulatory loan-loss provisioning frameworks in place to ensure banks hold adequate 
reserves to account for such expected losses. This chapter examines the differences between 
accounting and regulatory provisioning in Australia, an important distinction which paves the 
way for an empirical study of regulatory provisioning conducted in Chapter 6. Finally, this 
chapter concludes with a summary of past literature regarding obstacles to adequate 
provisioning practice.  
3.1. Bank Loan-Loss Provisioning 
Defaulting exposures are part of the daily business of banking. In making new loans, a bank 
is faced with the risk borrowers will default and not repay the full amount of the exposure. 
This gives rise to the need for some form of loss protection. History shows that even good 
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customers have the potential to default on their financial obligations. Loan-loss provisioning 
allows banks to create a loss reserve for ‘expected losses’ resulting from defaulted loans. This 
loss reserve should be adequate to account for the distance between O and EL in the credit 
loss distribution presented in Figure 3.1. 
When a loss becomes likely, the bank recognises this loss immediately by making a charge to 
the statement of financial performance (a ‘provision’) creating a loan-loss reserve on the 
statement of financial position. As the principal and interest repayments on the loan become 
uncollectable, the loan is written-off through a charge to the loan-loss reserve. Transparency 
and disclosure of bank provisions provide regulators, stakeholders and financial statement 
users with important information regarding the risk profile and risk management process of a 
bank (Angklomkliew et al, 2009). As already mentioned, loan-loss provisions should be 
adequate to cover the full spectrum of ‘expected’ credit losses if one thinks of provisions as a 
measure of true credit risk (Dugan, 2009).  
3.2. Distinguishing Regulatory and Accounting Provisioning 
There are distinct differences between regulatory and accounting provisions in the Australian 
banking sector, due in large part to a difference in the purpose and role of bank provisioning 
for each setting. Overall, accounting provisioning reflects an ‘incurred loss’ concept, whereas 
regulatory provisioning reflects a broader ‘loss absorbing’ concept. The purpose of 
accounting provisioning is to accurately portray the bank’s current losses to allow for market 
transparency, whilst the purpose of regulatory provisions is to be used as a primary buffer 
against loss, and as an adequate buffer against future losses expected to be incurred over a 
full credit cycle. In addition, regulatory provisions can be included in Tier 2 regulatory 
capital subject to the restrictions and limits prescribed in Australian Prudential Standard 
(APS) 110 and 111 and the associated guidance notes.  
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Australian banks adopted Australian International Financial Reporting Standards (A-IFRS) in 
2005. There are two types of accounting provisions: specific provisions and collective 
provisions. The standards require individually assessed (specific) provisions to be made 
against individually significant impaired assets where there is objective evidence of a loss 
having been incurred. Collective provisions on the other hand are made on groups of 
financial assets. Where the entity finds no objective evidence of impairment for an 
individually assessed financial asset, whether significant or not, the asset is included in a 
group of financial assets with similar credit risk characteristics and ‘collectively assessed’ for 
impairment. The collective impairment process determines losses that have been incurred, but 
not yet identified on an individual basis (Paragraph AG87 of AASB 139). An important 
distinction for accounting provisions is that losses expected as a result of ‘future’ events, no 
matter how likely, are not recognised under the Australian Accounting Standards Board 
(AASB) 139.  
 
Figure 3.2: AIFRS and Regulatory Reporting of Provisions 
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In Australia, regulatory provisioning adopts a broader ‘loss absorbing’ concept. In a sense, 
banks are given greater freedom in reporting regulatory provisions to encourage their use as a 
primary buffer against loss, and an adequate buffer against expected loss over a full credit 
cycle. Regulatory provisions consist of specific provisions and the general reserve for credit 
loss (GRCL). Specific provisions include all A-IFRS individually assessed (specific) 
provisions and the component of A-IFRS collective provisions that are ineligible for GRCL. 
Where a reasonable expectation of loss or impairment, write-down or write-off is anticipated 
in the short term, a regulatory specific provision should be created. For inclusion in GRCL, 
the bank must demonstrate that the collective provision is related to possible losses in a group 
of facilities, and such a loss is expected but not certain. The facility must be meeting 
contractual terms, such that it is not past due more than 90 days to be eligible for inclusion in 
GRCL. In addition, the GRCL is required to include expected losses on new loans, whereas 
IFRS accounting provisions does not permit provisions to be made at the inception of a loan.  
3.3. Reconciling Australian Bank Accounting and Regulatory Provisioning 
A reconciliation of the AIFRS accounting treatment of provisions with APRA’s regulatory 
treatment is shown in Figure 3.2. Specific provisions for accounting purposes reported under 
AIFRS are eligible for inclusion as regulatory specific provisions. Collective provisions that 
are not eligible for inclusion as GRCL are recognised as regulatory specific provisions. The 
remaining collective provisions deemed eligible for inclusion in GRCL represent provisions 
held for future, rather than known, credit losses. Any additional amounts of regulatory 
provisions must be reported as a reserve against retained earnings. 
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3.4. Literature Review: Obstacles to Adequate Provisioning Practice 
The following gives a brief overview of the general themes and concerns in the academic 
literature and regulatory environment about factors that undermine adequate provisioning 
practice. The discussion is from a regulatory provisioning perspective, such that provisions 
should be adequate to proxy for a bank’s current and future expected losses. Under both the 
accounting and regulatory treatment, managers must exercise a significant level of discretion 
in setting loan-loss provisions. Past literature has identified four obstacles to adequate bank 
provisioning practice: earnings management, capital management, signal management and 
procyclicality in provisioning practice. These result in provisioning levels that depart from a 
true representation of expected losses in the banking book. The next three sections examine 
these concerns in greater detail by analysing the relevant literature. 
Early research into provisions management focused on the use of accounting provisions by 
bank managers as a tool to smooth reported earnings, manage regulatory capital and provide 
desirable signals to market participants. The vast majority of such research focused on banks 
in the United States. More recent studies have examined European and Japanese banks. 
However, to date there are few published studies on the Australian banking system. In 
addition, there is little research focusing on ‘regulatory’ provisioning practices by banks, with 
most studies being restricted to publicly available ‘accounting provisions’.  
The majority of past literature concludes that at one point or another, loan-loss provisions 
have been used by banks for the purpose of earnings management12. Past literature finds prior 
                                                 
12 Greenawalt and Sinkey (1988), Ma, (1988), Scholes et al. (1990), Collins et al. (1995), Bhat, (1996), Hasan 
and Hunter (1999), Shrieves and Dhal (2003), Agarwal et al (2007), Anandarajan et al. (2007), Fonseca and 
Gonzalez (2008), Perez et al. (2008), Hess et al (2009), Laventis et al. (2011). There are a number of studies that 
find no evidence of earnings management, including; Wetmore and Brick (1994), Beatty et al (1995), Ahmed et 
al. (1999) and Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008). 
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to the move to the Basel Accord in 198813, bank managers had a strong incentive to 
manipulate loan-loss provisions to improve their capital adequacy ratio. Empirical research 
has supported these claims14. Past literature examining the United States banking system 
finds provisions were no longer being used by banks to manage capital after implementation 
of the new capital regulation in 1990. Research into other jurisdictions provides conflicting 
findings after the implementation of the Basel Accord. Further studies of provisioning find 
bank managers have an incentive to use provisioning to manage signals to the market, finding 
unexpected increases in loan-loss provisions have been viewed positively by market 
participants (Beaver et al., 1989; Wahlen, 1994). Finally, a number of studies find cyclicality 
in provisioning practices can exacerbate financial system procyclicality. The remainder of 
this chapter examines the relevant literature regarding obstacles to adequate bank 
provisioning practice in greater detail.  
3.4.1. Earnings Management 
A significant body of past research finds evidence that banks have used provisions for 
earnings management. Bank managers are found to increase provisions when earnings are 
high as a way to reduce tax expenses, and reduce provisions during times of low earnings to 
help alleviate negative strains on reported earnings. This has a smoothing effect on earnings, 
providing an additional benefit to the bank as reduced variability in earnings is viewed 
positively by market participants. Earnings variability is a key indicator of risk for any 
business, and since risk affects value, managers are able to enhance shareholder value by 
using provisions to manipulate earnings. The literature refers to these actions as ‘earnings 
                                                 
13 and equivalently the new capital accord of 1990 in the United States. 
14 Moyer (1990), Beatty et al. (1995), Collins et al. (1995) and Ahmed et al. (1999) 
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management’, ‘smoothing earnings’ or ‘income smoothing’. A diverse body of past literature 
has found empirical evidence of earnings management by banks.  
The early work of Hepworth (1953) presented the notion that firms can benefit by reducing 
tax payments and signal a better managerial image by offsetting cyclical earnings 
fluctuations. Ronen and Sadan (1975) built on this argument by demonstrating how 
smoothing earnings reduces the uncertainty of expected future cash flows, resulting in a 
lower risk premium in the pricing of capital assets.  
Further studies suggest that earnings management practices have developed as a result of an 
agency problem. Agency theorists suggest a manager acting as an agent for an owner will 
tend to pursue a strategy that meets his or her own goals, rather than those of the owner 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980). To mitigate agency problems, most owners try to 
include short-term performance compensation packages to align the interests of agents with 
those of owners (Yermack, 1995; Core and Guay, 2002). However, Watts and Zimmerman 
(1978) and Ronen and Sadan (1981) have demonstrated such earnings-based compensation 
schemes ultimately lead to earnings-smoothing behaviour.  
Further literature has found management-controlled firms report smoother earnings and hold 
lower systematic market risk than owner-controlled firms (Koch, 1981; Monsen, Chiu and 
Cooley, 1968; and Larner, 1971). Lambert (1984) shows that under certain conditions “the 
optimal compensation scheme offered by the principal causes the manager to smooth the 
firm’s income”. In addition, he argues that compensation packages will be selected by 
principals to encourage earnings-smoothing. This result comes about firstly because of a 
moral hazard brought on by the unobservability of the manager’s actions and secondly, 
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because of the desire to maximise the principal’s own utility. Lambert argues earnings 
smoothing is the result of rational equilibrium behaviour15.  
With such abundant literature indicating earnings management in manufacturing firms, one 
might expect earnings management to be even more pronounced in the banking industry. In 
the banking sector, stable earnings minimises stock price volatility and maximises 
shareholder wealth. Of further importance though, is banks’ responsibility for promoting 
public confidence in the depository financial institution system (Ma, 1988). Agency 
behaviour is intensified in the banking system, characterised by lower capital ratios and 
higher levels of debt to equity. Information asymmetry is higher in the banking system, 
providing increased opportunities for earnings management. Unlike other asset accounts, 
bank managers have a higher level of discretion over loan-loss reserves. This is an argument 
presented by Laeven and Majnoni (2003) in forming the view that bank provisioning should 
be more closely regulated. 
In one of the first empirical studies of bank earnings management, Ma (1988) presents 
evidence of US commercial banks using loan loss provisions (LLP) and charge-offs to 
smooth reported earnings. By allowing for different risk levels of loan portfolios, the study 
shows LLPs are not related to loan quality but are strongly related to operating income. Ma 
(1988) concludes LLPs were not fully serving their original intention of reflecting banks 
actual loan portfolio quality but are being used to manage reported earnings. Greenwalt and 
Sinkey (1988) find a similar result after controlling for banks’ loan portfolio characteristics 
and macroeconomic measures. In a study of 106 large bank holding companies for the period 
1976 to 1984, the authors present evidence in favour of LLPs being used for earnings 
                                                 
15 An important difference must be noted. Lambert (1984) is concerned with real earnings smoothing, as 
opposed to artificial earnings smoothing. However, Lambert does contend that the same framework can be 
applied to artificial smoothing.  
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management. In addition, their findings suggest regional banking companies tend to engage 
in earnings management to a greater extent than money-centre bank holding companies. 
Collins, Shakelford and Wahlen (1995) also find evidence of a positive relationship between 
earnings and LLPs, in agreement with the earnings-smoothing hypothesis.  
Bhat (1996) investigates a sample of 148 banks over ten years, 1981-1991. He finds banks 
engaging in earnings management are characterised by low growth, low book to asset ratios 
and low return on assets. Hasan and Hunter (1999) examine banks’ tendency to engage in 
earnings management subject to the 1986 change in the Tax Reform Act. The authors use a 
similar methodology to Greenawalt and Sinkey, finding evidence of LLPs being used as a 
tool for earnings management, but with no significant impact attributed to the new tax 
reform. In contrast to the above studies that find LLPs are used as a tool for earnings 
management, other studies have found no association (Wetmore and Brick, 1994; Beatty et 
al, 1995).  
Ahmed et al (1999) examine 113 U.S. bank holding companies over the period 1986-1995, 
around the implementation of the 1990 capital adequacy regulations. This study was the first 
to examine earnings management under the new capital framework. The key implication of 
the Basel Accord (1988) for provisioning was that general provisions could only be included 
in Tier 2 capital up to a limit of 1.25% of Tier 2 capital. It has been argued that this change in 
capital regulation reduced the costs of earnings management, with a number of studies 
hypothesising earnings management would be more pronounced under the new capital 
framework. The idea being, increasing earnings by reducing LLPs would result in a greater 
reduction in capital under the old regulatory regime, but under the new regime that restricts 
the inclusion of provisions in Tier 2 capital, banks would be able to conduct earnings 
management with a reduced cost to capital. These studies hypothesise that earnings 
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management would be more pronounced under the new regime. However, empirical results 
are inconsistent. In an attempt to reconcile their findings with those of Collins et al. (1995), 
Ahmed et al (1999) notes that a positive relation between LLPs and earnings before interest 
and tax (EBIT) is contingent on the inclusion of lagged Non-Performing Loans (NPLt-1) in 
modelling non-discretionary provisions. When non-discretionary provisions are modelled 
differently, the relationship remains positive but loses significance. Ahmed et al (1999) 
conclude the earnings management finding of Collins et al. (1995) is specific to the model 
used. 
Up until the end of the 1990s, the majority of studies examining earnings management were 
based on a sample of U.S. banks. However, Shrieves and Dahl (2003) examined the use of 
discretionary accounting practices for earnings management by Japanese banks under the 
Basel Accord. Their result indicate that banks were in fact managing earnings by setting 
securities sales and LLPs in such a way as to smooth earnings and replenish regulatory 
capital. In a study of Australian banks, Anandarajan et al (2007) find similar evidence 
consistent with LLPs being used by banks to manage earnings. Furthermore, the study finds 
that earnings management more pronounced in the post-Basel period16 and that listed 
commercial banks engage more aggressively in earnings management using LLPs than 
unlisted banks. The study sample includes 50 banks reporting annually between 1991 and 
2001, of which 10 were listed and 40 unlisted.  
In a global study by Fonseca and Gonzalez (2008), the authors conclude that bank income 
smoothing by managing LLPs varies from country to country. Their findings suggest the 
level of earnings management is based on the strength of investor protection, the extent of 
accounting disclosure, the level of restriction on bank activity and the extent of supervision. 
                                                 
16 The study assumes that implementation of the Basel Accord in Australia occurred in 1996. 
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In addition, income smoothing is found to be more prominent in countries with greater levels 
of market and financial system development. In a more recent study of the Spanish banking 
sector, Perez (2008) finds LLPs are used to smooth earnings. The author examines the 
implementation of the statistical provision17 in Spain, finding the quality of accounting 
statements improves after its inclusion, with credit risk variables becoming more closely 
linked to provisions. In contrast, using a similar sample period to study whether the 
provisioning system amplifies credit fluctuations for European banks, Bouvatier and Lepetit 
(2008)18 test and report an additional finding that LLPs are not used for earnings 
management, whereas in a recent study of Australasian banks, Hess et al (2009) examine the 
determinants of bank credit losses over the past two decades, and find strong signs of income 
smoothing using LLPs. 
In the most recent examination of earnings management by banks, Leventis et al (2010) 
examine 91 EU listed commercial banks around the move to adoption of IFRS. The authors 
test the hypothesis that IFRS has reduced bank managers’ discretion in setting LLPs. Their 
study finds evidence consistent with earnings management leading up to the change, but with 
a significant reduction in the post-IFRS period for riskier banks. The authors conclude that 
the move to IFRS has improved earnings quality and reduced bank managers’ ability to 
engage in earnings management using LLPs. 
                                                 
17 The statistical provision forced banks to use their reserves to cover realised losses, enabling them to maintain 
provisions for incurred losses that were embedded in the credit portfolio and would build up during periods of 
expansion (Fernandez de Lis et al., 2001). The statistical provision essentially enforced a counter-cyclical loan 
loss provision that resulted in income smoothing. 
18 The study’s aim is to examine whether bank behaviours induced by the capital adequacy constraint and the 
provisioning system amplify credit fluctuations. However in addition the study tests for earnings and capital 
management incentives. 
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3.4.2. Capital Management 
Past literature examining the use of bank LLPs for capital management can be broken up into 
studies conducted prior to the adoption of the Basel Accord (1988), or in the case of United 
States banks, prior to the change to the new regulatory framework in 1990, and studies 
conducted after implementation of the relevant regulations. The Basel Accord changed the 
way provisions could be included in regulatory capital. The traditional capital management 
hypothesis was based on the notion that a capitally constrained bank could in fact increase its 
regulatory capital ratio by increasing provisions. Prior to the change in capital requirements, 
provisions were included in regulatory capital. To this extent, discretionary behaviour in the 
setting of bank provisions could increase regulatory capital without a corresponding 
reduction in the risk of insolvency (Bouvatier and Lepitit, 2008), constituting regulatory 
capital arbitrage. A number of studies investigated the capital management hypothesis prior 
to the implementation of the Basel Accord, with the literature widely in agreement that banks 
were using LLPs to manage regulatory capital during this time. 
3.4.2.1. Capital Management prior to Basel Accord 
In a seminal paper investigating capital adequacy regulation and accounting choices by 
banks, Moyer (1990) finds results consistent with the use of LLPs for capital management. 
Moyer argues banks with inadequate capital are likely to incur greater regulatory cost, and 
since bank managers prefer smaller regulatory costs they seek to reduce these costs by 
increasing the capital adequacy ratio to an adequate regulatory level. Moyer examines the 
primary capital adequacy ratio (PCAR) before adjustment (BA), which in the United States 
prior to the implementation of the Basel Accord was calculated as; 
PCARBA  = {Stockholders’ equity + Loan loss allowance} / Gross assets 
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= {SE + LLA} / GA 
Moyer (1990) then examines the capital adequacy ratio after adjustment (AA) including loan 
loss provisions (LLP), loan charge-offs (LCO) and securities gains and losses (SGL) and the 
tax rate (τ), such that: 
PCARAA  = {(SE – (1- τ) ΔLLP + (1- τ)ΔSGL) + (LLA + ΔLLP – ΔLCO)} /   
  {GA – ΔLCO + (1-τ)ΔSGL} 
= {SE + LLA + τΔLLP – ΔLCO + (1-τ)ΔSGL} /  
{GA – ΔLCO + (1-τ)ΔSGL} 
Thus a manager could increase the primary capital adequacy ratio either by increasing LLPs, 
or decreasing LCOs. Increasing the difference between LLP and LCO would allow for an 
increase in the PCAR. It is clear that a one dollar increase in LLP could increase regulatory 
capital by the tax rate times one dollar. This led Moyer (1990) to hypothesise that if a bank’s 
PCAR declined relative to the regulatory minimum, a bank manager would be predicted to 
increase the difference between loan loss provision and charge off (LLP – LCO). To test this 
empirically, Moyer uses a sample of 142 U.S. banks from 1981 to 1986. Findings are in line 
with this capital management hypothesis for loan loss provisions but not for loan charge-offs. 
The relationship between LLPs and the capital adequacy ratio are found to be negative and 
significant. Unlike LLPs, Moyer finds no evidence of capital management for securities gains 
and losses. Moyer attributes this result to the potential costs of selling additional securities 
exceeding the anticipated benefits that would come from adjusting reported gains. 
In a study by Beatty et al (1995), a sample of 148 large U.S. banks between 1985 and 1989 is 
used to determine whether loan charge-offs, loan-loss provisions and the decision to issue 
securities are used to achieve earnings, capital and tax goals. Results suggest loan charge-offs 
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and provisions reflect both capital management and loan quality. The conclusion is similar to 
that of Moyer (1990), however the authors argue past studies have not adjusted for the joint 
determination of accrual accounting variables. Beatty et al (1995) finds LCOs, LLPs and 
SGLs are jointly determined so as to minimise regulatory capital costs. Collins et al. (1995) 
examine the relationship between LLPs and the primary capital ratio for U.S. banks on a bank 
by bank basis, controlling for heterogeneity between banks. The authors find an unexpected 
positive sign that differed from the mechanical relationship expected between the two 
variables. As a result, Collins et al conclude that banks are not using LLPs for capital 
management and suggest that growth is the source of capital demand associated with 
decreased loan-loss provisions. In contrast to Moyer (1990), Collins et al find banks use 
write-offs to manage capital ratios.  
A more recent study by Ahmed et al. (1999) documents that the lack of support by Collins et 
al. (1995) for the capital management hypothesis is based on an assumption that the target for 
capital management is the bank-specific mean capital ratio, rather than the minimum 
regulatory required ratio. Ahmed et al. (1999) suggest there is a clear incentive for bank 
managers to use loan-loss provisions for capital management and show that the conflicting 
result of Collins et al. (1995) was driven by this misguided assumption.  
3.4.2.2. Capital Management after implementation of Basel Accord 
The move to the Basel Accord (1988) changed bank managers’ incentive to use loan loss 
provisions for capital management. As demonstrated by Moyer (1990), prior to the 
implementation of the accord, the inclusion of loan loss reserves in regulatory capital meant 
that a one dollar increase in loan-loss provisions increased regulatory capital by one dollar 
times the tax rate. Thus banks managers with low regulatory capital had incentives to 
increase loan loss provisions. Under the Basel Accord, new risk-based capital standards were 
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implemented. Total capital was required to be divided into Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital, with 
regulatory minimums set for Tier 1 at 4% of Risk Weighted Assets (RWA) and Tier 2 at 8% 
of RWA. In addition, Tier 1 capital needed to make up at least half of total capital. Loan loss 
reserves could no longer be included in Tier 1 capital, and were limited to 1.25% of RWA for 
inclusion in Tier 2 capital. 
The changes implied that a dollar increase in loan-loss provisions now decreased Tier 1 
capital by the after-tax amount of the provision. Since loan-loss provisions could still count 
towards Tier 2 capital, a dollar increase would still increase total capital by the tax rate times 
one dollar as before (provided loan-loss reserves did not exceed the restriction of 1.25% of 
RWA) but the changes meant loan-loss provisions now had opposing effects on Tier 1 and 
Tier 2 capital. In essence, a bank would be able to use provisions to increase the total capital 
ratio as before, however this would come at the expense of a smaller Tier 1 capital ratio. A 
number of authors hypothesised the change would remove bank managers’ incentive to 
capital manage using provisions.  
From an empirical standpoint, the literature regarding US banks is in agreement that in the 
post 1990 period after the adoption of the new capital framework, banks no longer used 
provisions to manage capital. However studies in other jurisdictions have found conflicting 
results. A study of Australian banks by Anandarajan et al (2007) is the only study to find 
empirical evidence in the post Basel (1988) period of the ‘traditional’ capital management 
hypothesis that was originally proposed by Moyer (1990). However, a number of other 
studies find results in line with an alternative form of capital management. This alternative 
capital management hypothesis proposes that capitally constrained banks (particularly in 
regards to Tier 1 capital ratios) seek to reduce provisions to limit the impact provisions have 
on depleting the Tier 1 capital ratio. Conversely, banks with higher capital ratios are less 
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capitally restricted, holding relatively larger provisions. A positive relationship between 
discretionary provisions and regulatory capital is regarded as evidence for this form of capital 
management.  
Kim and Kross (1998) examine LLP before and after implementation of the Basel Accord for 
U.S. banks. The authors find banks with low capital ratios provisioned less during the post-
Basel period 1990-1992 than during the 1985-1988 pre-Basel period, whereas the changes in 
capital standards had no effect on loan-loss provisions for banks with high capital ratios. This 
leads to the conclusion that the regulatory change has reduced the incentive for bank 
managers to use LLPs to manage capital. In a similar study of U.S. banks, Ahmed et al 
(1999) finds a negative relationship between LLPs and the capital ratio (before provisions) in 
the pre-Basel period but finds that in the post-Basel period this relationship is less significant, 
with a positive coefficient on the interaction term between the new regime and the capital 
ratio. Like Kim and Kross (1998), the authors conclude that the move to the Basel accord 
significantly reduced bank managers’ incentive to capital manage using loan-loss provisions.  
In a study of Japanese banks after the implementation of the Basel Accord, Shrieves and Dahl 
(2003) find banks with relatively low levels of surplus regulatory capital have a positive 
relationship between regulatory capital and provisions. The authors argue this result reflects 
banks seeking to reduce provisioning when Tier 1 capital is constrained. In contrast, 
Anandarajan et al (2007) find results consistent with Australian banks continuing to use 
provisions to capital manage despite the reduced incentive to do so under the Basel Accord. 
The study uses an annual sample of Australian bank accounting disclosures between 1991 
and 2001, covering the move to the Basel Accord. The authors find a negative relationship 
between LLPs and the capital ratio after controlling for bank-specific risk, arguing the results 
demonstrate evidence of Moyer’s (1990) traditional capital management hypothesis. While 
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they found there was no overall change to this behaviour as a result of the new regulatory 
capital regime, Australian stock exchange listed banks were found to engage in more 
pronounced capital management. 
In the lead up to the implementation of the Basel II capital framework in 2008, the literature 
on quality of bank provisioning shifted to the pressing topic of procyclicality. A number of 
studies aimed to examine the relationship between bank provisions and the business cycle, 
with implications for procyclicality if banks restricted lending. In the course of examining 
this issue a number of studies also tested hypotheses regarding the use of provisions for 
capital management. Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008) use a sample of 186 European banks 
between 1992 and 2004. They find no evidence of the traditional capital management 
hypothesis proposed by Moyer (1990). Instead they find results in line with the alternative 
capital management hypothesis. Poorly capitalised banks used LLPs to manage regulatory 
capital in such a way that when regulatory capital surpluses are small, banks restrict 
provisions. Conversely when regulatory capital surpluses are increasing, these banks 
increased LLPs. The authors attribute this result to the lower capacity of capitally constrained 
banks to provision.  
In a study by Perez (2008) no evidence of capital management is found in a sample consisting 
of annual Spanish bank data between 1986, the year Spain joined the European Economic 
Community, and 2002, two years after the implementation of a ‘statistical provision’. In 
regards to regulatory capital, throughout the sample period, Perez explains that existing 
regulation excluded loan-loss reserves from regulatory capital. The only way for banks to 
engage in capital management was by setting provisions in such a way as to manage retained 
profits to meet regulatory targets. The findings showed no evidence of banks engaging in this 
practice.  
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The most recent study examining the use of provisions for capital management was 
conducted by Leventis et al (2011). The authors examine the move by European banks to 
IFRS accounting. The accounting change removed a significant amount of discretion over the 
setting of accounting provisions by bank managers. The study hypothesises that such a 
change would reduce the ability of banks to provision for adverse incentives. However the 
study finds no evidence of capital management in either period, before or after the accounting 
change.  
3.4.3. Signal Management 
The signal management hypothesis is based on bank managers’ use of loan loss provisions as 
a signalling device to stakeholders about future expected cash flows. In an early study, 
Beaver et al (1989) find that after controlling for non-performing loans, banks with higher 
allowances for loan losses have higher market to book ratios. Wahlen (1994) also finds that 
banks with higher unexpected loan-loss provisions have higher abnormal returns. Both 
studies conclude that the market views unexpected increases in LLPs positively. Liu and 
Ryan (1995) find the market reaction to bank loan-loss provisions is positive for banks with a 
high proportion of large and frequently renegotiated loans. The authors find that increases in 
LLPs are good news only where the market perceives the bank to have loan default problems, 
but if the market views the bank as financially sound, no stock market reaction results.  
Lie et al (1997) find that banks with low regulatory capital and potential loan default 
problems tend to increase discretionary LLPs in an attempt to achieve the desired positive 
market reaction. In contrast, Ahmed et al (1999) finds loan-loss provisions are negatively 
related to contemporaneous stock returns, contrary to the signal management hypothesis. 
Using a sample of Australian banks between 1991 and 2001, Anandarajan et al (2007) 
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conclude Australian banks do not set discretionary loan-loss provisions in such a way as to 
signal future intentions of higher earnings to investors.  
3.4.4. Procyclical Provisioning Practices 
Finally, a number of studies find cyclicality in provisioning practices can exacerbate financial 
system procyclicality. Banks, on average, provision too little in good times and so are forced 
to increase provisions in downturns and during times of crisis. This can have the effect of 
magnified losses and larger shocks to regulatory capital and the overall economy if banks 
restrict business credit as a result of stricter underwriting standards and reduced loan growth. 
A study by Borio et al. (2001) finds a negative correlation between provisioning and the 
economic cycle over ten OECD countries indicative of banks’ procyclical provisioning 
practices. Further studies by Laeven and Majnoni (2003), Bikker and Metzemaker (2005), 
Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008) and Craig et al. (2006) confirm the existence of this negative 
relationship for banking sectors across the globe. In a study of 12 Asian economies, Packer 
and Zhu (2012) find Japanese banks exhibit procyclical provisioning, however countries in 
emerging Asia demonstrate countercyclical provisioning. The authors conclude the Asian 
financial crisis of the late 1990s did not result in more conservative provisioning practices, 
“but actively leaned in a fashion that ameliorated swings in earnings and the macroeconomy” 
(Packer and Zhu, 2012, pp. 14). 
This chapter has examined expected losses, the loan-loss provisioning framework in 
Australian and the relevant literature relating to some of the key obstacles to adequate 
provisioning practice. Chapter 6 continues from this discussion, and builds on past literature 
with a study of adequate regulatory provisioning practice in the Australian banking sector. 
Particular attention is given to the potential for regulatory capital management. However, 
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continuing on with the structure previously outlined, the next chapter examines the next piece 
of the credit loss distribution: unexpected losses, economic and regulatory capital, and the 
Australian regulatory capital framework.  
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CHAPTER 4 
‘Unexpected Loss’: Economic and Regulatory Capital 
 
Figure 4.1: UL and Regulatory Capital in the Credit Risk Loss Distribution 
Adequate provisioning practice ensures a reserve is established to cover losses the bank 
expects. However holding a reserve against EL is generally not enough. In addition, banks 
must hold capital as a cushion against unexpected losses (UL) that exceed EL. While losses 
of this magnitude are not frequent, they have the potential to create serious concerns for bank 
solvency if the bank is not prepared by holding sufficient capital reserves. In regard to 
selecting a sufficient level of bank capital, a natural choice might be to hold capital adequate 
to cover one standard deviation greater than the level of expected loss. But as indicated by 
recent widespread financial turmoil, and past periods of distress, there tend to be occurrences 
of loss that far outweigh a one standard deviation difference from portfolio EL.  
This supports a quantification of credit risk capital based on taking a targeted level of 
statistical confidence into account. This is the concept of economic capital (EC). For a 
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prescribed level of confidence α, economic capital is defined as the α-quintile of the credit 
portfolio loss function minus the EL of the portfolio. Thus UL is determined based on a 
specified tolerance level. Figure 4.1 shows UL calculated as the 99th percentile, such that a 1 
per cent tolerance level is chosen. In practice, for regulatory requirements and banks’ own 
economic capital models it is not uncommon for UL to be calculated in excess of a 99.95 per 
cent confidence level. The concept of the dual buffer of expected and unexpected losses 
underlying the Basel II IRB framework is best explained by the BCBS; “if EL is covered by 
provisions or revenues, then the likelihood that the bank will remain solvent over a one-year 
horizon is equal to the confidence level. Under Basel II, capital is set to maintain a 
supervisory fixed confidence level” (BCBS, 2005).  
As explained in Chapter 2, if left unregulated, banks tend to target levels of economic capital 
that fall short of that considered to be socially optimal. To mitigate this market failure and to 
improve the overall health of the banking system as a whole, supervisors impose regulatory 
capital requirements. Such requirements generally impose a stricter prescribed level of loss 
tolerance α and other more prudent portfolio-specific requirements. One example is that in 
which LGD is calculated based on economic downturn conditions for the determination of 
required capital (K) for the retail residential mortgage portfolio. The remainder of this chapter 
examines the regulatory capital framework in the Australian banking system, and the relevant 
literature that has identified potential obstacles and weaknesses in the regulatory capital 
framework. 
4.1. Regulating the Australian Banking Sector 
The Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) is the prudential regulator of the 
Australian financial services industry. It oversees banks, credit unions, building societies, 
general insurance and reinsurance companies, life insurance, friendly societies, and most 
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members of the superannuation industry. It was established on the 1st July, 1998 and is 
largely funded by the industries that it supervises. Currently it supervises institutions holding 
$4 trillion in assets for almost 23 million Australian depositors, policyholders and 
superannuation fund members.  
Prior to APRA’s establishment, the Australian financial services industry was regulated by 
the Insurance and Superannuation Commission (ISC), the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) 
and the Australian Financial Institutions Commission (AFIC). In June 1996, the Wallis 
Inquiry recommended a new structure whereby the RBA was to deal with monetary policy 
and payments systems regulation, and the Australian Prudential Regulation Commission 
(later to become APRA) would deal with prudential regulation of the financial services 
industry. In addition, the enquiry recommended the Corporations and Financial Services 
Commission (later renamed the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, ASIC) 
deal with market integrity, consumer protection and corporate governance. This model of 
regulation is referred to as the ‘twin peaks’ model of regulation.  
The actions of the main financial regulatory agencies in Australia are coordinated through the 
Council of Financial Regulators, having a mandate to contribute to the efficiency and 
effectiveness of regulation and the stability of the financial system. The council provides a 
forum for identifying important issues and trends in the financial system, ensuring effective 
co-ordination in responding to actual or potential financial instability and harmonising 
regulatory and reporting requirements in Australia. The Council also advises the government 
on the adequacy of Australia’s financial system architecture based on ongoing developments.  
In addition, there is an overlapping board representation (one APRA member has 
representation on the Payments System Board of the RBA, and the Secretary to the Treasury 
has a seat on the Reserve Bank board). A Memoranda of Understanding exists between each 
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of the Council members and a Coordination Committee of senior staff of the RBA and APRA 
which meet regularly. 
4.2. The Basel Capital Framework 
In a bid to reduce risk and instability in the banking sector, the governors of central banks for 
major industrialised nations established a new standing committee in 1974, known as the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), a committee of the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS) located in Basel, Switzerland. The purpose of the committee’s work has 
been to develop a framework that maintains a sound international financial system and 
promotes greater competition between banks in the global market, whilst allowing individual 
banks to have freedom of control over their operations. 
In 1983, banking supervision authorities of the G7 countries agreed on rules for banking 
regulation which were incorporated into national regulation laws, and termed the Basel 
Capital Accord (now known as Basel I). The accord highlighted a regulatory minimum 
capital requirement of 8 per cent of banks’ risk weighted assets (RWA), where risk weights 
were based on the type of bank exposure (for example, zero for government loans, 20% for 
loans to OECD banks and 100% for corporate loans). The accord proved successful in lifting 
bank capital levels around the world including Australia. As a result, banks all over the world 
and particularly those operating internationally were considered to be far safer and more 
prudentially sound.  
The initial accord created a more level playing field with regard to regulatory capital 
requirements for internationally operating banks. However, a major criticism of the Basel I 
framework was its inability to assign differing risk weights to obligors with different 
creditworthiness. Instead, risk weights (and thus capital requirements) were based entirely on 
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the type of exposure. This insensitivity to variations between and within risk categories had 
the potential to lead to increased risk-taking behaviour. For example, Hogan and Sharpe 
(1997) show that assigning a 100% risk weight to all commercial loans allowed banks to 
pursue higher returns by investing in riskier corporate exposures for the same level of capital 
cost.  
By the 1990s the first capital accord was becoming obsolete. Banks were already developing 
economic capital models that estimated the equity required to limit the probability of 
financial failure given a bank’s actual risk position, rather than relying on the standardised 
assumptions governing regulatory capital models (Littrell, 2003). The Basel II Accord was 
initially published in June 2004 and subsequently revised in 2006 and 2009. The objectives of 
the second Basel accord were to ensure capital allocation became more risk sensitive. Further 
objectives included: enhancing the disclosure requirements and allowing market participants 
to better assess the capital adequacy of an institution, ensuring credit risk, operational risk 
and market risk could be quantified, and more closely aligning economic and regulatory 
capital to reduce the scope for regulatory arbitrage.  
Basel II introduced a three pillar structure. The first pillar comprises the standards for 
minimum capital requirements for three major components of bank risk – credit risk, 
operational risk and market risk. The second pillar comprises ‘supervisory review’. Banks are 
required to have their own comprehensive Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process 
(ICAAP) and hold sufficient capital to cover additional risks outside of those defined under 
Pillar 1, such as: liquidity risk, interest rate risk in the banking book, systemic risk, pension 
risk, concentration risk, strategic risk, reputational risk, legal risk. In addition, Pillar 2 details 
the regulatory responses to the first pillar. The third pillar comprises ‘market discipline’. This 
pillar aims to complement the first two pillars by setting disclosure requirements that allow 
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market participants the means to make an informed judgement on the capital adequacy of an 
institution.  
To achieve greater risk sensitivity, Basel II implemented two options for calculating capital 
requirements for credit risk under the first pillar. The first option is the standardised 
approach, which assigns varying risk-weights to claims on corporate, banks and sovereign, 
retail and equity exposure categories. The major development of Basel II was in providing 
greater risk-sensitivity. Varying risk weights were assigned, based on external ratings based 
assessments of credit risk. Within each exposure category, there were varying sub-groups 
reflecting different risk parameters to determine the average probability that a loan to each 
borrower category would default and the proportion of LGD. Risk weights were prescribed 
for each risk category based on the rating of the borrower from an externally determined 
credit-rating agency such as Standard and Poor’s (S&P) and Moodys. For corporate 
exposures, risk weights vary from 20 per cent to 150 per cent (APS 112 and APG 112) based 
on risk categories mapped from external ratings. This represented a major development from 
Basel I which included just four risk weights. This is particularly the case for Australian 
banks, in which two of the Basel I risk weights covered the majority of bank balance sheet 
assets (Terry, 2009).  
The second option is the Internal Ratings Based (IRB) approach where greater risk sensitivity 
is introduced based on banks internal estimates for individual exposures. There are two 
variants of the IRB approach, the Foundation IRB (FIRB) approach where banks provide 
estimates of the probability of default (PD) and exposure at default (EAD) but not loss given 
default (LGD), and the Advanced IRB (AIRB) approach where banks also provide estimates 
of their EAD as well as maturity of their exposure and the LGD, which are prescribed under 
the FIRB approach.  
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By implementing the IRB approach, Basel II made it possible for FIRB and AIRB banks to 
use elements of their economic capital models as inputs into their regulatory capital 
requirements. Whilst subject to supervisory approval, the use of IRB models was a significant 
improvement on the first Basel Accord. It linked risks and capital requirements much more 
closely and assuming economic capital models were being used adequately, personal 
incentives for senior managers could be tied into resultant capital costs, discouraging 
imprudent business strategies. 
4.3. The Basel II IRB Framework 
The IRB approach focuses on the “frequency of bank insolvencies arising from credit losses 
that supervisors are willing to accept” (BCBC, 2005). This approach uses a stochastic credit 
portfolio model to determine the amount of capital (K) required to limit the probability of 
insolvency to a small, pre-defined level. The IRB approach is built on the same three risk 
factors used to calculate EL. These include: PD, LGD and EAD. For the purposes of the IRB 
framework, the time horizon is set to 1 year.  
The model used to derive supervisory capital charges is based on Gordy (2003) subject to a 
restriction of portfolio invariance. This restriction ensures the capital required for a given 
loan is not dependent on the risk of the portfolio to which it is added, only the risk of the loan 
itself.  The Gordy (2003) approach is an Asymptotic Single Risk Factor (ASRF) model. The 
basis for the model is that under the law of large numbers, idiosyncratic risks are diversified, 
leaving only systemic risks to have a material effect on portfolio loss.  
Under the ASRF framework, the sum of expected and unexpected losses for each exposure 
can be calculated. To do so, the IRB model relies on a ‘conditional expected loss’ for 
exposures under an appropriately conservative value of the single systematic risk factor. 
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Under Basel II, the conditional expected loss is expressed based on PD and LGD. Average 
PD is converted into a conditional PD using a mapping function. For LGD no such mapping 
function is used, instead banks are required to use LGDs that reflect economic downturn 
levels (downturn LGD).  
PD and LGD 
The mapping of conditional PDs from average PDs is based on the Merton (1974) single 
asset model. Under this model, a borrower defaults in the event they are unable to meet their 
obligations within a fixed horizon because assets fall below due commitments. The Merton 
model is based on changes in the value of the borrower’s assets following a normally 
distributed random variable. Vasicek (2002) showed that under certain conditions the Merton 
model can be extended to an ASRF credit portfolio model. Under the Merton model, the 
input is the default threshold which gives a PD. The input and outputs are connected based on 
the normal distribution function. To determine the appropriate default threshold for ‘average’ 
conditions, the reverse Merton model is applied, where the default threshold is inferred by 
applying the inverse normal distribution function and the ‘average PD’. In a similar way, the 
appropriately conservative value of the systemic risk factor can be derived by applying the 
inverse normal distribution function to the fixed supervisory confidence level. The second 
step involves taking this conditional default threshold and using it as an input into the original 
Merton model to derive what is termed the ‘conditional PD’.  
The ‘conditional PD’ is combined with a ‘downturn LGD’ to give a combined expected and 
unexpected loss (termed the conditional expected loss). The Basel Committee decided to 
allow banks to estimate their own downturn LGDs subject to supervisory review because of 
the evolving nature of bank practice in the area of LGD quantification. The ASRF model 
gives the full distance from the origin to the Value at Risk (VaR), however UL is determined 
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as the distance between EL and VaR only. To make the necessary adjustment, the EL 
component is removed from the ASRF model.  
Correlations and Maturity Adjustment 
Asset correlations in the Basel IRB model are driven by the single systematic risk factor. All 
borrowers are linked by this single risk factor, providing a basis for calculation of 
correlations between them. The Basel Committee recognises that different borrowers or asset 
classes show different degrees of dependency on the overall economy. It is for this reason 
that asset correlations are specified to be class dependent in the IRB model.  
In addition, a maturity adjustment is included in the IRB model such that longer maturities 
attract a higher capital requirement. Downgrades are more likely in the case of long-term 
credits based on empirical evidence and the intuition of there being more time for potential 
loss events to arise. The maturity adjustment is also specified to be higher for low-PD loans, 
the reason being there is “more potential and more room for down-grading than high PD 
borrowers” (BCBS, 2005, pg. 10). In this way, the maturity adjustment specified in the IRB 
framework is a function of both maturity and PD.  
Supervisors must specify two things, firstly the level of loss tolerance (precision of the 
confidence interval) that they are comfortable with and secondly, the asset correlations for the 
varying asset classes. The Basel Committee sets the confidence interval at 99.9%. This 
represents a level of risk tolerance judged to be appropriately conservative to protect against 
inevitable estimation errors that might occur from banks’ internal assessment of PD, LGD 
and EAD and other model uncertainties.  
Asset correlations based on analysis of datasets from G10 supervisors found that asset 
correlations decrease with increasing PDs, and asset correlations increase with firm size. For 
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the Basel II IRB model, an asset correlation function has limits of 12% and 24% for high and 
low PDs. Correlations between these limits are based on an exponentially decreasing 
function. A size adjustment factor acts as an additional overlay for correlations. The size 
adjustment is a linear formula which becomes zero for annual sales greater than 50 million 
Euros, and reduces asset correlation for lower sized firms. The size adjustment factor does 
not apply to sovereign and bank exposures.  
Retail risk weights differ from corporate risk weights by having a different correlation 
assumption and no maturity adjustments. The asset correlations are ‘reverse engineered’ 
using banks economic capital models and supervisory historical datasets. Under this 
approach, the correlations can be backed out of the IRB formula by inputting economic 
capital, PD and LGD figures from banks’ internal data. A similar process is utilised with the 
supervisory dataset. The analysis finds different asset correlations for different retail asset 
classes; residential mortgage (high and constant = 0.15), qualifying revolving retail exposures 
(low and constant = 0.04) and other retail exposures (similar to corporate). For other retail, 
the correlation function is the same as for corporate, but with highs and lows of 3% and 16%, 
and a k-factor of 35%. Given the above reverse engineering of economic capital models and 
supervisory datasets, no maturity adjustment is necessary since it will be captured implicitly 
in the correlations.  
4.4. Implementation of Basel II in Australia 
APRA was responsible for developing the prudential standards for the implementation of 
Basel II in Australia, developing the prudential reporting regime and for the approval process 
of Authorised Deposit-Taking Institutions (ADI) for advanced accreditation. The prudential 
standards generally emulate the requirements of the Basel II Framework, only diverging 
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where APRA believes there is sound prudential reason to do so. The main areas where 
APRA’s prudential standards differ from the Basel II framework are specified below. 
4.4.1. Pillar 1 Variants 
APRA has not permitted the use of the simplified standardised approach. All ADIs not 
accredited for the IRB approach were required to report under the standardised approach 
(SA) to credit risk. APRA has in some instances required higher risk weights than the 
minimum Basel II framework. For example, retail exposures (100 per cent instead of 75 per 
cent) and residential properties (100 per cent instead of 35 per cent, based on LTV ratios).  
Under APRA’s IRB framework, deviations from Basel II are all conservative, in the direction 
of requiring additional capital. The most significant feature being that APRA has set a 
downturn LGD floor of 20 percent for residential mortgage exposures instead of the 10 
percent specified under Basel II. APRA has also required downturn estimates for corporate 
and bank exposures, whilst specialised lending is subject to the supervisory slotting approach.  
APS 113 sets out the methodology for the calculation of the regulatory capital charge for 
credit risk under the IRB approach. ADI credit exposures are divided into defined IRB asset 
classes: corporate, sovereign, bank and retail. For non-retail classes, the foundation IRB 
approach is available to use where ADIs are only required to provide estimates of PD and 
maturity (M). For the retail asset class, there is no FIRB approach, and banks must determine 
their own PD, LGD and EAD estimates. To help confirm the sufficiency of Pillar 1 capital 
numbers, the IRB approach requires banks to stress-test capital estimates. If under a stress-
test a bank finds a plausible scenario that would lead to losses greater than the Pillar 1 
requirement, there is an expectation that the bank will hold Pillar 2 capital above that level.  
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APRA specifies that expected loss on credit exposures be compared to the amount of eligible 
provisions. Where eligible provisions are not sufficient to cover total expected loss, the 
deficiency is to be deducted from the ADI’s capital (50% from Tier 1 and 50% from Tier 2). 
Where total expected loss is less than the amount of eligible provisions for non-defaulted 
exposures, the difference may be recognised as Tier 2 capital up to a limit of 0.6% of credit 
risk weighted assets. APRA specifies that where thresholds are expressed in Euro dollar 
values, these thresholds be converted to Australian dollars on a fixed 1 to 1 basis to reduce 
complexity that would arise if such limits were converted using the prevailing exchange rate.  
4.4.2. Pillar 2 Variants 
APRA’s implementation of Pillar 2 included a key element regarding its risk assessment and 
ratings system and its setting of a prudential capital ratio (PCR) for individual ADIs that is 
above the Basel minimum. With regard to ICAAPs, APRA has not specified a particular 
format and its requirements are less detailed than in a number of other jurisdictions (IMF, 
2010). For the major banks, ICAAPs are based on economic capital models and their risk 
measurement processes. APRA specifies that at a minimum ADI’s have adequate systems 
and procedures to identify, measure, monitor, and manage the risks arising from the ADI’s 
activities on a continuous basis to ensure that capital is held at a level consistent with the 
ADI’s risk profile. APRA is currently in the process of reviewing ICAAPs.  
As part of the move to Basel II, PCRs were added to the Pillar 2 process. APRA determines 
an overall rating for each ADI based on consideration of all of its risks and the quality of its 
management controls. This rating then feeds into the PCR for each ADI. The supervisory 
rating is based on both indicative ranges and supervisor judgement overlay. PCR levels are 
confidential, and APRA generally requires a 100-200 bps buffer above the PCR to account 
for the normal volatility in capital (IMF, 2010).  
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Under the supervisory review process of other risks, the most notable for the Australian 
banking system are credit concentration risk and liquidity risk. APRA requires that interest 
rate risk in the banking book be covered under Pillar 1. Since the global financial crisis, 
APRA has focused more closely on how ADIs were managing their liquidity and funding.  
4.5. Literature Review: Determinants of Bank Capital Ratios 
The Modigliani-Millar theorem (Modigliani and Millar, 1958) forms the basis for modern 
thinking with regard to firm capital structure. This is no different in the banking sector, but it 
holds particular relevance given banks systemically have the highest leverage of firms in any 
industry19. The theorem states that under the assumptions governing market price processes 
and an efficient market, and in the absence of taxes, bankruptcy costs, agency costs and 
asymmetric information, firm value will be unaffected by the capital structure of the firm.  
In reality though, the assumptions of Modigliani and Millar (1958) are unrealistic. Departures 
from these assumptions exist, such as the presence of taxes, expected costs of financial 
distress, transaction costs, and signalling and agency problems arising from asymmetric 
information. These identified departures can influence the capital decisions of any firm. 
However, as Berger et al (1995) point out, a bank differs substantially from other firms due to 
protection in the form of a regulatory safety net20. The presence of safety nets in the banking 
sector shields creditors from the full consequences of bank risk-taking and so have the effect 
                                                 
19 In addition, Berger et al (1995) explains this research is of particular relevance to the banking sector since 
under the conditions of the frictionless world of Modigliani-Millar, financial institutions lack any plausible 
rationale for existence. 
20 The safety net includes deposit insurance, unconditional payment guarantees, access to the discount window 
and all regulation and supervision not related to capital. 
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of reducing the market capital requirements21 of banks. This may help explain why banks 
generally have the lowest equity-to-asset ratios of any industry. 
Finally, in the presence of low market capital requirements, bank regulators impose 
regulatory capital requirements. Regulatory capital requirements can be thought of as a 
means to limit the risk exposure of the government and taxpayers, who effectively represent 
uninsured creditors of the banking sector22. Regulatory capital requirements protect against 
widespread risks to the economy, such as negative externalities caused by bank failures and 
systemic risk23. If regulatory capital requirements are binding (such that market capital 
requirements are lower than the regulatory capital requirements), capital regulation is costly 
to the bank. In this way a bank’s optimal capital structure will constitute a trade-off between 
the costs of reducing the risk of negative externalities and systemic risk in the economy, and 
the costs of reducing the risk of regulatory intervention. As a result, capital structure and 
bank value are not independent, and an optimal capital ratio exists for an individual bank. A 
bank seeks to maximise value by targeting this optimal capital ratio.  
A significant body of theoretical literature models bank optimal capital ratios based on this 
trade-off (Froot et al, 1993; Blum and Hellwig, 1995; Froot and Stein, 1998; Estrella, 2004). 
Theoretical models generally break down trade-off costs into three distinct categories: 
                                                 
21 Berger et al (1995) defines market capital requirement as the capital ratio that maximises the value of the bank 
in the absence of regulatory capital requirements. In the presence of no regulatory capital requirements, the 
market capital requirement is the ratio a bank would target in the long run. 
22 This is more relevant to the United States banking sector in the presence of strict deposit insurance and their 
recent track record of major bank bail-outs. However, the RBA and APRA have shown signs of an increased 
shift to the implementation of stricter safety nets in the Australian banking sector with a Committed Liquidity 
Facility due to be implemented in 2015, and a temporary move to a government guarantee scheme for large 
deposits and wholesale funding to help ease funding pressure brought on by global turmoil in October 2008. 
Australian implemented a deposit guarantee in 2007. 
23 A more lengthy discussion of the rationale for capital regulation has been discussed in Chapter 1. 
55 
Financing costs, costs of financial distress, and adjustment capital costs. Financing costs are 
the direct cost to the bank of holding capital. They represent an opportunity cost since capital 
is more costly than bank liabilities such as deposits or debt (Campbell, 1979; Myers and 
Majluf, 1984). Costs of financial distress represent a cost to the bank of holding insufficient 
capital. Holding capital reduces the probability of failure and thus reduces costs associated 
with financial distress (Acharya, 1996). Ayuso et al (2004) explain that compulsory capital 
requirements are related to these costs and are best modelled together rather than used 
separately as a constraint. Capital regulation has the same effect, reducing the probability of 
not complying with requirements, and thus reducing the costs associated with financial 
distress.  
Finally, adjustment capital costs include a pure transaction cost component, but also costs 
arising from asymmetric information, since the issuer has an informational advantage over 
potential buyers. Potential buyers view this as a signal that market prices are above (for 
issuing capital) or below (for repurchasing capital) true value (Myers and Majluf, 1984; 
Winter, 1994; McNally, 1999).  
The theoretical banking literature is in agreement that banks target an optimal capital ratio 
which satisfies a trade-off between the costs of holding too little or too much capital. In the 
event that conditions change, such as a difference in perceived risk or a change to creditors’ 
risk aversion, a bank will adjust its preferred level of capital (Flannery and Rangan, 2008). 
Since raising capital is costly, Berger et al (1995) argue that a bank may hold additional 
capital as financial slack to take advantage of future potential profitable opportunities or to 
guard against unexpected losses. Banks may also hold additional capital through market 
discipline, or to increase confidence of shareholders, ratings agencies and depositors. Finally, 
banks may decide to hold additional capital to protect against going-concern value if they 
view regulatory capital to be insufficient.  
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There is scarce empirical literature focusing on the determinants of capital buffers, instead 
research has tended to focus on analysing the cyclical behaviour of capital buffers. The next 
section reviews this literature. However, in the course of examining cyclicality, a number of 
these studies control for the determinants of optimal bank capital buffers, providing empirical 
insights. Ayuso et al (2004) use a partial adjustment framework similar to the theoretical 
work of Estrella (2004)24. They use a lagged change in the capital buffer as a proxy for the 
presence of adjustment costs, with findings showing a significant and positive relationship in 
the short term. They use return on equity (ROE) as a proxy for the costs of remunerating 
excess capital with findings suggesting a negative relationship, as expected. Finally, they use 
non-performing loans (NPL) to represent the risk profile of the bank, and bank size25, 
together as a proxy for costs of financial distress. Findings indicate a negative relationship 
between NPL and capital buffer, indicating banks with a conservative risk profile tend to hold 
a higher capital buffer. The relationship between bank size and capital buffer is found to be 
negative, consistent with the too-big-to-fail hypothesis26. 
Alfron et al (2004) survey UK banks to determine the reasons behind capital decisions. 
Findings show firms differ in their views about target capital. The major reasons given to 
explain the level of target capital include: regulatory capital requirements and financing the 
bank’s long-term business strategy. In addition, their survey shows that banks’ actual capital 
                                                 
24 A number of studies have adopted the framework of Ayuso et al (2004) such as Lindquist (2004) for 
Norwegian banks, Biker and Metzemakers (2004) for a sample of OECD countries, Jokipii and Milne (2008) for 
European banks, Francis and Osborne (2010) for UK banks, Stolz and Wedow (2011) for German banks and 
Shim (2012) for US banks. 
25 Bank failure costs have been shown to be linked to bank’s attitudes towards risk (Keeley, 1990; Salas and 
Saurina, 2002a), and the size of the bank, demonstrated by the too-big-to-fail hypothesis. 
26 The too-big-to-fail hypothesis predicts large banks hold smaller capital buffers given there is a greater chance 
these banks will be bailed out in the event of default because of their systemic importance to the economy. 
57 
levels exceed target capital and that a change in regulatory capital requirements would likely 
lead to a corresponding change in the target level of capital in the medium term.  
Flannery and Rangan (2008) investigate the influence of market discipline on capital buffers 
for a sample of US banks between 1986 and 2000. The authors find bank capital buffers 
increased in the latter half of the 1990s, despite no bank being constrained by regulatory 
capital minima after 1995. They attribute this finding to enhancements in market incentives to 
monitor and price large banks’ default risk brought on by the removal of implicit government 
guarantees. The authors argue that market discipline from bank counterparties forced banks 
to align their capital ratios more closely with portfolio risk exposures, or face paying large 
default risk premiums on uninsured obligations. 
A study of banks in 32 countries by Neir and Baumann (2006) finds government safety nets 
reduce capital ratios, whilst market discipline, resulting from uninsured liabilities and 
disclosure results in higher capital ratios. A more recent study by Fonseca and Gonzalez 
(2010) investigates the determinants of bank capital buffers across 70 countries between the 
period 1992 and 2002. The authors use the cost of deposits as a proxy for market discipline 
and confirm that market discipline is positively related to capital buffers. In addition, when 
the authors use the Lerner index as a proxy for market power, they also find a positive 
relationship with capital buffer. The authors suggest that higher market power reduces banks’ 
incentives to increase risk, resulting in higher bank capital buffers. The impact of results 
varies across countries, with restrictions and supervision reducing the incentives for banks to 
hold capital buffers by weakening market discipline. The authors find institutional quality has 
the opposite effect, with better accounting disclosure and less generous deposit insurance 
having a positive effect on capital buffers by strengthening both market discipline and 
reducing risk-taking incentives. 
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Past research has examined the relationship between portfolio risk and bank capital. 
Theoretical literature is ambiguous as to their relationship; moral hazard theory predicts 
information asymmetries and deposit insurance releases banks from the disciplining control 
of depositors. As a result, banks have incentives to increase risky exposures. This literature 
predicts that more stringent capital adequacy regulation will reduce the volume of risky assets 
(Sharpe, 1978; Furlong and Keeley, 1989). Charter value theory argues banks have 
something to lose since bankruptcy removes future profits. This literature predicts two 
resulting relationships. If bank capital exceeds regulatory capital requirements, greater 
portfolio risk increases the banks probability of default, encouraging banks to hold more 
capital, or alternatively, higher systemic risk reduces charter value and reduces bank capital. 
Finally, in the case of regulatory capital requirements exceeding banks targeted level of 
capital, charter effects become less important (Jokipii and Milne, 2011). 
Several empirical studies have examined the relationship between bank capital and risk. The 
majority of studies find a positive relationship (Shrieves and Dahl, 1992; Aggarwal and 
Jacques, 2001; Rime, 2001). However, Jacques and Nigro (1997) find a negative relationship, 
attributing the results to methodological flaws in risk-based weighting. In addition, Shrieves 
and Dahl (1992) suggest a negative relationship may exist if banks exploit the deposit 
insurance subsidy. An empirical study of German banks by Heid et al (2004) tests the capital 
buffer theory (Marcus, 1984 and Milne and Whalley, 2002), finding the relationship between 
bank capital and risk is dependent on the amount of capital banks hold in excess of the 
regulatory minimum such that banks with low capital buffers try to rebuild capital by raising 
capital whilst simultaneously reducing risk, whereas banks with large capital buffers seek to 
maintain their buffer by increasing risk only when capital increases. 
Jokipii and Milne (2011) investigate the relationship between adjustments in bank capital 
buffers and risk for US banks between 1986 and 2008. Their findings suggest a positive 
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relationship in line with capital buffer theory and the empirical results of Heid et al (2004), 
with the short-term adjustments dependent on the degree of bank capitalisation. Findings are 
in line with capital buffer theory, which predicts well capitalised banks adjust their buffer 
capital and risk positively. For banks with low capital buffers, the relationship between 
capital buffer and risk is negative. 
4.6. Literature Review: Summary of Criticisms of the Regulatory Capital Framework 
In response to a request by the BCBS for comments regarding the ongoing development of 
Basel II, the London School of Economic Financial Markets Group (LSE, 2001) enumerated 
potential sources of instability within Basel II framework. These arguments were echoed 
along with renewed debate and criticism in the subsequent years leading up to the new capital 
accord (BCBS, 2004) and the years following implementation and the global financial crisis 
that developed.  
4.6.1. Failure to consider Risk as Endogenous 
The first argument proposed was that the new regulations failed to consider risk as an 
endogenous concept. Such endogeneity is innocuous during times of calm, however during 
crisis periods, agents’ actions become more homogenous resulting in significant endogeneity 
in risk with the potential for large spikes in volatility (LSE, 2001). The argument here is that 
VaR modelling may no longer apply since a central assumption of stationarity in the 
underlying stochastic process is violated.  
4.6.2. Problems with VaR/ASRF Approach to Capital Calculation 
Jarrow (2007) identifies a number of problems with the implementation of VaR based capital 
charges underlying the Basel II framework. Firstly, the assumption of ‘portfolio invariance’ 
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provides perverse incentives. The assumption implies that a well diversified portfolio has the 
same required capital as a concentrated portfolio. Secondly, the reliance on a single 
systematic risk factor is not consistent with evidence. If more than one systematic risk factor 
is present, the portfolio invariance fails, resulting in incorrect levels of required capital. As 
explained early in the chapter, the ASRF model under Basel II assumes that the correlation 
between asset classes is a function of PD, and falls in a range between 0.12 and 0.24. Jarrow 
explains this is a very crude approximation at best. The assumption of a normal distribution 
for asset returns is inconsistent with the concept of limited liability for asset returns and 
excludes stochastic volatility and jump processes for asset returns. Under Basel II, the 
maturity adjustment is a determining factor in the calculation of PD. However, Jarrow (2007) 
explains this logic is inconsistent with current asset pricing theory (Bielecki and Rutkowski, 
2004). A downgrade of an asset may depend on underlying collateral and seniority, but not its 
maturity (Acharya, Bharath and Srinivasan, 2007). 
4.6.3. Reliance on Credit Rating Agencies 
There is argument in the literature that heavy reliance on credit ratings agencies for the 
standard approach to credit risk is misguided. The LSE (2001) argues that this has been 
shown to provide conflicting and inconsistent forecasts of individual clients’ 
creditworthiness. Ratings tend to lag market developments, and ratings agencies themselves 
are not regulated. In addition, credit ratings and transition probabilities do not capture ratings 
variability which is an important component of credit risk. 
4.6.4. Procyclicality and Amplification of the Economic Cycle 
With Basel III capital requirements on banking supervision recently being endorsed and 
implemented globally, the management of capital buffers over the economic cycle has 
become increasingly important. As already mentioned, under the new rules banks will be 
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required to hold a countercyclical capital buffer designed to weaken potential lending bubbles 
by requiring banks to increase capital buffers during upturns. The countercyclical capital 
buffer is a response to criticisms surrounding the previous Basel II accord. Basel II aimed to 
increase risk-sensitivity by more closely aligning capital requirements with bank risk. 
However, with increased risk-sensitivity a number of critics have raised the concern that 
capital requirements would become more dependent on the business cycle.  
The public demand for credit and the supply of deposit funds to banks are positively related 
to economic activity. VanHoose (2008) makes this argument in demonstrating that banking is 
inherently a procyclical industry. Early literature examining procyclicality in capital 
regulation is widely in agreement that risk-sensitive capital regulation has the potential to 
lead to amplified economic cycles. A number of studies rely on simulations of bank capital 
requirements under the new Basel II requirements in order to assess the potential for 
procyclicality. Goodhart et al (2004) argue that increased banking sector liberalisation since 
early 1970s has increased the procyclicality of the financial system. In addition, these authors 
argue that regulation of bank capital in the form of capital adequacy requirements is itself 
procyclical and may therefore amplify the economic cycle. Their simulation demonstrates 
that the increase in risk-sensitivity of the Basel II accord may accentuate the procyclicality of 
the regulatory system. Heightened risk-sensitivity will result in capital requirements 
increasing during economic downturns, which are characterised by greater bank portfolio 
risk. During these times capital tends to be costly and difficult to raise, which could lead to 
banks decreasing lending during recessionary periods in an attempt to maintain capital ratios 
sufficiently above regulatory minimums.  
VanHoose (2008) explains that another consequence of greater risk-sensitivity in capital 
requirements might be higher market loan rates during such recessionary periods. Despite the 
inherently procyclical design of the Basel II framework, Borio (2003) provides an argument 
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that greater market transparency under Pillar III and heightened supervisory discretion under 
Pillar II of the Basel II capital reforms could help mitigate the potential for procyclical capital 
requirements. However, Estrella (2004) examines the relationship between optimal forward 
looking capital buffers and deterministic cycles of loan losses, and find that banks, subject to 
costs of capital adjustment, will decide to increase capital buffers when they anticipate loan 
losses. Using a simulation framework, Estrella (2004) shows that risk-based capital 
requirements are likely to have procyclical consequences.  
Catarieneu-Rabell et al (2005) argue banks may adopt a point in time rating system as a result 
of profit incentives in the short-run, consequently boosting procyclicality. Kashyap and Stein 
(2004) examine U.S. loan defaults from 1998 to 2002 and conduct simulations under the 
proposed Basel II capital requirements. Results indicate an economically significant amount 
of additional cyclicality in capital charges. However, Gordy and Howells (2006) use a 
simulation framework of bank portfolio volatility under different rating systems and conclude 
that banks strategies to select higher quality borrowers during downturns would dampen 
procyclical effects considerably. On the other hand, VanHoose (2008) argues that, as pointed 
out by Goodhart et al (2004), realistically banks might find it considerably more difficult to 
locate a significant number of creditworthy borrowers than assumed by Gordy and Howells 
(2006). 
In response to procyclicality criticisms of theoretical literature and simulation based studies, a 
number of empirical studies have investigated the relationship between capital buffers and the 
economic cycle. Ayuso et al (2004) is credited with the first empirical study to estimate the 
relationship between bank capital buffers and the economic cycle. The authors examine the 
Spanish banking sector between 1986 and 2000, comprising a complete economic cycle. The 
estimation framework used is a partial adjustment model with quadratic costs of adjusting 
capital. The authors control for other determinants of capital buffers, finding a significant 
63 
negative association between capital buffers and the business cycle. The magnitude is only 
moderate, such that a 1 percentage point increase in GDP growth reduces capital buffers by 
17 percent. The authors conclude this is likely to explain why, despite the cyclical behaviour 
of capital buffers, banks have managed to keep them at fairly safe levels even during deep 
recessions. The authors conclude this relationship is evidence of the procyclicality of capital 
buffers, with banks behaving in an excessively lax manner during upturns, potentially 
increasing riskiness and size of exposures and thus reducing the capital buffer. During 
downturns, the negative relationship suggests banks seek to build capital buffers by 
increasing capital and reducing riskiness and size of exposures, with a potentially harmful 
effect on the real economy. 
Lindquist (2004), Stolz and Wedow (2005), Jokipii and Milne (2008) and Francis and 
Osborne (2010) use a similar partial adjustment estimation framework to Ayuso et al (2004) 
to examine capital buffers in Norway, Germany, Europe and the United Kingdom 
respectively, under the Basel I framework. Findings are in agreement that bank capital 
buffers increase during downturns and decrease during upturns, representing a significant 
negative association with the business cycle. The authors interpret this result as evidence of 
procyclical capital requirements. In a study of cross-country determinants of capital buffers, 
Fonseca and Gonzalez (2010) examine banks in 70 countries between 1992 and 2002, finding 
different patterns across countries. Results indicate a negative relation between the economic 
cycle and capital buffers in seven countries, a positive relationship in five countries and no 
relationship in the remaining fifty-nine counties.  
Findings of Ayuso et al (2004) suggest a procyclical effect exists, however commercial banks 
are found to be less procyclical than savings banks. Francis and Osborne (2010) explain that 
the existence of a subset of Spanish commercial banks that have a positive relationship 
between capital buffers and the business cycle is in conflict with the study’s overall finding 
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of procyclical capital buffers. Similarly, Stolz and Wedow (2005) find a subset of low 
capitalised banks do not reduce loan supply during economic downturns, a result which is in 
conflict with procyclicality, as pointed out by Francis and Osborne (2010). Finally, doubts 
exists over the procyclical conclusion of Lindquist (2004) since she uses a sample which does 
not encompass a full economic cycle.  
Most importantly, none of the above studies is able to disentangle demand effects from 
supply effects. As mentioned, the business of banking is inherently cyclical. Expansions are 
characterised by increasing demand for credit, whilst during economic downturns, the 
demand for credit dampens considerably. The negative relationship between capital buffers 
and the economic cycle found in these studies may be a result of cyclicality in the demand for 
credit. Banks’ capital buffers may increase during a downturn in the business cycle purely 
due to declines in investments and profitable lending opportunities lowering the demand for 
credit. For an empirical study to conclude that capital buffers are procyclical, two conditions 
must be met. Firstly, capital buffers must co-move with the economic cycle and secondly, 
capital buffers must positively influence bank lending, such that they amplify the business 
cycle. The above literature focusing on the capital buffers’ relationship with the economic 
cycle focuses on only one dimension of the debate. 
Studies focusing on the role of bank capital in explaining fluctuations in loan growth 
(Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004; Jackson et al 1999) find negative shocks to capital cause 
low-capitalised banks to reduce new lending during recessionary periods. Further research 
by, Nier and Zicchino (2005), Berrospide and Edge (2010) and Francis and Osborne (2012) 
confirm this. However, studies by Berger and Udell (2004) and Stolz and Wedow (2011) find 
the opposite effect for US and German banks, where declines in loan growth are larger for 
well-capitalised banks, while low-capitalised banks do not reduce lending during economic 
downturns. 
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In a recent study of the French banking system, Coffinet et al (2012) attempt to account for 
demand and supply effects by assessing the two-way interplays between capital buffers and 
credit growth using panel data simultaneous equations and Granger causality tests. Their 
findings indicate a mutually reinforcing mechanism between capital buffers and loan growth, 
more so for estimations using higher quality capital. Their empirical findings suggest 
procyclicality in the capital buffers of French banks, such that a negative relationship exists 
between capital buffers and loan growth. Granger causality runs in both directions however 
they caution that the relationship may be the result of a common factor, since the two 
variables are affected by economic growth. 
Finally, in the most recent study to date examining the potential for procyclical capital 
requirements, Shim (2012) attempts to assess the efficacy of the newly created 
countercyclical buffer requirements by examining the relationship between macroeconomic 
developments and bank capital buffer and portfolio risk adjustments. The study examines US 
banks over the period 1992:Q1 to 2011:Q3, confirming a negative relationship between the 
economic cycle and capital buffers. The study is the first to assess this relationship in the 
period leading up to the implementation of the new Basel III capital reforms. 
4.7. Basel III Framework Overview 
The Basel III Accord is the third set of global reforms aimed at raising the level and quality 
of regulatory capital in the global banking system. APRA has fully supported the 
implementation of these reforms, with prudential and reporting standards now finalised to 
take effect from January 2013. With regard to capital reforms, the Basel III Accord requires 
banks to hold 4.5% of RWA in common equity tier 1 capital (CET1) and 6% in tier 1 capital.  
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In addition, Basel III has introduced two additional capital buffers that banks will be required 
to hold. Firstly, a mandatory capital conservation buffer of 2.5% and secondly a discretionary 
counter-cyclical buffer, which allows national regulators to require an additional 2.5% of 
capital during periods of high capital growth. This reform has come as a result of criticisms 
of the Basel II capital reforms regarding potential procyclicality and amplification of the 
economic cycle. Finally, the BCBS has advocated a minimum leverage ratio, which is not 
included under the Australian implementation. Instead, a simple, transparent leverage ratio 
will be reported by Australian ADIs to help contain the build-up of leverage in the banking 
system. 
This chapter has introduced the concept of unexpected loss and the regulatory capital 
framework in Australia which ensures banks hold enough capital to withstand sizable losses 
on exposures. In addition, this chapter has reviewed past literature examining the 
determinants of capital buffers held by banks. Lastly, this chapter has reviewed some of the 
obstacles of bank capital regulation and how this has influenced the new Basel III framework. 
This chapter provides the background and literary basis for a study of the behaviour and 
determinants of Australian banks capital buffers, which is presented in Chapter 6. However, 
continuing with this thesis structure, the next chapter introduces the next component of the 
credit loss distribution, ‘intolerable losses’. 
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CHAPTER 5 
‘Intolerable Loss’: Regulatory Stress-Testing 
 
Figure 5.1: Intolerable loss and Stress-Testing in the Credit Risk Loss Distribution 
This chapter examines how banks and regulators account for the risk of intolerable credit loss 
in the banking book. Particular emphasis is placed on regulatory stress-testing, examining the 
typical design, current stress-testing practices, and a discussion of stress-testing in APRA. 
The chapter concludes with a brief summary of some of the limitations of current stress-
testing practice. 
As already mentioned, regulators and credit risk professionals are much more concerned with 
tail risk. Stress-testing involves subjecting a bank or banking system to an extreme yet 
plausible scenario to determine whether a bank has enough capital to withstand adverse 
conditions. Stress-testing is a useful method to determine the likelihood, and types of events 
that could result in such extreme tail losses, allowing for better bank preparation and 
determining whether the banking sector is in need of greater levels of capital. In Australia, 
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APRA requires all ADI’s reporting under the IRB framework to have in place sound stress-
testing processes for use in the assessment of capital adequacy, including the sufficiency of 
the IRB capital requirement. In addition, APRA undertakes periodic regulatory stress-testing 
of the banking system. 
5.1. Typical Stress-Testing Design 
Typical credit stress-tests are designed in three stages. First, macroeconomic variables are 
forecast under a pre-specified stress scenario for a given horizon. Second, a data generating 
process is conducted using a macroeconomic model to determine the value of related 
macroeconomic variables under stress. The impact of the stress scenario on the banks’ credit 
risk parameters is then assessed. Finally, impacts on banks’ capital, performance and loss 
indicators are assessed. Figure 5.2 summarises the typical stress-testing process: 
 
Figure 5.2: Typical Stress-Testing Design 
In general, regulatory stress-tests are conducted as either top-down or bottom-up. In a top-
down stress-test, the regulator uses data of its own to conduct all three stages of the stress-
test. In bottom-up stress-tests, the regulator usually supplies a stressed macroeconomic 
scenario, for which banks themselves estimate the stressed credit variables and the ultimate 
impact on their capital and performance variables. These variables are then reported back to 
the regulator to assess the overall resilience of the banking system. 
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Since macroeconomic models usually do not include credit risk variables, the typical stress-
testing process includes a credit risk model as a separate “satellite” model. This approach to 
stress-testing is commonly referred to as the “modular approach”. When credit risk and 
macroeconomic variables are jointly estimated in a single modelling process, the approach is 
referred to as an “integrated approach” to stress-testing. 
5.2. Current Stress-Testing Practice 
The framework of all stress-tests typically follows the process described above, however 
differing objectives cause pronounced differences in the scope, modelling and risk measures 
among other aspects. In what follows a summary of current stress-testing practice is 
presented. Firstly, the published stress-tests of the 2009 Fed Supervisory Capital Assessment 
Program (SCAP) and the 2011 European Banking Authority (EBA) stress-tests are reviewed. 
Secondly, the stress-tests conducted by individual country authorities as part of the IMF’s 
Financial Sector Assessment Programs (FSAPs) are summarised, thirdly stress-testing 
practice in APRA is examined and finally, some of the weaknesses and limitations of current 
stress-testing practice identified by the literature are summarised. 
5.2.1. U.S. Treasury’s Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (2009) 
In May, 2009 the Federal Reserve co-ordinated a stress-test of US banks capital 
requirements. Results showed that 10 of the 19 largest banks would need a total of $75 billion 
in capital to maintain at least 4% of common equity Tier 1 capital in the event of an adverse 
stress on the macro-economy. An important objective of the SCAP was to evaluate 
projections submitted by the firms and the models and methodologies used to generate the 
loss and resource estimates. The overall intent of the process was to bring together as much 
information as possible at the firm level to provide the best judgement on potential loss in the 
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event of economic conditions severely worsening. Individual institutions’ SCAP stress-test 
results were released publicly, an unusual step at the time for supervisors, but in the midst of 
considerable uncertainty, U.S. authorities thought it necessary to restore confidence in the 
financial system. 
Banks conducted credit risk modelling at the loan portfolio level for 12 separate categories of 
loans. Stress-tests included both base case and adverse scenarios. Regulatory modelling was 
conducted by the Federal Reserve for each loan category to come up with ‘indicative loan 
loss measures’. These indicative loan loss measures or ‘ranges’ were given to banks. Banks 
accepted a position within the range which best reflected their measures. If the bank’s 
measures were outside the ‘indicative range’ provided by the Federal Reserve, they were 
required to report reasons for such a departure (SCAP, 2009).  
On the back of the SCAP stress-test, a number of institutions began developing in-house 
stress tests based on the Treasury’s SCAP approach27. Matsakh (2010) argues that the SCAP 
was not intended to be a best-practice framework for stress testing. The SCAP focuses 
exclusively on credit risk, focuses on only a single severe stress event and is limited by a 
need to be comparable across institutions. He argues the SCAP was meant to operate as an ad 
hoc stress-test, rather than as an integrated component of a more comprehensive and ongoing 
capital management process.  
Despite some criticism, the Treasury’s SCAP stress-test highlights the importance the market 
has placed on stress-testing and improved transparency. Since March 2009, banks included in 
Treasury’s stress-test experienced a 181 percent increase in share price, compared to just 17 
percent for those not included (Matsakh, 2010). Smaller institutions have found it much more 
                                                 
27 Matsakh (2010) notes this may have been motivated by a short term objective to compete with SCAP banks in 
attracting capital by applying a market-standard stress test. 
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difficult to raise additional capital to replenish their capital base or repay their Troubled Asset 
Relief Program (TARP) funds without participation in such a widespread credible stress-test. 
5.2.3. European Banking Authority (EBA) Stress Testing Exercise (2011) 
In July 2011, the EBA released the results of a coordinated exercise to assess the resilience of 
a large sample of EU banks (90 institutions in 21 countries) against an adverse stress-scenario 
to provide a relatively strong benchmark. As with the SCAP, individual institutions’ results 
were released publicly. The exercise was aimed at offering greater transparency on bank 
disclosure (with emphasis on sovereign risk) to help foster market confidence and increase 
the degree of comparability.  
The credit risk component of the 2011 EBA stress testing exercise was no different to the 
typical stress-test design discussed above. Key macroeconomic variables were forecast for a 
benchmark and adverse scenario over a two year horizon. Credit risk parameters for PD and 
LGD were evaluated for a range of portfolio categories including: financial institutions, 
sovereign, corporate, consumer credit and retail real estate. The solvency position of each 
bank was then assessed.  
The exercise was a bottom-up stress-test, with banks performing the credit risk modelling 
component themselves for the various loan portfolios to estimate key credit loss variables, i.e. 
expected losses and impairments. The EBA provided baseline and stressed credit risk 
parameters for guidance and as a reference for banks when assessing their own measures of 
the impact on capital positions. Results of the 2011 exercise found that eight out of ninety 
banks failed the test; five in Spain, two in Greece and one in Austria.  
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5.2.4. Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) 
The FSAP is a joint effort by the IMF and the World Bank, the broad objective of which is to 
help strengthen and deepen financial systems and enhance their resilience to potential 
financial crises. Since its inception in 1999, FSAPs have been carried out in over 120 
countries (Moretti, Stolz and Swinburne, 2008), with many more updates completed or 
underway. Stress-testing forms an important component, with approaches ranging from 
relatively basic to quite sophisticated.  
Stress-testing approaches in FSAPs differ in many ways between countries. In a 2008 IMF 
working paper that reviewed past FSAP stress-testing, Moretti et al (2008) identified three 
main dimensions for which FSAP stress-tests differ. Firstly, the number of risk factors 
shocked (one to multiple). Secondly, the approach taken, being bottom-up, top-down or a 
combination of the two, and finally the level of aggregation (portfolio level, whole bank level 
or banking system level as a whole).  
FSAPs are intended to address the risks that arise from common shocks. In this way all FSAP 
stress-tests are conducted such that the same shocks are applied uniformly to all institutions. 
Moretti et al. (2008) explain that no measure of system level stability should rely only on 
system averages and aggregates. “Some attempt needs to be made to understand the nature of 
the dispersion underneath the aggregates and averages, since concentrations of exposures and 
vulnerabilities that may be important for the system can be hidden beneath more benign-
looking aggregates” (Moretti et al, 2008, p. 7). It is argued that some form of bank by bank 
testing is essential rather than a reliance on an aggregated system level stress-test. 
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5.2.5. Academic Research and Approaches to Stress-Testing 
This section provides a review of stress-testing efforts published by University academics and 
research teams operating in central banks and regulatory authorities. The aim of such 
literature is to identify limitations and gaps in current stress-testing practice and promote 
better practice. As highlighted above, the typical credit risk stress-testing framework consists 
of two, commonly separate, modelling stages. The first involves estimating macroeconomic 
conditions based on the stress scenario. The second involves forecasting loan performance or 
credit risk based on stressed macroeconomic estimates. 
5.2.5.1. Macroeconomic Model 
The majority of regulatory stress-tests use an existing structural macroeconomic model, such 
as that already in use by the central bank for forecasting and policy analysis. The use of such 
a model allows for consistency in predicted values in the stress scenario. Typically a 
structural model is used, whereby a single risk factor or group of risk factors are initially 
shocked as exogenous inputs, and through their interactions with other macroeconomic 
variables, projections are made over the scenario horizon. Foglia (2009) has raised the 
concern that linear models are unable to capture relationships between macroeconomic 
variables that commonly become nonlinear in times of stress.  
Another common modelling technique is the use of vector autoregressions (VARs) or vector 
error correction models (VECMs) to allow exogenous shocks to jointly affect a set of 
macroeconomic variables. Such models have been used in studies developed at central banks 
such as the Bank of England, Bank of Japan, Bank of Spain, the Dutch Central Bank, and the 
ECB28.  
                                                 
28 A more comprehensive summary is provided by Foglia (2009) 
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5.2.5.2. Credit Risk Model 
Regardless of the approach used to forecast macroeconomic variables under stress, a method 
is needed to map macroeconomic variables to banks’ asset quality to assess credit risk and 
capital adequacy. A credit risk model is typically used. Foglia (2009) identifies various 
modelling techniques in two classes. The first is based on data regarding loan performance, 
such as impaired loans, non-performing loans (NPLs), loan-loss provisions (LLPs) and 
historical default rates. The other class is based on more granular level data related to 
individual borrower default risk.  
Models based on loan performance tend to rely on NPLs, LLPs or historical default rates as 
the key credit risk proxy and dependent variable in stress-testing. Alessandri et al (2009) 
from the Bank of England, and Marcucci and Quagliariello (2008) from the Bank of Italy, 
model credit risk based on default frequencies aggregated at the corporate level. Marcucci 
and Quagliariello use a VAR approach to estimate a credit risk model. They use output gap, 
inflation, short-term interest rates and the real exchange rate as their macroeconomic 
variables. Impulse response functions indicate a significant impact of these macroeconomic 
variables on the default rate (with the exception of inflation).  
Lehmann and Manz (2006) of the Swiss National Bank and Van den End et al (2006) of the 
Dutch Central Bank use LLP ratios to measure asset quality and credit risk at the individual 
bank level. Cihak (2007) uses both NPLs and LLPs to estimate a credit risk satellite model on 
macroeconomic data. Shocks are then incorporated into the model to estimate stress events. A 
great majority of models based on loan performance follow Wilson (1997), a variant of the 
Merton method, with logit or probit transformations commonly used to model non-linearities 
in the default rate. Models based on individual borrower default risk usually rely on 
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accounting data at the loan borrower level to calculate PD. These PD’s are then aggregated to 
estimate an individual bank’s or the banking sector’s total loan loss.  
Asberg and Shahnazarian (2008) of the Sveriges Riksbank use Moody’s KMV29 Expected 
Default Frequency (EDF) as the dependent variables in their credit risk model. The EDF is 
forward looking and market based measure, estimating the firm’s probability of defaulting 
within the next year. The study estimates a vector error correction model (VECM) with EDF, 
a production index, inflation and interest rate variables.  
Castren et al (2008) also use EDF as a credit risk proxy. Five macroeconomic variables are 
used, including equity prices and gross domestic product (GDP). The French Banking 
Commission and the Bank of Japan use internal datasets of bank ratings to produce transition 
matrices. These transition matrices show the probability that borrowers will move to a 
different rating class with respect to a limited number of macroeconomic variables.  
5.3. Stress-Testing in APRA 
Stress-testing is used by APRA as part of its regular supervisory activities. Regulated 
institutions are required to undertake regular stress-testing to ensure they can adequately 
withstand a severe yet plausible shock to the macro economy. Aside from this, APRA 
conducts its own stress-testing to better understand vulnerabilities in the institutions it 
regulates, and the potential for systemic threats. APRA stress-testing outcomes place 
supervisors in a better position to consider actions that may be necessary to address any 
concerns. APRA has conducted or participated in three comprehensive stress-tests of the 
Australian banking system (APRA, 2010). 
                                                 
29 The KMV model is named after its developers, Kealhofer, McQuown and Vasicek (KMV). Moody’s 
purchased KMV in February 2002 
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APRA’s first formal stress-test in 2002-2003 tested the resilience of ADI capital positions in 
response to a severe housing market correction. APRA stressed both mortgage default and 
loss rates across 120 ADIs. The level of stress was determined by the risk characteristics of 
the housing loan (for example the loan-to-value ratio and use of lenders mortgage insurance). 
The stress-testing outcomes showed the majority of ADI were adequately capitalised to 
withstand the imposed housing market downturn. However, the test did highlight a number of 
issues regarding data quality and system capabilities which subsequently led to a 
strengthening of APRA’s prudential framework for ADI housing lending and lenders 
mortgage insurance (LMI).  
In 2005-2006, APRA participated in a macroeconomic stress-test for the Australian banking 
system as part of the IMF’s FSAP. A three-year stress scenario was developed by the IMF in 
conjunction with the RBA, APRA and Treasury. The stress scenario was categorised by a 
short recession, a large fall in house prices and a depreciation of the exchange rate. Again, 
banks were resilient. Bank profits declined, however no losses were incurred. Explanations 
attributed this result to the favourable macroeconomic starting point, the high proportion of 
residential mortgages making up Australian bank portfolios and the short-lived recession. 
In response to the global financial crisis in the second half of 2007, APRA conducted a 
macroeconomic stress-test to determine institutions’ resilience to a pronounced decline in 
wholesale funding and the continued absence of securitisation markets. As the severity of the 
crisis became clearer, APRA followed with further top-down stress-tests based on collected 
information relating to the lending portfolios of the institutions. Internally generated 
scenarios were based on expected default rates, underlying profit generation, dividend payout 
expectations and capital availability. Any weaknesses identified were addressed with the 
institutions concerned. 
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More recently, APRA in conjunction with the RBA and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
(RBNZ) conducted a comprehensive stress-test of larger systemic ADIs. The stress scenario 
assumed a continued deterioration in global economic conditions. The scenario was designed 
to administer conditions far worse than that experienced in the early 1990s. A particular 
emphasis of the stress scenario is the assumption that China is unable to offset all declines in 
its exports with domestic spending. A fall in Chinese demand causes commodity prices to 
drop by 60 per cent from their peak. The stress-test was applied in two phases. Phase 1 
required advanced Basel II banks to apply the macroeconomic scenario to their own models 
(APRA, 2010). Outcomes were reported to APRA regarding the migration of credit ratings, 
default behaviour, profitability and capital. The stress-test was aggregated around five key 
portfolios: commercial property, income-producing real estate, corporate, small and medium 
enterprises, and residential mortgages. 
In Phase 2, the advanced banks were asked to apply APRA’s risk estimates to their loan 
portfolios (APRA, 2010). APRA’s estimates were based on regulatory modelling and 
judgement to determine a range of common portfolio-specific default and credit migration 
outcomes. Estimates of defaults were generally similar to what the banks provided, however 
credit migration estimates were more severe. In addition, APRA supervisors applied the 
estimates, in a more simplified form, to a select group of ‘standardised’ Basel II ADIs, 
extending the stress-test to cover the 20 largest locally incorporated ADIs by asset size. The 
results of the stress-tests again proved banks were resilient. No ADI would have failed under 
the severe macroeconomic scenario and no ADI would have breached Tier 1 capital 
requirements. The weighted average reduction in Tier 1 capital ratios was 3.1 percentage 
points. Part of the reduction reflected losses arising from higher bad debts charges, however 
the primary driver was downwards ratings migration (APRA, 2010). 
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Stress-testing in APRA is typically done behind closed doors unlike the Federal Reserve 
SCAP (2009) and ECB stress-tests (2010, 2011) which published institution specific results. 
APRA maintains that stress-testing practice is to be well embedded in the supervisory 
framework of regulated institutions. 
5.4. Limitations of Current Stress-Testing Practice 
Current banking and stress-testing literature has identified a number of potential 
shortcomings that apply to both banks’ internal stress-testing practice and regulatory stress-
testing; 
Inadequate granularity: Despite banks and regulators holding sufficient internal data, they 
often fail to stress portfolios at the most granular level. Instead of stressing at the level of 
LVR or credit score, many banks and regulators limit their lens to the portfolio level 
(Matsakh, 2010).  
Model Misspecifications: Interactions between credit, market, and liquidity risk are often 
ignored, weak proxies of asset quality are often used, structural breaks and non-linearities are 
often not considered, and cointegration between macroeconomic variables is not sufficiently 
modelled. (Foglia, 2009) 
Feedback Effects: Financial institutions will tend to off-load troubled assets, causing prices to 
be driven down further and causing feedback effects on the original stressed variable. 
Regulators must consider these second round effects when conducting banking sector stress-
tests. 
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Contagion and Spillover Effects: A troubled financial institutions will often threaten the 
solvency and financial wellbeing of similar financial institutions through direct exposures or 
funding markets. Such contagious and spillover effects must be accounted for. 
Disaster Myopia: Agents have the propensity to underestimate the probability of adverse 
outcomes, in particular small probability events from the distant past (Haldane, 2009). This 
was the case in the U.S. with 20 years of house price appreciation preceding one of the 
largest financial crises of the modern era. It is a reminder to Australian banks and supervisors 
to remain prudent in designing sufficiently extreme scenarios in stress-testing.  
Location/Geographic Dispersion: Considering house price depreciation at the geographic or 
cluster level can significantly change results. Matsakh (2010) points out that cumulative 
home price depreciation within the same U.S. metropolitan statistical area (MSA) can vary by 
close to 20 per cent, a significant implication for loss projections. 
Dynamic vs. Original LVR: Traditional approaches using credit migration matrices for stress-
testing original LVR bands are not accurate. The default rate for a loan with LVR of 95 per 
cent can be as much as five times greater than that of an 80 per cent LVR loan, even though 
they both began at an LVR of 75 per cent (Matsakh, 2010). This places importance on a 
dynamic credit migration matrix based on current LVR under the continuing home price 
decline scenario. 
Whilst the above are significant limitations of current stress-testing practice, perhaps the 
greatest weakness is that regulatory stress-tests are not resulting in bank failures, yet banks 
are continue to fail. There are a number of potential reasons for this: 
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Banks might be stronger: Perhaps banks are stronger, having learned from past mistakes and 
having seen the effects of the latest and most significant crisis. Given the hubris and disaster 
myopia of agents, one might regard this as unlikely. Nevertheless, it cannot be ruled out. 
Limitations and Weaknesses: The previous weaknesses and limitations of the stress-testing 
process could be limiting realistic estimations of banking system losses.  
Overreliance on Bottom-Up Stress-Testing: Regulators have in the past relied too heavily on 
providing stress scenarios to banks, allowing capital adequacy and solvency assessments to 
be purely based on internal bank modelling. The potential for bias is clear. No bank wants to 
admit to the regulator they will be undercapitalised given a plausible stress event. With no 
top-down estimates from the regulator to validate results, under-prediction of bank failure is 
likely. 
This chapter has examined intolerable credit losses and regulatory stress-testing practices, 
providing the background for the work presented in Chapter 8. If it is assumed the above 
limitations to stress-testing identified in past literature result in no bias or failure under-
prediction, this thesis argues regulatory stress-testing will still significantly under-predict loss 
because of an overreliance on mean estimates in stress-testing. The work presented in 
Chapter 8 focuses on the residential mortgage portfolio of Australian banks to examine the 
importance of decomposing the mean in regulatory stress-testing. The next chapters (6, 7 and 
8) present three studies which build on the literature and concepts presented thus far in this 
thesis. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Effect of new Basel capital requirements on the loan-loss 
provisioning practices of Australian banks 
6.1. Introduction 
Recent events have caused regulatory authorities to reassess the potential for rapid and 
exceptional losses in the financial institutions they regulate. As a result, there is amplified 
interest in the strengthening of bank capital regulation. Despite extensive effort in advancing 
capital regulation, considerably less regulatory attention is given to banks’ provisioning 
practices. Provisions have a direct impact on banks’ retained earnings, a significant 
component of bank capital. A bank’s capital adequacy ratio will overstate the soundness of 
the bank if provisioning is insufficient. In light of this, the study presented in this chapter 
examines whether the provisioning practices of Australian banks has supported regulatory 
developments in the Australian banking industry.  
The majority of existing literature has focussed on accounting provisioning. Instead this study 
focuses on ‘regulatory provisioning’, those provisions directly affecting bank capital. A 
compelling body of past literature finds that banks have used accounting provisions to 
smooth earnings, manage regulatory capital positions, and positively signal the market 
(Ahmed et al., 1999; Fonseca and Gonzalez, 2008; Anandarajan et al., 2007). Regulatory 
provisioning is distinct from accounting provisioning. In Australia, regulatory provisioning 
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adopts a ‘forward looking’ approach30, a method widely endorsed by the Basel Committee in 
the latest version of the Basel III regulatory framework (BCBS, 2011 par. 23).  
This study focuses on regulatory provisioning, since this is not viewed publically by the 
market so that banks are expected to have less incentive to smooth reported earnings or 
manage investor expectations. However, if banks exploit their greater permitted discretion in 
setting regulatory provisions in order to manage their capital position, the supporting role of 
bank provisioning is undermined. This study uses confidential data reported by banks to the 
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) to investigate whether banks utilise their 
discretion over regulatory provisions as a means to manage regulatory expectations about 
their key regulatory solvency ratios.  
The majority of past literature examining provisions management has focused on the Basel I 
period (Beatty et al., 1995; Shrieves and Dahl, 2003; Anandarajan et al., 2007). This study is 
one of the few to empirically examine the impact of the Basel II capital framework. A key 
objective of Basel II is to increase the risk sensitivity and transparency of capital, in order to 
better align regulatory capital with the riskiness of banks’ exposures (BCBS, 2006 par. 5). 
Under Basel II there are two regimes for the treatment of provisions for capital purposes, one 
for standardised banks and the other for advanced banks. This study tests how these two 
regimes impact on banks regulatory provisioning practices, relative to the Basel I framework.  
This study is the first to examine provisions management in banks reporting under the IRB 
approach to Basel II. As explained in Chapter 4, the IRB approach allows banks to use 
internal capital models to determine the required capital for regulatory purposes, subject to 
regulatory approval. An important objective of the IRB approach has been a greater 
                                                 
30 In contrast, the accounting framework requires evidence of a loss event occurring before a provision can be 
made, in a sense it encompasses a backward looking ‘incurred loss’ approach. 
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integration between regulatory provisioning and the expected loss (EL) of banks internal 
credit risk models. In this study, a unique access to privately reported regulatory submissions 
has allowed for an empirical examination of whether IRB banks are reporting regulatory 
provisions consistent with internal capital model outputs, and to determine whether this 
setting has influenced banks’ decisions to set regulatory provisions for capital management 
incentives. 
This study finds regulatory provisions exhibit a significantly positive relationship with 
regulatory capital ratios (before provisions and taxes) for the sample of all Australian banks. 
Banks with higher (lower) regulatory capital positions are found to report larger (lower) 
regulatory provisions across the full sample. The results suggest banks’ capital position is a 
relevant determinant in the decision to set regulatory provisions. Australian banks are to some 
extent using regulatory provisions as a tool to manage regulatory capital. In the Basel II 
period, results for standardised banks are consistent with this finding. For IRB banks, results 
confirm that the main determinant of regulatory provisions is the expected loss estimate from 
banks’ internal capital models. There is no relationship found between regulatory capital 
position and reported regulatory provisions for IRB banks in the post Basel II period. This 
result is attributed to a prudential standard applied under the Basel II IRB approach whereby 
a bank that reports eligible provisions (EP) that fall short of expected loss (EL) credit model 
outputs is subject to a capital charge equal to the amount that EP falls short of EL. It appears 
this standard has reduced the incentive for banks to use regulatory provisions to manage 
regulatory capital. This result is encouraging and that which was intended by the prudential 
standard, however it also highlights the need for further empirical research regarding the 
quality and reliability of internal capital model estimates for IRB banks. This is of increased 
relevance given that such estimates are not only influencing regulatory capital, but also the 
regulatory provisioning that supports it. 
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The remaining sections of this study build on the literature presented in Chapter 3; section 6.2 
provides greater detail on the regulatory treatment of provisioning in Australia, section 6.3 
introduces the variables and data sample used in this study, section 6.4 details the research 
hypotheses, section 6.5 presents descriptive statistics, section 6.6 details the methodology and 
section 6.7 interprets the results. Finally, section 6.8 provides a summary of this study’s 
conclusions. 
6.2. Regulatory Treatment of Provisions 
The prudential standard released by APRA entitled ‘Credit Quality’ (APS 220) is aimed at 
ensuring that all banks control credit risk and adopt prudent credit risk management policies 
and procedures, and sets out the requirements for regulatory provisioning in Australia. Banks 
must have an effective credit risk management system in place, maintaining provisions and 
reserves adequate to absorb existing and estimated future credit losses given the facts and 
circumstances applicable at the time (APS 220 – 1). The condition that provisions and 
reserves must be adequate to absorb ‘future’ credit losses and not just those ‘existing’ 
represents the main difference between regulatory standards and accounting standards for 
provisioning in Australia31.  
Australian banks are required to report specific provisions and a General Reserve for Credit 
Losses (GRCL), which together make up total loan-loss provisions for regulatory purposes. 
Regulatory provisions must be adequate to absorb credit losses identified as being incurred 
and incurred-but-not-yet-reported, as well as credit losses estimated but not certain to arise in 
the future (APS 220 – 9). Specific provisions include those defined under IFRS guidelines to 
be individually assessed provisions but also include any collective provisions ineligible to be 
                                                 
31 For greater detail on the differences between regulatory provisions and accounting provisions in Australia, 
Chapter 3 provides more extensive coverage. 
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included in GRCL. The GRCL is not a substitute for the establishment of adequate specific 
provisions or the write-off of bad debts. When information about an identifiable loss becomes 
available, the bank is required to establish a suitable specific provision or a write-off. The 
GRCL represents a reserve that is required to account for all anticipated future credit losses 
over the life of the portfolio, not certain to arise. 
The GRCL is eligible to be included in Upper Tier 2 regulatory capital. The amount to be 
included is limited to a maximum of 1.25 per cent of total risk-weighted assets. For a bank 
reporting under the internal ratings-based (IRB) approach to credit risk, the limit is a 
maximum of 0.6 per cent of total credit risk-weighted assets for non-defaulted exposures, for 
the excess of total eligible provisions (EP) over total expected losses (EL). The amount of 
GRCL to be included in Upper Tier 2 capital is on an after-tax basis, and any deferred tax 
asset associated with collective provisions eligible to be included in the GRCL is required to 
be removed (APS 111 – 10). 
IRB banks are required to report total eligible provisions (EP) for defaulted and non-
defaulted exposures. Total EP include all credit related provisions (i.e. specific provisions 
and GRCL), partial write-offs and any discounts on defaulted assets. IRB banks are required 
to compare total expected loss (EL) to EP for defaulted and non-defaulted exposures. Where 
the total EP amount is lower than EL the difference must be deducted on the basis of 50 per 
cent from Tier 1 capital, and 50 per cent from Tier 2 capital (APS 111), referred to as a 
shortfall capital charge. For non-defaulted exposures, where total EP is larger than EL, the 
amount of the difference made up of the GRCL can be included in Tier 2 capital up to a 
maximum of 0.6 per cent of risk-weighted assets. 
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6.3. Data and Sample Selection 
The dataset used in this study consists of 22 Australian banks reporting quarterly to APRA 
between 30 March 2004 and 31 December 2011 for a total of 32 quarterly periods. The 
sample consists of 687 bank-quarterly observations. Banks with higher than 30% Tier 1 
capital ratios at any point in the sample period are removed, corresponding to the removal of 
20 bank-quarter observations. It is assumed these banks are of sufficiently high levels of 
regulatory capital to remove any managerial incentive to use provisioning for capital 
management. The dataset consists of six major Australian banks32, nine local Australian 
banks and nine foreign-owned Australian banks. The panel dataset is constructed based on 
variables for loans and assets outstanding, impairments, regulatory provisions, earnings, 
capital, risk-weighted assets and macroeconomic data. The panel is unbalanced, with 18 
banks reporting for all periods, two banks beginning to report after the start of the sample 
period and two banks ceasing to report mid-way through the sample period due to mergers. 
The final dataset consists of 22 banks and 667 bank quarters. 
Australian banks implemented Basel II at the start of 2008, with 5 Australian banks being 
approved for reporting under the IRB approach. These banks were accredited to begin 
reporting under the IRB approach at the beginning of 2008 with the exception of one bank 
which was accredited for IRB reporting beginning in the June quarter, 2008. Four banks were 
accredited for the advanced approach to IRB reporting (A-IRB), with one bank accredited for 
the Foundation approach to IRB reporting (F-IRB). 
                                                 
32 This includes St. George Bank which was acquired by Westpac Banking Corporation, and BankWest which 
was acquired by Commonwealth Bank of Australia. 
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6.3.1. Bank Specific Credit Risk Variables 
Following past literature that examines the use of provisions for capital management, this 
study uses a model which controls for bank-specific credit risk. The two variables are used 
are the impaired assets ratio (IMP) and the impaired and past due assets ratio (IMPPD). They 
are calculated as follows: 
𝐈𝐌𝐏t = Impairments𝐭(TL𝐭−𝟏+TL𝐭)/𝟐      (6.1) 
𝐈𝐌𝐏𝐏𝐃t = Impairments𝐭+ 𝐏𝐚𝐬𝐭 𝐃𝐮𝐞𝐭(TL𝐭−𝟏+TL𝐭)/𝟐      (6.2) 
Impairments are defined by APRA to be facilities for which there is doubt as to whether the 
full amount due will be received in a timely manner. Past due items are those for which 90 
calendar days have elapsed since the due date of a contractual payment which has not been 
met in full. The impairments ratio (IMP) provides an indication of potential credit losses 
within the bank. The impaired and past due ratio (IMPPD) includes items overdue but well 
secured (past due) which at this point in time are not impaired. However, in the event that 
economic conditions worsen or collateral values fall, these items would more than likely 
become impaired. The denominator of the bank-specific credit risk variables is the average 
total loans (TL) over the current and past period.  
6.3.2. Banks Capital Ratios before Provisions and Taxes 
To correctly examine management incentives to use provisions to manage the bank’s 
regulatory capital position, in keeping with past literature this study calculates tier 1 and total 
capital on a before provisions and taxation basis. This removes endogenous effects that would 
exist between provisions and capital ratios. The adjustments made are specific to the 
Australian framework, however the concept of adjusting bank capital ratios before provisions 
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and taxes is in line with the literature (Collins et al., 1995; Ahmed et al., 1999; Anandarajan, 
Hasan and McCarthy, 2007). 
For Basel I and Basel II standardised banks, the tier 1 capital ratio (T1BP) and total capital 
ratios (before provisions and taxes) (TCBP) are calculated in excess of regulatory minimum. 
They are calculated by adding back provisions to tier 1 (total) capital and removing the tax 
benefit of provisioning. The tax rate is set at the prevailing Australian corporate tax rate of 
30%. GRCL is eligible to be included in tier 2 capital (up to a maximum of 1.25 percent of 
RWA), so this is reversed by removing its full amount from the numerator. RWA are 
calculated net of specific provisions, but gross of GRCL, so specific provisions are added 
back to RWA to correctly reflect the amount before provisioning, as follows33: 
T1BP std = Tier 1 capital + (𝟏−𝟎.𝟑) × (specific + GRCL)RWA + specific  - 0.04    (6.3) 
TCBP std = total capital + (𝟏−𝟎.𝟑) × (specific + GRCL)−GRCLRWA + specific  - 0.08    (6.4) 
For Basel II IRB banks, T1BP and TCBP are calculated in the same fashion as for 
standardised banks but with an additional reversal to apply the shortfall charge that would 
have been applied to banks if provisions were not made. To accurately portray these capital 
ratios before provisioning, banks actual shortfall charge is removed, and then half of EL (in 
the case of T1BP) and the full amount of EL (in the case of TCBP) are applied as the shortfall 
charges. Finally for IRB banks, RWA are calculated gross of specific and GRCL provisions 
and so no adjustment is needed. Where EP is greater than EL on non-defaulted assets, the 
additional component is eligible to be included in tier 2 capital (up to a maximum of 0.6 
                                                 
33 Note in regards to equation 6.4. There are no cases in the sample of a bank’s GRCL exceeding 1.25% of 
RWA. For this reason the full amount of GRCL is removed from the numerator. 
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percent of Credit RWA). This amount, here referred to as eligible GRCL (EGRCL) is thus 
removed for the purposes of determining the capital ratio for IRB banks before provisions. 
T1BP IRB = Tier 1 capital +𝟎.𝟕× (specific+GRCL)+(𝟎.𝟓 ×shortfall)−(𝟎.𝟓×EL)RWA  - 0.04  (6.5) 
𝐓𝐂𝐁𝐏 IRB = total capital +𝟎.𝟕× (specific + GRCL)−EGRCL+shortfall−ELRWA  - 0.08  (6.6) 
6.3.3. Banks Earnings before Provisions and Taxes 
Building on past literature that has found earnings management in the banking sector for 
other countries, as a secondary objective this study examines whether banks use regulatory 
provisions to manage bank earnings. To do so, earnings is included as a variable after the 
removal of all provisions and taxes (EBTP).  
6.4. Hypothesis Development 
This section develops the research hypotheses that are tested in this study. The treatment of 
regulatory provisions for capital purposes is different under the Basel I and Basel II 
standardised framework compared to the Basel II IRB framework. Table 6.1 shows the effect 
of a one dollar increase in provisions on the Tier 1 capital ratio and the Total Capital Ratio.  
6.4.1. Capital Management Hypothesis – Standardised Banks Specific Provisions 
For Basel I banks and Basel II standardised banks, an increase of one dollar in specific 
provisions results in a reduction in retained earnings of one minus the corporate tax rate 
(assuming positive earnings). Since risk-weighted assets (RWA) are calculated on a net of 
specific provisions basis in Australia (APS 112 - 7), the denominator of the capital adequacy 
ratio is reduced by one multiplied by the risk weight on that particular asset’s risk grade. The 
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numerator effect dominates the denominator effect in every case, resulting in a net reduction 
in the Tier 1 capital ratio.  
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Table 6.1: Effect of a $1 change in Provisions on Regulatory Capital 
Basel I banks and Basel II standardised banks 
 Impact on capital adequacy: 
 Tier 1 capital ratio Total capital ratio 
Effect of:   
↑ specific provisions 
(SPROV) 
Retained earnings ↓ 
Total RWA ↓ 
Net effect: ↓ 
Retained earnings ↓ 
Total RWA ↓ 
Net effect: ↓ 
↑ general reserve for 
credit losses (GRCL) 
Retained earnings ↓ 
Total RWA no effect 
 
 
Net effect: ↓ 
Retained earnings ↓ 
Tier 2 capital ↑ (to a max. of 
1.25% of total RWA) 
Total RWA no effect 
Net effect: None 
Basel II IRB banks 
 Impact on capital adequacy: 
 Tier 1 capital ratio Total capital ratio 
Effect of:   
↑ specific provisions 
(SPROV) 
Retained earnings ↓ 
Shortfall in provisions (50%) ↓ 
Total RWA no effect 
 
Net effect: ↓ 
Retained earnings ↓ 
Shortfall in provisions ↓ 
Total RWA no effect 
 
Net effect: None 
↑ general reserve for 
credit losses (GRCL) 
Retained earnings ↓ 
Shortfall in provisions (50%) ↓ 
Total RWA no effect 
 
 
 
 
Net effect: ↓ 
Retained earnings ↓ 
Shortfall in provisions ↓ 
Surplus provisions ↑ (to a max. 
of 0.6% of credit RWA for the 
component of GRCL for non-
defaulted exposures) 
Total RWA no effect 
Net effect: None 
↑ eligible provisions on 
defaulted exposures  
(EP - defaulted) 
Retained earnings ↓ 
Shortfall in provisions (50%) ↓ 
Total RWA no effect 
 
Net effect: ↓ 
Retained earnings ↓ 
Shortfall in provisions ↓ 
Total RWA no effect 
 
Net effect: None 
↑ eligible provisions on 
non-defaulted 
exposures 
(EP - non defaulted) 
Retained earnings ↓ 
Shortfall in provisions (50%) ↓ 
Total RWA no effect 
 
 
Net effect: ↓ 
Retained earnings ↓ 
Shortfall in provisions ↓ 
Surplus provisions ↑ (to a max. 
of 0.6% of credit RWA) 
Total RWA no effect 
Net effect: None 
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Since specific provisions are not eligible to be included in Tier 2 capital, the effect of a one 
dollar increase in specific provisions will also result in a net reduction in the Total Capital 
Ratio. Given that an additional increase in specific provisions results in a reduction in 
regulatory capital, the following hypotheses are tested to determine whether banks report less 
(more) specific provisions during times when regulatory capital ratios are lower (higher): 
H1: Specific provisions have no relationship with the Tier 1 (Total) capital ratio 
(before taxes and provisions) for Australian banks operating in the Basel I and 
Basel II Standardised regimes. 
H1a: Specific provisions are positively related to the Tier 1 (Total) capital ratio 
(before taxes and provisions) for Australian banks operating in the Basel I and 
Basel II Standardised regimes. 
6.4.2. Capital Management Hypothesis – Standardised Banks GRCL 
For Basel I and Basel II standardised banks, the treatment of GRCL differs from that of 
specific provisions. In the case of the Tier 1 Capital ratio, a one dollar increase in GRCL 
results in a reduction in retained earnings by one minus the corporate tax rate (assuming 
positive earnings), but has no effect on RWA. The resulting effect is a net reduction of the 
Tier 1 capital ratio. The net reduction in the Tier 1 capital ratio is larger (though only 
marginally) for an increase in GRCL than for the same increase in specific provisions since 
RWA are calculated net of specific provisions but gross of GRCL.  
In regard to the total capital ratio, an increase in GRCL has no effect. A one dollar increase in 
GRCL reduces retained earnings by one minus the corporate rate, but the amount of GRCL 
eligible for inclusion in Tier 2 capital is on an after tax basis and restricted to a limit of 1.25 
per cent of RWA. Any deferred tax asset (DTA) associated with collective provisions eligible 
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for inclusion in the GRCL is required to be removed (APS 111 - 10). As a result, the 
reduction in retained earnings and the increase in Tier 2 capital exactly offset, resulting in 
GRCL having no impact on total regulatory capital (provided GRCL is less than the limit of 
1.25 per cent of RWA).  
Given an additional increase in GRCL causes a reduction in Tier 1 capital, the second 
research hypotheses as detailed below are tested to determine whether banks report less 
GRCL when Tier 1 capital ratios are lower. Since an increase in GRCL has no effect on the 
total capital ratio, a positive relationship with the total capital ratio would indicate capital 
management: 
H2: GRCL has no relationship with the Tier 1 (Total) capital ratio (before taxes 
and provisions) for Australian banks operating in the Basel I and Basel II 
Standardised regimes. 
H2a: GRCL is positively related to the Tier 1 (Total) capital ratio (before taxes and 
provisions) for Australian banks operating in the Basel I and Basel II 
Standardised regimes. 
6.4.3. Capital Management Hypothesis – Standardised Banks Total Provisions 
Finally for standardised banks, the capital management hypothesis is tested for total 
provisions (the sum of specific and GRCL). As shown in Table 6.1, increases in total 
provisions would be expected to reduce the Tier 1 capital ratio and have no effect on the 
Total Capital Ratio. A positive empirical relationship between these two variables is 
interpreted as capital management. This gives rise to the following hypothesis: 
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 H3: Total provisions have no relationship with the Tier 1 (Total) capital ratio 
(before taxes and provisions) for Australian banks operating in the Basel I and 
Basel II Standardised regimes. 
H3a: Total provisions are positively related to the Tier 1 (Total) capital ratio (before 
taxes and provisions) for Australian banks operating in the Basel I and Basel II 
Standardised regimes. 
6.4.4. Capital Management Hypothesis – IRB Banks Specific Provisions 
As shown in Table 6.1, an increase in specific provisions has the effect of reducing retained 
earnings for IRB banks. The shortfall in provisions charge is reduced. The reduction in the 
shortfall charge is by 50% of the increase in specific provisions for the Tier 1 capital ratio 
and the full amount of the increase for the total capital ratio. This assumes specific provisions 
are such that eligible provisions are less than expected loss. Total RWA remains unchanged 
since RWA are calculated gross of specific provisions. The net effect of the increase in 
specific provisions is a reduction in the Tier 1 capital ratio, and no change to the Total Capital 
Ratio. This leads to the hypothesis that a positive relationship between specific provisions 
and the Tier 1 and Total capital ratios (before provisions) would indicate capital 
management: 
H4: Specific provisions have no relationship with the Tier 1 (Total) capital ratio 
(before taxes and provisions) for IRB accredited Australian banks. 
H4a: Specific provisions are positively related to the Tier 1 (Total) capital ratio 
(before taxes and provisions) for IRB accredited Australian banks. 
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6.4.5. Capital Management Hypothesis – IRB Banks GRCL 
As shown in Table 6.1 an increase in GRCL has an identical effect on the Tier 1 capital ratio 
as specific provisions. The increase reduces retained earnings, reduces the shortfall in 
provisions charge by 50% of the change and has no impact on RWA, which is gross of 
GRCL. An increase in GRCL also has no effect on the total capital ratio, in a similar manner 
to specific provisions. This leads to tests of the following capital management hypotheses 
regarding GRCL: 
H5: GRCL has no relationship with the Tier 1 (Total) capital ratio (before taxes 
and provisions) for IRB accredited Australian banks. 
H5a: GRCL is positively related to the Tier 1 (Total) capital ratio (before taxes and 
provisions) for IRB accredited Australian banks. 
6.4.6. Capital Management Hypothesis – IRB Banks Total Provisions 
The effect of an increase in specific provisions on the tier 1 capital ratio and the total capital 
ratio is the same for that of GRCL. So the relationship between total provisions (the 
combination of specific and GRCL) and the tier 1 and total capital ratios is also the same. The 
following hypotheses regarding capital management for total provisions are tested: 
H6: Total provisions have no relationship with the tier 1 (total) capital ratio (before 
taxes and provisions) for IRB accredited Australian banks. 
H6a: Total provisions are positively related to the tier 1 (total) capital ratio (before 
taxes and provisions) for IRB accredited Australian banks. 
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6.4.7. Basel II IRB Hypothesis – EP Defaulted 
For Basel II IRB banks, provisions are separated into eligible provisions (EP) on defaulted 
exposures, and eligible provisions on non-defaulted exposures. An increase in EP on 
defaulted exposures results in a reduction in the Tier 1 capital ratio and no change to the 
Total capital ratio. EP on defaulted exposures reduces retained earnings and has no effect on 
RWA. However assuming banks EP is less than EL for defaulted exposures, it reduces the 
shortfall capital charge on defaulted exposures. A shortfall capital charge is assessed where 
EP fails to be adequate to cover EL from banks’ internal capital models. If EP falls below EL, 
the difference is charged 50% to Tier 1 and 50% to Tier 2 capital. Assuming a bank’s EP is 
below EL, a one dollar increase in EP for defaulted exposures reduces the shortfall charge by 
50 cents for Tier 1 capital and by the full dollar for Total capital. As a result, an increase in 
EP on defaulted exposures results in a net reduction in the Tier 1 capital ratio, and no change 
to the total capital ratio. The following hypotheses are tested to determine whether IRB 
banks’ capital manage using eligible provisions, by reporting less EP for defaulted exposures 
when Tier 1 and Total capital ratios are lower, and reporting more EP for defaulted exposures 
when capital ratios are larger: 
H7: EP-defaulted has no relationship with the Tier 1 (Total) capital ratio (before 
taxes and provisions) for Australian banks operating in the Basel II IRB 
regime. 
H7a: EP-defaulted is positively related to the Tier 1 (Total) capital ratio (before 
taxes and provisions) for Australian banks operating in the Basel II IRB 
regime. 
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6.4.8. Basel II IRB Hypothesis – EP Non Defaulted 
EP on non-defaulted exposures is assessed in a similar manner, and as shown in Table 6.1, an 
increase results in a net reduction in the Tier 1 capital ratio but has no effect on the total 
capital ratio. In the case where EP is greater than EL for non-defaulted exposures, the surplus 
provisions may be included in Tier 2 capital up to a maximum of 0.6% of credit RWA. In this 
way, EP on non-defaulted exposures will have no effect on Total capital. In the case where 
EP is below EL, increases in EP create opposing effects with a decrease in retained earnings 
being offset by a reduction in the shortfall charge. In the case where EP is greater than EL, a 
further increase in EP results in opposing effects of a decrease in retained earnings being 
offset by an increase in Tier 2 capital for the inclusion of surplus provisions (provided EP for 
non-defaulted exposures is less than 0.6% of credit RWA). The following hypotheses are 
tested to determine whether EP on non-defaulted exposures are used for the purpose of 
capital management: 
H8: EP non-defaulted has no relationship with the Tier 1 (Total) capital ratio 
(before taxes and provisions) for Australian banks operating in the Basel II 
IRB regime. 
H8a: EP non-defaulted is positively related to the Tier 1 (Total) capital ratio (before 
taxes and provisions) for Australian banks operating in the Basel II IRB 
regime. 
After controlling for expected losses from banks’ internal capital models, hypotheses 7 and 8 
are retested. IRB banks have an incentive to report EP’s in line with EL to avoid being capital 
charged for the shortfall in provisions. Capital management is re-examined after controlling 
for EL to account for this incentive. If a positive and significant relationship between EP and 
regulatory capital prevails, capital management is found to exist for IRB banks using EP. 
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6.4.9. Earnings Management Hypothesis 
In addition, the study examines whether Australian banks are setting regulatory provisions in 
such a way as to influence reported earnings. For a bank with relatively high earnings before 
tax and provisions (EBTP), a bank manager may set higher discretionary provisions to reduce 
earnings, such that tax expense is minimised and earnings are, in effect saved for future 
periods. In contrast, for banks with relatively lower EBTP, a bank manager may set lower 
discretionary provisions to limit further reductions in earnings. The following hypotheses are 
tested to determine whether banks have used regulatory provisions for earnings management: 
H9:  Bank provisioning for loan losses (specific, GRCL, total provisions) has no 
relationship with earnings before taxes and provisions. 
H9a:  Bank provisioning for loan losses (specific, GRCL, total provisions) has a 
positively relationship with earnings before taxes and provisions. 
6.5. Descriptive Statistics 
Australian banks experienced a strong period of growth, categorised by low provisions as a 
percentage of total loans, leading up to the onset of the global financial crisis in late 2007. 
Figure 6.1 shows IRB banks experienced a downward trend in specific provisions and the 
general reserve for credit loss over this period.  
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The implementation of the regulatory equivalent of IFRS caused a noticeable drop in GRCL 
in the March quarter of 2006. Under Australian IFRS, accounting provisions were to be set 
only where objective evidence of an incurred loss existed for a loan. This raised transparency 
in financial reporting, reducing banks’ ability to use provisions to manage earnings and 
capital, however it restricted the ability of banks to provision for losses expected over the life 
of the loan, but not certain to occur. APRA’s regulatory equivalent allowed for more 
prudential and forward-looking approaches for regulatory provisioning, introducing a 
‘General Reserve for Credit Losses’ to cover both expected and incurred losses. 
Implementation of the regulatory equivalent of AIFRS began in 2006, resulting in a 
significant (almost 25 percent) drop in GRCL as a percentage of total loans.  
At the December quarter, 2009 IRB bank provisions as a percentage of total loans had almost 
doubled. The Australian financial system performed relatively well through the crisis when 
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compared with other countries. However, the financial turmoil exposed difficulties in a small 
number of highly levered companies in the lead up to the crisis, as well as widespread rises in 
repayment difficulties as the economy slowed. This resulted in IRB banks reporting larger 
specific provisions as shown in Figure 6.1, the majority of which come from corporate 
exposures.  
Since the crisis, IRB banks have increased GRCL marginally. The increase has been 
attributed largely to weaker economic conditions causing some declines in collateral value, 
and banks lowering internal credit ratings assigned to customers. Over the final two years in 
the sample 2010-2011, the trend for specific provisions has been relatively flat whilst GRCL 
as a percentage of total loans has exhibited a slight downward trend. At the end of the sample 
period, total provisions for IRB banks remain elevated, at a level in excess of 1 per cent of 
total loans. 
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For standardised banks, Figure 6.2 shows that provisioning as a percentage of total loans 
remained relatively flat prior to the onset of the global financial crisis. Specific provisions 
and GRCL together made up only 0.5 per cent of total loans. However, by the December 
quarter 2009, at the height of the financial crisis, provisions touched levels close to 1.6 per 
cent of total loans. Since this time, provisions have followed a downward trend, but remain 
elevated compared with pre-crisis levels.  
 
Figure 6.3 indicates that leading up to the global financial crisis, IRB bank capital positions 
remained relatively stable, with the banking sector as a whole being sufficiently capitalised.  
The IRB bank average Tier 1 ratio (before provisions) remained stable around 8 per cent, 
while the total capital ratio (before provisions) remained close to 11 per cent. These capital 
ratios were well above the minimum requirements imposed by the Basel capital framework of 
4 and 8 per cent respectively. In response to the global financial crisis, IRB banks 
strengthened their capital positions. Capital ratio strengthening was primarily in equity, rather 
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than less high quality capital. Whilst increases in capital ratios were not driven directly by 
changes in regulation, IRB banks may have anticipated that the implementation of Basel III 
would be forthcoming (APRA Insight Issue 2, 2012). This would explain banks’ 
concentration on strengthening higher quality Tier 1 capital, rising to levels of 11 percent by 
the December quarter 2009, with Tier 2 capital becoming of less importance.  
Standardised banks exhibited a similar trend in bank provisions and capital ratios (before 
provisions) as shown in Figure 6.4. In the lead up to the global financial crisis, provisions and 
capital ratios remained flat. Tier 1 capital and total capital ratios (before provisions) remained 
at levels close to 10 and 12 percent respectively, well above Basel minimums. Total 
provisions remained stable at 0.5 per cent of total loans. In response to the global financial 
crisis, bank capital ratios were strengthened and provisions increased simultaneously. Total 
provisions reached levels above 1.5 per cent in the December quarter 2009, with Tier 1 and 
total capital ratios (before provisions) reaching levels of 12 and 14 per cent respectively. 
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Figure 6.5 shows that eligible provisions (EL) of IRB banks remained relatively stable for 
non-defaulted exposures throughout the Basel II sample period. EP for defaulted exposures 
rose steeply with the onset of the financial crisis. Between the January quarter 2008 and the 
June quarter 2009, EP on defaulted exposures almost doubled in size from 0.54% to 1.04% of 
total loans. Eligible provisions remained elevated at 1.02% of total loans at sample end in the 
December quarter 2011. 
Figure 6.6 indicates eligible provisions (EL) taken as a proportion of Expected Loss (EL) has 
stayed close to 70% throughout the Basel II sample period, rising marginally from 66.4% in 
March 2008 to 75.6% in December 2011. The rise in eligible provisions as a percentage of 
expected losses comes at the same time as a strengthening by IRB banks in the quality of 
their capital ratios, boosting equity and Tier 1 capital ratios at the expense of Tier 2 capital in 
preparation for Basel III. 
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Table 6.2 reports descriptive statistics for the full sample. The appendix includes additional 
descriptive statistics for Basel I, Basel II standardised and Basel II IRB samples. Table 6.3 
reports the Pearson correlation coefficients for the variables in the sample. The independent 
variables in the sample include the two bank-specific credit risk variables (IMP, IMPPD) as 
well as the proportion of corporate loans (LCORP), Tier 1 and Total Capital before 
provisions and taxes (T1BP, TCBP), all of which have significantly positive relationships 
with the bank provisions variables (SPROV, GRCL, TOTPROV). The logarithm of total 
loans and advances (LNSIZE) and the proportion of housing loans (LHOUS) both have a 
significant negative correlation with the bank provisions variables (SPROV, GRCL, 
TOTPROV). 
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Figure 6.6 
Relation between IRB-eligible provisions and bank capital ratios before provisions 
Tier 1 capital Tier 2 capital Total eligible provisions 
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Table 6.2 
          Descriptive statistics for sample bank-observations 
     
           This table presents the summary statistics for all Australian banks. The sample period is March 2004 to 
December 2011. The tier 1 capital ratio for Basel I banks and Basel II standardised banks is calculated as 
tier 1 capital plus provisions multiplied by one minus the corporate tax rate, divided by total risk-weighted 
assets. The total capital ratio for Basel I banks and Basel II standardised banks is calculated as total capital 
plus provisions multiplied by one minus the corporate tax rate minus the general reserve for credit losses 
(to a maximum of 1.25% of total RWA), divided by total risk-weighted assets. The tier 1 capital ratio for 
Basel II IRB banks is calculated as tier 1 capital plus provisions multiplied by one minus the corporate tax 
rate plus the shortfall in provisions for credit losses (50%) minus total expected losses (50%), divided by 
total risk-weighted assets. The total capital ratio for Basel II IRB banks is calculated as total capital plus 
provisions multiplied by one minus the corporate tax rate plus the shortfall in provisions for credit losses 
minus surplus provisions on non-defaulted exposures (to a maximum of 0.6% of credit RWA) minus total 
expected losses, divided by total risk-weighted assets. EBTP is earnings before provisions and taxes, 
divided by average assets. 
           All banks (March 2004 to December 2011), N=667 
    
Data item 
 
Mean 
 
Standard 
deviation 
 
Lower 
quartile 
 
Median 
 
Upper 
quartile 
           Total loans $mil 
 
58,886 
 
95,759 
 
3,146 
 
12,521 
 
48,788 
           Loans to households % 57.4 
 
29.1 
 
43.3 
 
62.7 
 
76.9 
Loans to corporates % 
 
42.1 
 
29.0 
 
21.6 
 
37.2 
 
55.3 
Loans to other % 
 
0.5 
 
0.9 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
0.5 
Impaired facilities % 
 
1.09 
 
1.99 
 
0.13 
 
0.40 
 
1.19 
Past due items % 
 
0.80 
 
1.11 
 
0.32 
 
0.50 
 
0.80 
RWA for credit risk % 
 
96.5 
 
46.7 
 
71.5 
 
87.6 
 
103.4 
           Specific provisions % 
 
0.35 
 
0.51 
 
0.05 
 
0.15 
 
0.41 
GRCL % 
 
0.56 
 
0.35 
 
0.33 
 
0.51 
 
0.76 
Total provisions % 
 
0.91 
 
0.73 
 
0.47 
 
0.73 
 
1.13 
Tier 1 capital ratio 
 
10.7 
 
3.9 
 
8.2 
 
9.5 
 
11.8 
Total capital ratio 
 
13.1 
 
3.5 
 
11.0 
 
11.9 
 
14.3 
EBTP % pq   0.35   1.01   0.18   0.30   0.43 
 
  
  
Table 6.3 
                                   Pearson correlation coefficients for key variables of the sample bank-observations 
                   
                                     LNSIZE is the logarithm of total loans and advances. LHOUS is loans to households divided by outstanding loans. LCORP is loans to corporations divided by outstanding loans. IMP is impaired facilities 
divided by outstanding loans. IMPPD is impaired and past due facilities divided by outstanding loans. RWAC is risk-weighted assets for credit risk divided by outstanding loans. SPROV is the ratio of 
specific provisions to outstanding loans. GRCL is the ratio of general reserve for credit losses to outstanding loans. LLP is the ratio of total provisions to outstanding loans. T1BP is the tier 1 capital ratio 
before provisions. TCBP is the total capital ratio before provisions. EBTP is earnings before provisions and taxes divided by average assets. ** indicates significance at the 5% level. 
                                     
  
LNSIZE 
 
LHOUS 
 
LCORP 
 
IMP 
 
IMPPD 
 
RWAC 
 
SPROV 
 
GRCL 
 
TOTPROV 
 
T1BP 
 
TCBP 
 
EBBP 
                                     LNSIZE 
 
1.00 
                                  LHOUS 
 
0.40 ** 
 
1.00 
                               
LCORP 
 
-
0.40 ** 
 
-
1.00 ** 
 
1.00 
                            
IMP 
 
-
0.09 ** 
 
-
0.25 ** 
 
0.25 ** 
 
1.00 
                         
IMPPD 
 
-
0.17 ** 
 
-
0.34 ** 
 
0.35 ** 
 
0.92 ** 
 
1.00 
                      
RWAC 
 
-
0.07 
  
-
0.27 ** 
 
0.26 ** 
 
0.46 ** 
 
0.36 ** 
 
1.00 
                   
SPROV 
 
-
0.06 
  
-
0.25 ** 
 
0.26 ** 
 
0.79 ** 
 
0.81 ** 
 
0.22 ** 
 
1.00 
                
GRCL 
 
0.06 
  
-
0.31 ** 
 
0.31 ** 
 
0.40 ** 
 
0.45 ** 
 
0.51 ** 
 
0.42 ** 
 
1.00 
             
TOTPROV 
 
-
0.01 
  
-
0.33 ** 
 
0.33 ** 
 
0.75 ** 
 
0.78 ** 
 
0.40 ** 
 
0.90 ** 
 
0.77 ** 
 
1.00 
          
T1BP 
 
-
0.48 ** 
 
-
0.30 ** 
 
0.29 ** 
 
0.12 ** 
 
0.18 ** 
 
0.05 
  
0.20 ** 
 
0.20 ** 
 
0.24 ** 
 
1.00 
       
TCBP 
 
-
0.53 ** 
 
-
0.32 ** 
 
0.31 ** 
 
0.11 ** 
 
0.18 ** 
 
0.13 ** 
 
0.17 ** 
 
0.28 ** 
 
0.25 ** 
 
0.92 ** 
 
1.00 
    
EBTP   0.03     
-
0.02     0.02     0.00     
-
0.02     0.09 **   0.02     0.05     0.04     0.02     0.01     1.00   
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6.6. Methodology 
To test the capital management hypothesis and the hypotheses stated in section 6.4, this study 
uses a Tobit fixed-effects panel regression. The Tobit panel regression model is used because 
the dependent variable ‘regulatory provisions’ is strictly non-negative. The Tobit model 
overcomes the problem with OLS being inconsistent as a result of provisions being bounded 
at zero. Using a latent variable censored at zero it can be shown that the Tobit estimator 
retains consistency. Results show no difference in the sign and significance of variable 
coefficients under a fixed-effect panel specification. The general model specification is set up 
as follows: 
 y𝐢,𝐭∗ = 𝛂𝐢 + 𝛃𝟏CRISK𝐢,𝐭 + 𝛃𝟐CRBP𝐢,𝐭 + 𝛆𝐢,𝐭    (6.7) 
 𝐏𝐑𝐎𝐕𝒊,𝒕 =  �y𝐢,𝐭∗   𝐢𝐟   y𝐢,𝐭∗ > 𝟎𝟎     𝐢𝐟   y𝐢,𝐭∗ ≤ 𝟎       (6.8) 
yi,t∗  = Latent variable taking the value of PROV𝑖,𝑡, and zero if negative.  
αi = Panel fixed effects intercept term. PROV𝑖,𝑡 = ratio of provisions to outstanding loans. Either, Specific provisions (SPROVi,t) the 
General Reserve for Credit Losses (GRCLi,t) or Total Provisions (TOTPROVi,t), depending 
on the model. All regulatory provisions variables are included as ratios to Total Loans. 
CRISKi,t = Credit risk proxy as specified in section 6.3 (IMPi,t, IMPPDi,t) 
CRBPi,t = The regulatory capital ratio in excess of the minimum regulatory requirement and 
before provisions and taxes, as either Tier 1 capital ratio before provisions and taxes (T1BPi,t) 
or Total capital ratio before provisions (TCBPi,t) as specified in section 6.3. 
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6.6.1. Full Sample Model 
The first set of models examines the whole sample of Australian banks, both standardised and 
IRB banks operating across the entire sample from March 2004 to December 2011 during 
Basel I and Basel II periods. The model tests the capital management hypothesis across the 
sample. The model also tests for the presence of earnings management, in line with 
hypothesis 9. The models are Tobit regressions, specified as follows; 
SPROV𝐢,𝐭 = 𝛂𝐢 + 𝛃𝟏CRISK𝐢,𝐭 + 𝛃𝟐CRBP𝐢,𝐭 + 𝛃𝟑EBTP𝐢,𝐭 + 𝛆𝐢,𝐭   (6.9) 
GRCL𝐢,𝐭 = 𝛂𝐢 + 𝛃𝟏CRISK𝐢,𝐭 + 𝛃𝟐CRBP𝐢,𝐭 + 𝛃𝟑EBTP𝐢,𝐭 + 𝛆𝐢,𝐭   (6.10) 
TOTPROV𝐢,𝐭 = 𝛂𝐢 + 𝛃𝟏CRISK𝐢,𝐭 + 𝛃𝟐CRBP𝐢,𝐭 + 𝛃𝟑EBTP𝐢,𝐭 + 𝛆𝐢,𝐭  (6.11) 
6.6.2. Standardised Bank Model 
The second set of models examines the sample of Australian banks reporting under the 
standardised approach to Basel II throughout the full sample period March 2004 to December 
2011. The models test the capital management hypothesis in line with hypotheses 1-3. The 
models are Tobit regressions specified as follows; 
SPROV𝐢,𝐭 = 𝛂𝐢 + 𝛃𝟏CRISK𝐢,𝐭 + 𝛃𝟐CRBP𝐢,𝐭 + 𝛆𝐢,𝐭     (6.12) 
GRCL𝐢,𝐭 = 𝛂𝐢 + 𝛃𝟏CRISK𝐢,𝐭 + 𝛃𝟐CRBP𝐢,𝐭 + 𝛆𝐢,𝐭     (6.13) 
TOTPROV𝐢,𝐭 = 𝛂𝐢 + 𝛃𝟏CRISK𝐢,𝐭 + 𝛃𝟐CRBP𝐢,𝐭 + 𝛆𝐢,𝐭    (6.14) 
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6.6.3. IRB Bank Models 
The third set of models examines the sample of Australian banks reporting under the IRB 
approach to Basel II throughout the full sample period March 2004 to December 2011. The 
models test the capital management hypothesis in line with hypotheses 4-6. The models are 
Tobit regressions specified as follows; 
SPROV𝐢,𝐭 = 𝛂𝐢 + 𝛃𝟏CRISK𝐢,𝐭 + 𝛃𝟐CRBP𝐢,𝐭 + 𝛃𝟑BASELII × CRBP𝐢,𝐭 + 𝛃𝟒BASELII + 𝛆𝐢,𝐭 
        (6.15) 
GRCL𝐢,𝐭 = 𝛂𝐢 + 𝛃𝟏CRISK𝐢,𝐭 + 𝛃𝟐CRBP𝐢,𝐭 + 𝛃𝟑BASELII × CRBP𝐢,𝐭 + 𝛃𝟒BASELII + 𝛆𝐢,𝐭 
        (6.16) 
TOTPROV𝐢,𝐭 = 𝛂𝐢 + 𝛃𝟏CRISK𝐢,𝐭 + 𝛃𝟐CRBP𝐢,𝐭 + 𝛃𝟑BASELII × CRBP𝐢,𝐭 + 𝛃𝟒BASELII +
𝛆𝐢,𝐭         (6.17) 
Where: 
BASELII = dummy variable taking the value of 1 where the bank is reporting under Basel II, 
and zero otherwise. 
BASELII × CRBPi,t = interaction effect between Basel II and the Regulatory Capital Ratio 
(before provisions and taxes), interpreted as the additional effect on the relationship between 
CRBPi,t and PROVi,t that occurs as a result of the change to Basel II IRB reporting. 
6.6.4. Eligible Provisions Model 
The fourth set of models tests hypotheses 3 and 4. The sample is for all IRB banks reporting 
eligible provisions (EL) during the Basel II period, from March 2008 to December 2011. The 
three models separately examine eligible provisions on defaulted exposures, eligible 
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provisions on non-defaulted exposures and total eligible provisions. The models are Tobit 
regressions, specified as follows; 
EP-Defaulted𝐢,𝐭 = 𝛂𝐢 + 𝛃𝟏CRISK𝐢,𝐭 + 𝛃𝟐CRBP𝐢,𝐭 + 𝛆𝐢,𝐭    (6.18) 
EP-Non Defaulted𝐢,𝐭 = 𝛂𝐢 + 𝛃𝟏CRISK𝐢,𝐭 + 𝛃𝟐CRBP𝐢,𝐭 + 𝛆𝐢,𝐭   (6.19) 
EP𝐢,𝐭 = 𝛂𝐢 + 𝛃𝟏CRISK𝐢,𝐭 + 𝛃𝟐CRBP𝐢,𝐭 + 𝛆𝐢,𝐭     (6.20) 
6.6.5. Eligible Provisions Model after Expected Loss 
The final set of models examines the relationship between eligible provisions and regulatory 
capital after controlling for expected loss. As mentioned, banks are required to set eligible 
provisions in line with expected loss outcomes or be capital charged for the shortfall between 
EP and EL (50% to Tier 1 and 50% to Tier 2). This final model specification examines 
hypothesis 7 and 8 to determine if banks use eligible provisions to capital manage after 
controlling for the incentive to provision in line with expected loss estimates from internal 
capital models. 
EP-Defaulted𝐢,𝐭 = 𝛂𝐢 + 𝛃𝟏EL-Defaulted𝐢,𝐭 + 𝛃𝟐CRBP𝐢,𝐭 + 𝛆𝐢,𝐭   (6.21) 
EP-Non Defaulted𝐢,𝐭 = 𝛂𝐢 + 𝛃𝟏EL-Non Defaulted𝐢,𝐭 + 𝛃𝟐CRBP𝐢,𝐭 + 𝛆𝐢,𝐭  (6.22) 
EP𝐢,𝐭 = 𝛂𝐢 + 𝛃𝟏CRISK𝐢,𝐭 + 𝛃𝟐EL𝐢,𝐭 + 𝛆𝐢,𝐭      (6.23) 
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6.7. Results 
Table 6.4 shows results for all banks over the sample period. Results for 12 models are 
shown, split into three panels A, B and C, based on the dependent variable used in the model; 
specific provisions, GRCL and total provisions, respectively. Within each panel there are two 
separate groups of models based on the regulatory capital ratio used: Tier 1 capital ratio and 
Total capital ratio. Within each group there are two models, one for each banks-specific 
credit risk variable used: (1) impairments ratio to total loans and (2) impaired and past due 
ratio to total loans. The model fit is sufficiently high across the 12 model specifications, with 
pseudo-R2 of close to 70%. Bank-specific credit risk variables and regulatory capital ratios 
show high levels of significance across the 12 models in Table 6.4.  
6.7.1. Full Sample Results for Earnings Management 
The coefficient for EBTP is negative and insignificant for all dependent variables, SPROV, 
GRCL and TOTPROV for the results presented in Table 6.4 over the whole sample of banks. 
The null hypothesis of no earnings management (Hypothesis 9) cannot be rejected, indicating 
Australian banks have not used provisions as a tool to manage earnings over the sample 
period. Similar results were found for EBTP when tested separately for standardised and IRB 
banks. These results are not reported but are available on request. 
6.7.2. Full Sample Results for Capital Management 
Results for the regulatory capital variables (T1BP and TCBP) are positive and significant as 
shown in Table 6.4 for specific provisions, GRCL and total provisions. This result is in line 
with banks using provisions as a tool to influence their capital position, limiting provisions 
when capital ratios are relatively lower and provisioning more when regulatory capital is 
high.  
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The difference in provisions for a bank with a regulatory capital ratio in the lower quartile 
and that of a bank with a higher regulatory capital ratio in the upper quartile is shown in 
Table 6.4 for each model specification. Results vary between specific provisions, GRCL and 
total provisions, averaging differences of 0.105%, 0.06% and 0.145% respectively. These 
differences are considerable when compared with the average provisioning levels across the 
sample of 0.26%, 0.66% and 0.91% of total loans respectively. 
Table 6.4 
            The effect of bank capital ratios on bank provisioning practices, Tobit regression analysis 
 
             This table examines the relation between bank capital adequacy ratios and bank loan-loss provisions. The sample 
period is March 2004 to December 2011. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. ** indicates significance at the 
5% level. 
             Panel A: Specific provisions 
          
  
Tier 1 capital ratio 
 
Total capital ratio 
Independent variables 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
             IMP 
 
0.2109 ** 
    
0.2153 ** 
   
  
(34.83) 
     
(35.88) 
    IMPPD 
    
0.1611 ** 
    
0.1651 ** 
     
(34.02) 
     
(35.15) 
 T1BP 
 
0.0212 ** 
 
0.0263 ** 
      
  
(4.75) 
  
(5.79) 
       TCBP 
       
0.0334 ** 
 
0.0386 ** 
        
(6.87) 
  
(7.79) 
 EBTP 
 
-0.0079 
  
-0.0017 
  
-0.0087 
  
-0.0026 
 
  
(-0.81) 
  
(-0.17) 
  
(-0.91) 
  
(-0.27) 
 
             Bank intercepts 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
 Quarter intercepts 
 
No 
  
No 
  
No 
  
No 
 
             Pseudo-R2 
 
0.80 
  
0.79 
  
0.80 
  
0.80 
 Banks 
 
22 
  
22 
  
22 
  
22 
 Observations 
 
667 
  
667 
  
667 
  
667 
 
             Effect of LQ to UQ change 
(%) 0.08     0.10     0.11     0.13   
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Panel B: General reserves for credit losses 
       
  
Tier 1 capital ratio 
 
Total capital ratio 
Independent variables 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
             IMP 
 
0.0313 ** 
    
0.0338 ** 
   
  
(6.41) 
     
(6.89) 
    IMPPD 
    
0.0302 ** 
    
0.0324 ** 
     
(8.19) 
     
(8.76) 
 T1BP 
 
0.0136 ** 
 
0.0149 ** 
      
  
(4.01) 
  
(4.44) 
       TCBP 
       
0.0191 ** 
 
0.0211 ** 
        
(5.05) 
  
(5.66) 
 EBTP 
 
0.0086 
  
0.0104 
  
0.0080 
  
0.0099 
 
  
(1.08) 
  
(1.34) 
  
(1.02) 
  
(1.29) 
 
             Bank intercepts 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
 Quarter intercepts 
 
No 
  
No 
  
No 
  
No 
 
             Pseudo-R2 
 
0.68 
  
0.69 
  
0.69 
  
0.70 
 Banks 
 
22 
  
22 
  
22 
  
22 
 Observations 
 
667 
  
667 
  
667 
  
667 
 
             Effect of LQ to UQ change 
(%) 0.05     0.05     0.06     0.07   
             
Panel C: Total provisions 
          
  
Tier 1 capital ratio 
 
Total capital ratio 
Independent variables 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
             IMP 
 
0.2391 ** 
    
0.2455 ** 
   
  
(27.85) 
     
(28.88) 
    IMPPD 
    
0.1882 ** 
    
0.1940 ** 
     
(29.40) 
     
(30.69) 
 T1BP 
 
0.0301 ** 
 
0.0361 ** 
      
  
(5.04) 
  
(6.20) 
       TCBP 
       
0.0476 ** 
 
0.0546 ** 
        
(7.24) 
  
(8.56) 
 EBTP 
 
0.0003 
  
0.0082 
  
-0.0009 
  
0.0069 
 
  
(0.02) 
  
(0.61) 
  
(-0.07) 
  
(0.52) 
 
             Bank intercepts 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
 Quarter intercepts 
 
No 
  
No 
  
No 
  
No 
 
             Pseudo-R2 
 
0.77 
  
0.78 
  
0.78 
  
0.79 
 Banks 
 
22 
  
22 
  
22 
  
22 
 Observations 
 
667 
  
667 
  
667 
  
667 
 
             Effect of LQ to UQ change 
(%) 0.11     0.13     0.16     0.18   
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The bank-specific credit risk variables are positive and significant across all model 
specifications in Table 6.4 indicating that for the entire sample of Australian banks, credit 
risk is an important determinant of the provisions banks set. As anticipated, the magnitude is 
found to be much greater for specific provisions (0.26 for every one dollar increase in 
impairments and past due items), since banks are required to create a specific provision once 
a loan becomes impaired.  
6.7.3. Standardised Bank Results 
Table 6.5 shows regulatory capital ratios (T1BP and TCBP) are highly significant and 
positive in all models leading to a rejection of the null hypothesis of no capital management 
for hypotheses 1, 2 and 3. The sizes of the coefficients for the regulatory capital ratios are 
similar for specific provisions (Panel A), and marginally larger for GRCL and total 
provisions (Panels B and C). The difference between a standardised bank in the lower 
quartile and a standardised bank in the upper quartile in respect to the size of regulatory 
capital ratio is a difference in provisioning of 0.128%, 0.085% and 0.19% respectively for 
specific, GRCL and total provisions. The magnitude of these differences is larger for the 
standardised bank sample than for the full sample of banks reported in Table 6.4. Bank-
specific credit risk variables (IMP and IMPPD) remain highly significant, with larger 
coefficients for specific provisions (Panel A) as anticipated, consistent with Table 6.4. 
Goodness of fit is adequately high for all models in Table 6.5, with Pseudo-R2 of above 80%, 
close to 70% and 80% respectively in Panels A, B and C. 
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Table 6.5 
            The effect of bank capital ratios on the loan-loss provisioning practices of standardised banks, Tobit 
regression analysis 
             This table examines the relation between bank capital adequacy ratios and loan-loss provisions for banks that use 
the standardised approach to credit risk across the entire the sample period. The sample period is March 2004 to 
December 2011. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. ** indicates significance at the 5% level. 
Panel A: Specific provisions 
          
  
Tier 1 capital ratio 
 
Total capital ratio 
Independent variables 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
             IMP 
 
0.2576 ** 
    
0.2560 ** 
   
  
(37.01) 
     
(36.97) 
    IMPPD 
    
0.1801 ** 
    
0.1799 ** 
     
(31.62) 
     
(31.99) 
 T1BP 
 
0.0274 ** 
 
0.0315 ** 
      
  
(5.86) 
  
(5.98) 
       TCBP 
       
0.0293 ** 
 
0.0375 ** 
        
(5.81) 
  
(6.65) 
 
             Bank intercepts 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
 Quarter intercepts 
 
No 
  
No 
  
No 
  
No 
 
             Pseudo-R2 
 
0.84 
  
0.81 
  
0.84 
  
0.81 
 Banks 
 
17 
  
17 
  
17 
  
17 
 Observations 
 
507 
  
507 
  
507 
  
507 
 
             Effect of LQ to UQ change 
(%) 0.12     0.13     0.11     0.15   
             Panel B: General reserves for credit losses 
        
  
Tier 1 capital ratio 
 
Total capital ratio 
Independent variables 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
             IMP 
 
0.0369 ** 
    
0.0364 ** 
   
  
(6.19) 
     
(6.16) 
    IMPPD 
    
0.0343 ** 
    
0.0345 ** 
     
(8.11) 
     
(8.25) 
 T1BP 
 
0.0177 ** 
 
0.0193 ** 
      
  
(4.71) 
  
(5.26) 
       TCBP 
       
0.0222 ** 
 
0.0245 ** 
        
(5.43) 
  
(6.12) 
 
             Bank intercepts 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
 Quarter intercepts 
 
No 
  
No 
  
No 
  
No 
 
             Pseudo-R2 
 
0.65 
  
0.67 
  
0.66 
  
0.68 
 Banks 
 
17 
  
17 
  
17 
  
17 
 Observations 
 
507 
  
507 
  
507 
  
507 
 
             Effect of LQ to UQ  (%) 0.08     0.08     0.09     0.09   
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Panel C: Total provisions 
          
  
Tier 1 capital ratio 
 
Total capital ratio 
Independent variables 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
             IMP 
 
0.2895 ** 
    
0.2880 ** 
   
  
(27.97) 
     
(28.12) 
    IMPPD 
    
0.2095 ** 
    
0.2101 ** 
     
(27.66) 
     
(28.24) 
 T1BP 
 
0.0390 ** 
 
0.0440 ** 
      
  
(5.98) 
  
(6.67) 
       TCBP 
       
0.0467 ** 
 
0.0565 ** 
        
(6.58) 
  
(7.93) 
 
             Bank intercepts 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
 Quarter intercepts 
 
No 
  
No 
  
No 
  
No 
 
             Pseudo-R2 
 
0.80 
  
0.79 
  
0.80 
  
0.80 
 Banks 
 
17 
  
17 
  
17 
  
17 
 Observations 
 
507 
  
507 
  
507 
  
507 
 
             Effect of LQ to UQ change 
(%) 0.17     0.19     0.18     0.22   
 
6.7.4. Internal Ratings Based (IRB) Bank Results 
Table 6.6 reports the results for IRB banks over the full sample period (including the Basel I 
period before IRB accreditation). As before, results are reported in three panels separately 
based on the dependent variable: specific provisions, GRCL and total provisions. 
Findings suggest that the T1BP is a significant determinant of specific provisions, with a 
positive coefficient in the model. This result leads to a rejection of the null hypothesis of no 
capital management for hypothesis 4, indicating IRB bank are using specific provisions for 
Tier 1 capital management. Regulatory capital ratios (T1BP and TCBP) are not statistically 
significant determinants of GRCL (Panel B) and total provisions (Panel C) in all models. As a 
result the null hypothesis of no capital management cannot be rejected for hypotheses 5 and 
6. The interaction variables (BASELII × T1BP) and (BASELII × TCBP) are not statistically 
significant in all models. This indicates that implementation of Basel II had no additional 
impact on the relationship between provisions and the regulatory capital ratios. 
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Table 6.6 
            The effect of the revised Basel capital framework on the loan-loss provisioning practices of IRB banks, 
Tobit regression analysis 
             This table examines the effect of the revised capital rules on the relation between bank capital adequacy ratios and 
loan-loss provisions for banks that receive approval to use the IRB approach to credit risk. The sample period is 
March 2004 to December 2011. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. ** indicates significance at the 5% level. 
             Panel A: Specific provisions 
          
  
Tier 1 capital ratio 
 
Total capital ratio 
Independent variables 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
             IMP 
 
0.0659 ** 
    
0.0697 ** 
   
  
(11.85) 
     
(11.37) 
    IMPPD 
    
0.0633 ** 
    
0.0670 ** 
     
(11.77) 
     
(11.43) 
 T1BP 
 
0.0238 ** 
 
0.0223 ** 
      
  
(2.36) 
  
(2.21) 
       Basel II × IRB × T1BP 
 
0.0044 
  
0.0035 
       
  
(0.37) 
  
(0.29) 
       TCBP 
       
0.0119 
  
0.0111 
 
        
(1.61) 
  
(1.52) 
 Basel II × IRB × TCBP 
       
-0.0153 
  
-0.0161 
 
        
(-1.68) 
  
(-1.77) 
 Basel II × IRB 
 
0.0008 
  
0.0008 
  
0.0022 ** 
 
0.0021 ** 
  
(1.32) 
  
(1.29) 
  
(5.71) 
  
(5.49) 
 
             Bank intercepts 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
 Quarter intercepts 
 
No 
  
No 
  
No 
  
No 
 
             Pseudo-R2 
 
0.85 
  
0.85 
  
0.84 
  
0.84 
 Banks 
 
5 
  
5 
  
5 
  
5 
 Observations 
 
160 
  
160 
  
160 
  
160 
 
             Effect of LQ to UQ change 
(%) 
           Before IRB approval 
 
0.07 
  
0.07 
  
0.02 
  
0.02 
 After IRB approval   0.08     0.08     -0.01     -0.01   
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Panel B: General reserves for credit losses 
        
  
Tier 1 capital ratio 
 
Total capital ratio 
Independent variables 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
             IMP 
 
0.0396 ** 
    
0.0329 ** 
   
  
(3.82) 
     
(2.95) 
    IMPPD 
    
0.0362 ** 
    
0.0298 ** 
     
(3.61) 
     
(2.77) 
 T1BP 
 
0.0169 
  
0.0144 
       
  
(0.90) 
  
(0.77) 
       Basel II × IRB × T1BP 
 
0.0032 
  
0.0046 
       
  
(0.14) 
  
(0.21) 
       TCBP 
       
-0.0107 
  
-0.0124 
 
        
(-0.79) 
  
(-0.92) 
 Basel II × IRB × TCBP 
       
-0.0070 
  
-0.0065 
 
        
(-0.42) 
  
(-0.39) 
 Basel II × IRB 
 
-0.0017 
  
-0.0018 
  
-0.0007 
  
-0.0008 
 
  
(-1.48) 
  
(-1.53) 
  
(-1.01) 
  
(-1.06) 
 
             Bank intercepts 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
 Quarter intercepts 
 
No 
  
No 
  
No 
  
No 
 Pseudo-R2 
 
0.60 
  
0.60 
  
0.60 
  
0.60 
 Banks 
 
5 
  
5 
  
5 
  
5 
 Observations 
 
160 
  
160 
  
160 
  
160 
 Effect of LQ to UQ (%) 
           Before IRB approval 
 
0.05 
  
0.04 
  
-0.02 
  
-0.02 
 After IRB approval   0.06     0.06     -0.03     -0.04   
             Panel C: Total provisions 
          
  
Tier 1 capital ratio 
 
Total capital ratio 
Independent variables 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
             IMP 
 
0.1054 ** 
    
0.1027 ** 
   
  
(9.37) 
     
(8.29) 
    IMPPD 
    
0.0994 ** 
    
0.0969 ** 
     
(9.07) 
     
(8.11) 
 T1BP 
 
0.0412 ** 
 
0.0371 
       
  
(2.01) 
  
(1.80) 
       Basel II × IRB × T1BP 
 
0.0072 
  
0.0078 
       
  
(0.30) 
  
(0.32) 
       TCBP 
       
0.0015 
  
-0.0010 
 
        
(0.10) 
  
(-0.07) 
 Basel II × IRB × TCBP 
       
-0.0225 
  
-0.0229 
 
        
(-1.23) 
  
(-1.23) 
 Basel II × IRB 
 
-0.0009 
  
-0.0010 
  
0.0015 
  
0.0014 
 
  
(-0.70) 
  
(-0.76) 
  
(1.93) 
  
(1.75) 
 Bank intercepts 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
 Quarter intercepts 
 
No 
  
No 
  
No 
  
No 
 Pseudo-R2 
 
0.80 
  
0.80 
  
0.79 
  
0.79 
 Banks 
 
5 
  
5 
  
5 
  
5 
 Observations 
 
160 
  
160 
  
160 
  
160 
 Effect of LQ to UQ (%) 
           Before IRB approval 
 
0.12 
  
0.11 
  
0.00 
  
0.00 
 After IRB approval   0.14     0.13     -0.04     -0.04   
 119 
6.7.5. IRB Bank Eligible Provisions Results 
Table 6.7 presents results for eligible provisions (EP). The results are structured in three 
Panels based on the dependent variable: eligible provisions on defaulted exposures (Panel A), 
eligible provisions on non-defaulted exposures (Panel B) and total eligible provisions (Panel 
C). The Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio (T1BP) is not statistically significant across all models, 
whilst total regulatory capital (TCBP) is negative and significant for EP-defaulted (Panel A) 
and total EP (Panel C). TCBP is not significant for EP-non defaulted (Panel B). As a result, 
there is insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis of no capital management using 
provisions, for hypotheses 7 and 8. Bank-specific credit risk variables (IMP and IMPPD) are 
significant determinants of EP-defaulted and total EP. Coefficients are positive as expected. 
Table 6.7 
            The effect of bank capital ratios on eligible provisions under the IRB approach, Tobit regression analysis 
             This table examines the relation between bank capital adequacy ratios and eligible provisions under the IRB 
approach. The sample period is March 2008 to December 2011. Eligible provisions are reported on an after-tax 
basis and net of any associated deferred tax assets. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. ** indicates 
significance at the 5% level. 
             Panel A: Eligible provisions on defaulted exposures 
       
  
Tier 1 capital ratio 
 
Total capital ratio 
Independent variables 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
             IMP 
 
0.2050 ** 
    
0.1791 ** 
   
  
(11.14) 
     
(9.14) 
    IMPPD 
    
0.1958 ** 
    
0.1709 ** 
     
(10.87) 
     
(9.07) 
 T1BP 
 
0.0283 
  
0.0188 
       
  
(1.13) 
  
(0.74) 
       TCBP 
       
-0.0788 ** 
 
-0.0837 ** 
        
(-2.90) 
  
(-3.10) 
 
             Bank intercepts 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
 Quarter intercepts 
 
No 
  
No 
  
No 
  
No 
 
             Pseudo-R2 
 
0.92 
  
0.92 
  
0.93 
  
0.93 
 Banks 
 
5 
  
5 
  
5 
  
5 
 Observations 
 
76 
  
76 
  
76 
  
76 
 
             Effect of LQ to UQ change 
(%) 0.05     0.04     -0.11     -0.12   
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Panel B: Eligible provisions on non-defaulted exposures 
       
  
Tier 1 capital ratio 
 
Total capital ratio 
Independent variables 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
             IMP 
 
0.0133 
     
0.0032 
    
  
(0.94) 
     
(0.20) 
    IMPPD 
    
0.0106 
     
0.0011 
 
     
(0.78) 
     
(0.08) 
 T1BP 
 
0.0126 
  
0.0120 
       
  
(0.65) 
  
(0.62) 
       TCBP 
       
-0.0307 
  
-0.0319 
 
        
(-1.42) 
  
(-1.49) 
 
             Bank intercepts 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
 Quarter intercepts 
 
No 
  
No 
  
No 
  
No 
 
             Pseudo-R2 
 
0.33 
  
0.33 
  
0.35 
  
0.35 
 Banks 
 
5 
  
5 
  
5 
  
5 
 Observations 
 
76 
  
76 
  
76 
  
76 
 
             Effect of LQ to UQ change 
(%) 0.02     0.02     -0.04     -0.05   
             Panel C: Total eligible provisions 
          
  
Tier 1 capital ratio 
 
Total capital ratio 
Independent variables 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
             IMP 
 
0.2183 ** 
    
0.1823 ** 
   
  
(7.33) 
     
(5.68) 
    IMPPD 
    
0.2064 ** 
    
0.1720 ** 
     
(7.09) 
     
(5.56) 
 T1BP 
 
0.0408 
  
0.0307 
       
  
(1.01) 
  
(0.75) 
       TCBP 
       
-0.1095 ** 
 
-0.1156 ** 
        
(-2.46) 
  
(-2.60) 
 
             Bank intercepts 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
 Quarter intercepts 
 
No 
  
No 
  
No 
  
No 
 
             Pseudo-R2 
 
0.85 
  
0.85 
  
0.86 
  
0.86 
 Banks 
 
5 
  
5 
  
5 
  
5 
 Observations 
 
76 
  
76 
  
76 
  
76 
 
             Effect of LQ to UQ change 
(%) 0.08     0.06     -0.16     -0.17   
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6.7.6. IRB Bank Eligible Provisions Results – Controlling for EL 
Table 6.8 shows the results for IRB bank eligible provisions after controlling for banks’ 
incentive to provision closely with expected loss (EL). IRB banks are charged for the 
shortfall between EP and EL to regulatory capital (50% Tier 1 and 50% Tier 2). Panel A 
shows descriptive statistics; average bank EL is larger than EP over the sample, 2.05% and 
1.34% respectively. Panel B shows results using the Tier 1 capital ratio and Panel C shows 
model results using the total capital ratio. Results indicate EL is a significant determinant in 
all models, with a positive coefficient. Banks with higher EL tend to set higher eligible 
provisions to reduce the shortfall charge on capital. Both T1BP and TCBP are positive and 
significant only in models of the dependent variable EP-non defaulted. For EP-defaulted and 
Total EP, the regulatory capital ratios are insignificant. This indicates there may be some use 
of eligible provisions for capital management in regards to EP non-defaulted. However the 
effects of the regulatory capital ratios on EP-defaulted and EP-non defaulted become net to 
no overall effect on total EP. 
Table 6.8 
         The effect of IRB-bank capital ratios on eligible provisions after the bank estimates 
expected losses, Tobit regression analysis 
          This table examines the relation between IRB-bank capital adequacy ratios and eligible 
provisions after the bank estimates expected losses. The sample period is March 2008 to 
December 2011. Eligible provisions are reported on an after-tax basis and net of any 
associated deferred tax assets. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. ** indicates 
significance at the 5% level. 
          Panel A: Descriptive statistics, N=76 
       
Data item 
 
Defaulted 
exposures 
 
Non-defaulted 
exposures 
 
Total 
          Eligible provisions 
            Mean % 
 
0.81 
  
0.53 
  
1.34 
    Median % 
 
0.42 
  
0.49 
  
0.90 
    Standard deviation % 
 
0.80 
  
0.21 
  
0.94 
 Expected losses 
            Mean % 
 
1.15 
  
0.90 
  
2.05 
    Median % 
 
0.51 
  
0.75 
  
1.29 
    Standard deviation %   1.40     0.45     1.77   
 122 
          Panel B: Effect of the Tier 1 capital ratio before provisions 
    
  
Dependent variable 
Independent variables 
 
EP defaulted 
 
EP non-
defaulted 
 
Total EP 
          EL defaulted 
 
0.415 ** 
      
  
(13.75) 
       EL non-defaulted 
    
0.504 ** 
   
     
(7.48) 
    Total EL 
       
0.482 ** 
        
(13.61) 
 T1BP 
 
0.020 
  
0.031 ** 
 
0.050 
 
  
(0.91) 
  
(2.07) 
  
(1.76) 
 
          Bank intercepts 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
 Quarter intercepts 
 
No 
  
No 
  
No 
 
          Pseudo-R2 
 
0.94 
  
0.61 
  
0.93 
 Banks 
 
5 
  
5 
  
5 
 Observations   76     76     76   
           
Panel C: Effect of the total capital ratio before provisions 
    
  
Dependent variable 
Independent variables 
 
EP defaulted 
 
EP non-
defaulted 
 
Total EP 
          EL defaulted 
 
0.377 ** 
      
  
(11.44) 
       EL non-defaulted 
    
0.572 ** 
   
     
(7.22) 
    Total EL 
       
0.480 ** 
        
(10.98) 
 TCBP 
 
-0.060 ** 
 
0.038 ** 
 
0.002 
 
  
(-2.48) 
  
(2.12) 
  
(0.05) 
 
          Bank intercepts 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
 Quarter intercepts 
 
No 
  
No 
  
No 
 
          Pseudo-R2 
 
0.95 
  
0.61 
  
0.92 
 Banks 
 
5 
  
5 
  
5 
 Observations   76     76     76   
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6.8. Conclusion 
A significant amount of past literature has shown banks have used accounting provisions to 
influence earnings and regulatory capital position. This has been a major driving force in the 
implementation of IFRS, requiring entities to provision only where it is deemed objective 
evidence of an incurred loss has occurred. From a regulatory perspective, such provisioning 
requirements are too restrictive. Regulators understand banks must be afforded the freedom 
to create more forward looking provisions for which losses are expected but not yet certain to 
arise. The concept of forward looking provisions is widely endorsed by the BCBS as part of 
Basel III and is an important concept for maintaining safety and soundness in the financial 
system. Forward looking provisions have already been implemented by APRA with the 
introduction of the General Reserve for Credit Losses (GRCL).  
This study provides an investigation of Australian banks’ regulatory provisioning practice 
and their overall support role for regulatory capital in light of the changes in capital 
regulation. After controlling for bank-specific risk, this study finds banks with lower 
regulatory capital ratios tend to reduce regulatory provisioning when compared with banks of 
higher regulatory capital position. Since regulatory provisioning further reduces Tier 1 
capital, banks with relatively lower capital positions are reluctant to provision, perhaps 
electing to delay to a later stage when their capital base has improved. This result is found to 
be most pronounced for Australian banks which adhere to the standardised approach in the 
post-Basel II period.  
The study finds that IRB banks tend to set regulatory provisions in a way which more closely 
aligns with expected loss estimates derived from their internal capital models. For the IRB 
banks, no significant relationship is found between regulatory provisioning and regulatory 
capital positions. A possible explanation centres on a reduced incentive to report regulatory 
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provisions that depart from expected loss estimates. Since a capital charge is imposed for 
under-provisioning, the incentive to capital manage is reduced.  
IRB banks set regulatory provisioning in a way that supports regulatory capital models, while 
an evaluation of the performance of IRB banks’ internal credit risk models is beyond the 
scope of this paper, it does demonstrate that the knowledge of their portfolio quality captured 
in internal ratings is, at very least, consistent with their allocation of regulatory provisions for 
expected losses. This is an encouraging result and one intended by the implementation of 
prudential standards. However, it does highlight the need for further empirical research 
regarding the quality and reliability of internal capital model estimates for IRB banks. This is 
of increased relevance given that such estimates are not only influencing regulatory capital, 
but also the regulatory provisioning that supports it. 
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Chapter 6 Appendix 
Table 6.A 
          Descriptive statistics for segmented sample bank-observations 
     
This table presents the summary statistics for Basel I banks (panel A), Basel II standardised banks (panel 
B), Basel II IRB banks (panel C). The sample period is March 2004 to December 2011. The tier 1 capital 
ratio for Basel I banks and Basel II standardised banks is calculated as tier 1 capital plus provisions 
multiplied by one minus the corporate tax rate, divided by total risk-weighted assets. The total capital ratio 
for Basel I banks and Basel II standardised banks is calculated as total capital plus provisions multiplied 
by one minus the corporate tax rate minus the general reserve for credit losses (to a maximum of 1.25% of 
total RWA), divided by total risk-weighted assets. The tier 1 capital ratio for Basel II IRB banks is 
calculated as tier 1 capital plus provisions multiplied by one minus the corporate tax rate plus the shortfall 
in provisions for credit losses (50%) minus total expected losses (50%), divided by total risk-weighted 
assets. The total capital ratio for Basel II IRB banks is calculated as total capital plus provisions multiplied 
by one minus the corporate tax rate plus the shortfall in provisions for credit losses minus surplus 
provisions on non-defaulted exposures (to a maximum of 0.6% of credit RWA) minus total expected 
losses, divided by total risk-weighted assets. EBTP is earnings before provisions and taxes, divided by 
average assets. 
 
Panel A:  Basel I banks (March 2004 to December 2007), N=336 
Data item 
 
Mean 
 
Standard 
deviation 
 
Lower 
quartile 
 
Median 
 
Upper 
quartile 
           Total loans $mil 
 
45,185 
 
68,704 
 
2,424 
 
10,599 
 
37,274 
           Loans to households % 56.6 
 
28.3 
 
41.0 
 
62.5 
 
76.9 
Loans to corporates % 
 
42.9 
 
28.2 
 
20.9 
 
37.3 
 
56.9 
Loans to other % 
 
0.5 
 
0.9 
 
0.0 
 
0.1 
 
0.5 
Impaired facilities % 
 
0.50 
 
1.15 
 
0.10 
 
0.23 
 
0.47 
Past due items % 
 
0.52 
 
0.58 
 
0.26 
 
0.39 
 
0.55 
RWA for credit risk % 
 
103.0 
 
43.7 
 
78.7 
 
96.5 
 
105.5 
           Specific provisions % 
 
0.16 
 
0.26 
 
0.04 
 
0.08 
 
0.17 
GRCL % 
 
0.52 
 
0.30 
 
0.33 
 
0.48 
 
0.69 
Total provisions % 
 
0.68 
 
0.39 
 
0.45 
 
0.61 
 
0.92 
Tier 1 capital ratio 
 
10.3 
 
4.4 
 
7.7 
 
8.6 
 
10.7 
Total capital ratio 
 
12.9 
 
4.0 
 
10.6 
 
11.5 
 
13.2 
EBTP % pq   0.43   1.10   0.18   0.30   0.45 
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Panel B: Basel II standardised banks (March 2008 to December 2011), N=255 
 
Data item 
 
Mean 
 
Standard 
deviation 
 
Lower 
quartile 
 
Median 
 
Upper 
quartile 
           Total loans $mil 
 
22,138 
 
36,315 
 
2,206 
 
10,379 
 
31,064 
           Loans to households % 56.7 
 
33.6 
 
32.1 
 
62.3 
 
90.0 
Loans to corporates % 
 
43.0 
 
33.5 
 
10.0 
 
37.4 
 
66.8 
Loans to other % 
 
0.3 
 
0.6 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
0.2 
Impaired facilities % 
 
1.50 
 
2.25 
 
0.13 
 
0.63 
 
2.02 
Past due items % 
 
1.24 
 
1.58 
 
0.46 
 
0.79 
 
1.35 
RWA for credit risk % 
 
82.2 
 
23.9 
 
65.6 
 
75.8 
 
99.1 
           Specific provisions % 
 
0.57 
 
0.69 
 
0.06 
 
0.24 
 
0.98 
GRCL % 
 
0.57 
 
0.41 
 
0.28 
 
0.42 
 
0.73 
Total provisions % 
 
1.13 
 
0.99 
 
0.43 
 
0.84 
 
1.55 
Tier 1 capital ratio 
 
11.3 
 
3.6 
 
8.9 
 
10.1 
 
12.7 
Total capital ratio 
 
13.7 
 
3.1 
 
11.5 
 
12.6 
 
15.1 
EBTP % pq   0.31   0.28   0.18   0.29   0.41 
Panel C: Basel II IRB banks (March 2008 to December 2011), N=76 
  
Data item 
 
Mean 
 
Standard 
deviation 
 
Lower 
quartile 
 
Median 
 
Upper 
quartile 
           Total loans $mil 
 
242,758 
 
127,219 
 
227,493 
 
272,485 
 
331,406 
           Loans to households % 63.5 
 
8.6 
 
58.4 
 
63.3 
 
70.9 
Loans to corporates % 
 
35.5 
 
9.4 
 
26.5 
 
36.5 
 
41.3 
Loans to other % 
 
1.0 
 
1.3 
 
0.1 
 
0.4 
 
0.6 
Impaired facilities % 
 
2.33 
 
2.89 
 
0.76 
 
1.32 
 
1.76 
Past due items % 
 
0.54 
 
0.16 
 
0.44 
 
0.53 
 
0.64 
RWA for credit risk % 
 
115.6 
 
87.5 
 
66.0 
 
77.3 
 
95.6 
           Specific provisions % 
 
0.43 
 
0.22 
 
0.29 
 
0.40 
 
0.48 
GRCL % 
 
0.77 
 
0.27 
 
0.58 
 
0.67 
 
0.85 
Total provisions % 
 
1.20 
 
0.46 
 
0.93 
 
1.10 
 
1.26 
Tier 1 capital ratio 
 
10.6 
 
1.3 
 
9.7 
 
10.8 
 
11.6 
Total capital ratio 
 
12.2 
 
1.3 
 
11.3 
 
11.8 
 
12.7 
EBTP% pq   0.12   1.80   0.25   0.35   0.41 
 
  
 127 
CHAPTER 7 
The Behaviour and Determinants of Australian  
Bank Capital Buffers 
7.1. Introduction and Motivations 
The banking sector is one of the most heavily regulated sectors of the economy, due in large 
part to the important role of banks in facilitating credit and economic growth. Global 
regulators continue to emphasise the importance of capital regulation to ensure that banks 
hold a minimum level of capital to cushion against unexpected losses and adverse shocks 
which could result in bank failure. Recent widespread problems in global financial markets 
and banking sectors have raised concerns over the design and role that capital regulation 
plays in influencing bank behaviour and the market perception of bank risk (Francis and 
Osborne, 2010).  
In Australia, banks have, for the most part, avoided the recent turmoil experienced by 
overseas financial markets, reflecting good regulation and economic management, as well as 
some good fortune (Davis and Brown, 2008). An International Monetary Fund (IMF) review 
found the Australian banking system has been resilient and well managed (IMF, 2012, p.5). 
As explained in Chapter 4, the regulatory body for the banking sector, the Australian 
Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) exhibits a high degree of compliance with 
international standards, maintaining a conservative supervisory approach34. Australian banks 
have been consistently well capitalised, holding average tier 1 and total regulatory capital 
                                                 
34 For example, APRA has already required Australian banks to hold 75% of tier 1 capital as the higher quality 
fundamental tier 1 capital, which is higher in quality and closely related to the new Basel III guidelines for 
common equity tier 1 capital. In addition, an LGD floor of 20% is imposed for residential mortgages, higher 
than the Basel II requirement. APRA is intending to keep a conservative stance in adopting Basel III. 
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ratios of 9.51% and 12.39% respectively over the sample period examined in this study. 
These levels are well above global regulatory minima35. However, much less is known about 
the way risk-based capital regulation affects the regulatory capital ratios held by Australian 
banks. This study provides insights into this relationship in the context of the Australian 
banking sector.  
Existing literature demonstrates that banks have an incentive to target a level of capital above 
the regulatory minimum, a so called ‘capital buffer’ (Marcus, 1984; Milne and Whalley, 
2001; Milne, 2004). The literature finds banks hold capital buffers as insurance against costly 
supervisory action in the event of unexpected events causing the capital ratio to fall below the 
regulatory minimum. Other reasons for holding capital buffers identified by past literature 
include: market discipline, to target an external credit rating, to weather economic downturns, 
to secure access to wholesale deposits and money markets, and for long-term growth and 
acquisition strategies (Berger et al, 1995; Ayuso et al, 2004; Lindquist, 2004; Stolz and 
Wedow, 2005; Jokipii and Milne, 2008).  
The issue of what determines bank capital ratios has become increasingly important. Global 
regulatory authorities are interested in identifying potential threats and problems in the 
banking system. A better understanding of the determinants and reasons for holding capital 
buffers allows authorities to evaluate regulatory intervention and future responses to banking 
problems (Francis and Osborne, 2010). To date there is scarce empirical literature 
investigating these areas in the Australian banking system.  
                                                 
35 Global regulatory minimum requirements are those imposed under the Basel I and Basel II frameworks of 4 
and 8 percent of risk-weighted assets for tier 1 and total capital, respectively. 
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In Australia, APRA imposes individual capital requirements for authorised deposit-taking 
institutions (ADI’s)36, known as prudential capital ratios (PCRs) as part of prudential 
standards for capital adequacy. In assessing an ADI’s overall capital adequacy, APRA may 
take into account additional risk factors to ensure minimum requirements are consistent with 
its overall risk profile. The PCR imposed on an ADI is never lower than the Basel minimum 
requirement. PCRs have been in force since January 2008 under Basel II, however elevated 
regulatory capital requirements could be enforced by supervisors prior to this, under the Basel 
I framework37.  
From a long-term perspective, theoretical literature reaches common conclusions regarding 
the way in which bank capital ratios respond to changes in underlying capital regulation. 
Thus theoretically, increases in capital requirements should increase bank capital both in 
absolute terms and relative to bank lending (VanHoose, 2008; Shrieves and Dahl, 1992). 
These findings have led to a considerable amount of empirical research (Van Roy, 2005; 
Barrios and Blanco, 2003; Beatty and Gron, 2001; Furfine, 2001; Jackson et al, 1999), with 
contrasting conclusions. To date, there is no such empirical literature in the context of the 
Australian banking sector. This study is the first to examine the efficacy of PCRs in 
influencing Australian bank capital management practices. 
From a short-term perspective, past literature predicts that increased capital requirements 
should have the potential adverse effect of reducing individual bank lending and increasing 
equilibrium loan rates (Goodhart et al, 2004; Borio, 2003; Catarieneu-Rabell et al, 2005; 
                                                 
36 An ADI is defined by APRA as a corporation which is authorised under the Banking Act 1959 to take 
deposits from customers. ADIs include banks, building societies and credit unions. All ADIs are subject to the 
same prudential standards imposed by APRA, but for the corporation to use the word ‘bank’, ‘building society’ 
and ‘credit union’ in its name,  it must meet certain criteria. 
37 For the purposes of this paper, the term PCR is used to refer to the bank specific minimum capital requirement 
imposed by APRA on an individual ADI, including during the Basel I period. 
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Estrella, 2004). This has led to a number of empirical studies examining the extent to which 
risk-based capital regulation is procyclical (Ayuso, 2004; Lindquist, 2004; Stolz and Wedow, 
2011; Francis and Osborne, 2010; Coffinet et al, 2012; Shim, 2012), with conflicting 
findings. The term procyclical here refers to the extent to which banks’ capital management 
practice amplifies economic cycles. A key objective of such capital regulation is risk-
sensitivity, particularly under the Basel II Framework, attempting to more accurately align 
banks capital requirements with the riskiness of their exposures.  
If banks are short-sighted in their capital management practices, an accumulation of risky 
exposures during expansions when risk-based capital requirements are low can result in 
considerable loss once a downturn in the business cycle sets in. During a downturn, when 
risk-based capital requirements increase, difficulty in raising capital may result in the need 
for banks to restrict lending considerably to meet a targeted optimal capital ratio. Such 
restricted bank lending has unfavourable consequences for the real economy, reducing output 
further and causing a longer and more pronounced downturn. 
In response, the BCBS has advocated that banks should build up countercyclical capital 
buffers in good times in order to draw down on these surpluses in bad times (BCBS 2012). 
This has led prudential standards in Australia to impose a countercyclical capital buffer in 
addition to minimum capital requirements as part of the Basel III framework (APS 110, 
2013)38. As a secondary objective, this paper contributes to the literature by testing the extent 
to which Australian banks’ capital management practices are procyclical. No prior research 
has examined this issue in the context of the Australian banking sector. As a result, this study 
                                                 
38 The new regime requires banks to accumulate extra capital above regulatory minimum requirements that can 
be used during periods of stress. The new countercyclical capital buffer has a range of 0-2.5% of common 
equity tier 1 capital, designed to dilute lending bubbles by requiring banks to increase capital during upturns. 
These requirements are due to be implemented by APRA from 1 January, 2016. 
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provides insights relevant to determining the efficacy of prudential standards in implementing 
countercyclical buffer requirements in Australia. 
This study uses a privately reported regulatory dataset to investigate three previously 
unexamined questions in the Australian banking system over the sample period 2004 to 2012 
with regard to the behaviour and determinants of capital buffers. Firstly, do Australian banks 
target a level of capital above the Basel imposed minimum risk-weighted capital ratio? 
Secondly, what determines the level of capital buffers held by Australian banks? And finally, 
what is the impact of bank-specific prudential capital ratios (PCRs) on Australian bank 
capital buffers?  
The findings of this study suggest that Australian banks hold a targeted level of capital with 
quarterly speed of adjustment coefficients of 19 and 15 per cent for total and Tier 1 capital 
ratios respectively. Findings suggest bank risk and size are negatively related to capital 
buffers with ROE being positively related, and that the implementation of Basel II has had a 
positive impact on the capital buffers banks hold. Findings suggest a positive relationship 
between the business cycle and Australian bank capital buffers, interpreted as a 
countercyclical effect. Finally, results indicate banks respond to increases in bank-specific 
regulatory imposed PCRs by increasing regulatory capital ratios, indicating their 
effectiveness in influencing banks’ capital management practices. 
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7.2. Evolution of Regulatory Capital Ratios in Australia 
The evolution of risk-based capital regulation in Australia has exhibited a strong compliance 
with international standards implemented by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS). APRA employs a conservative approach to the implementation of international 
principles, maintaining a number of strict national discretions39. In addition, the Australian 
regulatory and supervisory framework is strengthened by maintaining principle-based and 
outcome-oriented supervisory approaches, industry-wide risk assessments and a focus on 
board responsibility for risk management.  
APRA uses risk assessment and supervisory response tools known as the Probability and 
Impact Rating System (PAIRS) and the Supervisory Oversight and Response System 
(SOARS). PAIRS is a structured framework for supervisory judgement built on three 
principles: the inherent risks facing the ADI resulting from its strategies and risk appetite, the 
effectiveness of management and controls in controlling and mitigating these risks, and the 
extent of capital support to meet unexpected losses. SOARS is used to determine how 
supervisory concerns based on PAIRS risk assessments should be acted upon in order to 
ensure timely and targeted supervisory intervention if necessary (IMF, 2012a).  
APRA implements Prudential Capital Ratios (PCRs) for all ADIs. The PCR is always at least 
8% of risk weighted assets, as required under Basel II minimum requirements40. The PAIRS 
assessment process is a significant input into regulatory decisions to change banks PCR. 
Historically, PAIRS ratings are updated as much as 2 to 3 times each year as a result of risk 
                                                 
39 For greater detail see Chapter 4 for a summary of regulatory capital developments in the Australian banking 
system. 
40 APRA’s implementation of Basel III has increased minimum requirements and included minimum 
requirements for common equity tier 1 (CET1) capital, implementation of which is taking effect from January 
2013. However for the purposes of this study, the sample includes the Basel I and full Basel II periods only. 
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visits and preparation for annual reviews and prudential consultations (IMF, 2012a). These 
have the potential to lead to changes in the PCR, however APRA considers it inappropriate to 
change PCRs frequently.  
In addition to the PAIRs assessment process, PCRs are based on external factors such as the 
current environment, systemic risk and other issues deemed appropriate for consideration, 
such as analysis performed by APRA not already captured in ADI’s Internal Capital 
Adequacy Assessment Process (ICAAP)41. Finally, there is significant leeway for supervisory 
judgement. APRA’s requirement of ADI-specific PCRs gives rise to considerable variation in 
capital adequacy ratios across ADIs and over time. 
Risk-based capital ratios have varied considerably for ADIs42 since the introduction of Basel 
I in Australia. Figure 7.1 shows the key trends in the aggregate Australian banking industry 
capital ratio and the quarterly change in Gross Domestic Product (GDP)43 for the period from 
March 2004 to December 2012. The dashed line indicates the point when Australian banks 
began reporting under the Basel II framework in January of 2008. 
                                                 
41 Under the Basel II framework, banks must conduct an ICAAP demonstrating that they have implemented 
methods and procedures to ensure adequate capital resources, and all material risks must be considered. 
42 The term ADI is used instead of banks here because Figure 7.1 shows the aggregate capital ratio consisting of 
Banks, as well as Credit Unions and Building Societies (CUBS). ADI by definition includes Banks and CUBS. 
43 Sourced from the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) statistics table G10. 
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Figure 7.1 indicates that the Australian banking sector has been adequately capitalised over 
the sample period, with ADIs holding a considerable buffer over the minimum 8% capital 
ratio required under the Basel framework. Over the Basel I period, the average aggregate 
capital ratio was 11.39%, indicating an average aggregate capital buffer of 3.39%. The Basel 
I period was characterised by an economic expansion in the Australian economy with a 
quarterly average change in GDP of 0.83%. As displayed in Figure 7.1, the trend in aggregate 
capital ratios decreased by 0.71% from its high in the March quarter of 2005 to the end of the 
Basel I period in the December quarter of 2007.  
In the March quarter of 2008 the aggregate banking sector capital ratio increased by almost 1 
per cent. This was largely due to the implementation of Basel II risk-weightings. Major 
Banks, which hold 75 per cent of total banking sector assets, implemented the advanced 
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approach to Basel II, resulting in favourable risk-weighted asset calculations44 such as 
reduced risk-weights for residential mortgage exposures45 and the accreditation of IRB 
models. Over the Basel II period, aggregate capital ratios continued to rise, averaging 13.19% 
over the period.  
The beginning of the Basel II period was also characterised by the onset of the global 
financial crisis. Over the Basel II sample period, the quarterly average change in GDP 
declined from 0.83% to 0.63%, with two quarters of negative growth. There are a few 
possible explanations for the rise in aggregate capital ratios over the Basel II period. It is 
likely due to an increased threat of regulatory intervention and market discipline, as well as 
banks preparing for the implementation of Basel III in Australia. Higher bank capital ratios 
demonstrate a strong solvency position to the regulator and the market. Thus, weak 
conditions amid the global financial crisis may have provided an incentive for Australian 
ADIs to increase their capital ratios.  
It is likely ADIs increased capital ratios in anticipation of the Basel III framework. The Basel 
III framework is due to be implemented in Australia from January 2013 under transitional 
arrangements. Under the new framework, minimum capital requirements will be increased, 
with a greater emphasis on higher quality capital46. ADIs have been encouraged to prepare 
for its implementation, likely contributing to the continued rise in the aggregate capital ratio 
in the final years of the sample in the lead up to 2013, as shown in Figure 7.1. 
                                                 
44 A more detailed examination of the Australian implementation of Basel II has been included in Chapter 4. 
45 Australian’s four major banks hold above 85 per cent of all residential mortgage exposures 
46 Higher quality capital is defined by Basel III requirements to constitute the most subordinate claim in 
liquidation of the bank, a loss absorbing instrument, with a perpetual principle which is never paid outside of 
liquidation and other elements explained in the Basel III (2011) guidelines. 
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If these factors have contributed to the rise in the aggregate capital ratio over the Basel II 
period, there is no regulatory concern. However, if the rise is due in large part to ADIs 
restricting lending during uncertain conditions surrounding the global downturn, this is a 
more serious problem in need of regulatory attention. As already mentioned, during a crisis or 
downturn in the economic cycle, if banks attempt to increase capital ratios by restricting 
lending, this has the impact of deepening and increasing the length of the downturn. If 
increased capital requirements and stricter regulation during the downturn cause this bank 
reaction, then capital regulation is having an undesirable procyclical effect on the economy. 
In Australia, given the effects of the global financial crisis were mild compared to overseas 
jurisdictions, a procyclical effect is unlikely. Nevertheless, as a secondary objective, this 
study provides an investigation. 
7.3 Methodology and Variable Definitions 
This section describes the approach used to model banks’ capital buffers and estimate key 
determinants in the Australian banking system. The approach involves two parts. Firstly, a 
partial adjustment model of bank capital is specified following on from previous literature 
(Ayuso et al, 2004; Estrella, 2004; Jokipii and Milne, 2008; Francis and Osborne, 2010). 
Secondly, banks’ unobservable target capital ratio is modelled as a function of explanatory 
variables corresponding with determinants of capital buffers as detailed in past literature47.  
The partial adjustments model is specified such that lower adjustment costs will result in a 
faster speed of adjustment factor (𝛿): 
𝐤𝐢,𝐭 − 𝐤𝐢,𝐭−𝟏 = 𝛅�𝐤𝐢,𝐭∗ − 𝐤𝐢,𝐭−𝟏� + 𝛆𝐢,𝐭    (7.1) 
                                                 
47 This study builds on past literature relating to the determinants of capital buffers. A review of past literature is 
included in section 4.5 and 4.6. 
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Under this specification, ki,t and ki,t∗  represent the actual and target capital buffers, 
respectively, for bank i at time t. The speed of adjustment coefficient is δ, representing the 
proportionate adjustment towards the targeted capital buffer in each period. Finally, the error 
term εi,t represents an idiosyncratic error component. 
Since the target capital ratio is unobservable, ki,t∗  is estimated by a set of N explanatory 
variables. The variables chosen are based on previous literature regarding the determinants of 
bank capitalisation by approximating for: costs of remunerating excess capital and the costs 
of financial distress. Capital adjustment costs are approximated by the speed of adjustment 
coefficient. The above specification is adjusted by substituting the following equation for the 
target capital ratio into the above equation: 
𝐤𝐢,𝐭∗ = � 𝛃𝐧𝐗𝐧,𝐢,𝐭𝐍𝐧=𝟏 = 𝐗𝐢,𝐭𝛃𝟎      (7.2) 
This gives the following specification for bank’s choice of capital buffer commonly used in 
past literature: 
𝐤𝐢,𝐭 = (𝟏 − 𝛅)𝐤𝐢,𝐭−𝟏 + 𝐗𝐢,𝐭𝛃 + 𝛆𝐢,𝐭     (7.3) 
Where 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 represents a vector of determinants of bank capitalisation and 𝛽 represents a 
vector of coefficients for these determinants48.  
The specification used in this study is equivalent, but differs slightly since the dependent 
variable used is the change in capital buffer ∆𝑘𝑖,𝑡. This is in line with the specifications used 
in Jokipii and Milne (2011). Using differences instead of levels reduces potential issues 
associated with non-stationarity, the model used for estimation in this study is structured as 
follows: 
                                                 
48 Note that β =δβ0 representing the coefficient of the vector of determinants of bank capitalisation. 
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∆𝐤𝐢,𝐭 = −𝛅𝐤𝐢,𝐭−𝟏 + 𝐗𝐢,𝐭𝛃 + 𝛆𝐢,𝐭     (7.4) 
This equation forms the basis for the empirical analysis that follows. Using this framework, 
this study investigates three previously unexamined research questions in the Australian 
banking system with regard to the behaviour and determinants of capital buffers. The next 
section details the explanatory variables and estimation equation used in this study. 
7.4. Variable Definitions and Hypothesis Development 
The primary dependent variable used in this study is the change in capital buffer, (ΔBUF). 
The capital buffer is the ratio of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital to risk-weighted assets less the 
minimum 8 percent requirement specified under Pillar 1 of the Basel capital framework. An 
alternative dependent variable used in this study is the change in the Tier 1 capital buffer 
(ΔT1BUF), which is the ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets less the minimum 4 
percent requirement. 
As previously mentioned, explanatory variables used to model bank target capital ratios are 
those suggested by prior literature. According to the literature which was reviewed in section 
4.3, a bank’s optimal capital ratio is based on a trade-off between three costs: capital 
adjustments costs, financial distress costs and financing costs. The following explanatory 
variables are selected as proxies and listed in Table 7.1 along with their expected sign49. 
7.4.1. Capital Adjustment Costs 
In this study, a lagged capital buffer (L.BUF) is used as a proxy for the presence of 
adjustment costs. Berger et al (1995) explains that capital adjustment costs exist because of a 
pure transaction costs component as well as informational asymmetry between the bank and 
                                                 
49 As mentioned in Chapter 4 banks also hold capital buffers because of fixed costs associated with issuing new 
capital along with the amount of time it takes to prepare a new capital raising. 
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the market. If the speed of adjustment coefficient (δ) is equal to zero, no adjustment is made. 
If the speed of adjustment coefficient (δ) is equal to one, a full adjustment is made within one 
time period (one quarterly period). As a result, a positive sign is anticipated50. The null and 
alternative hypotheses are as follows: 
H1: The speed of adjustment coefficient (δ) is not significantly different from zero, 
such that capital adjustment costs (L.BUF) has no relationship with the change 
in bank capital buffer (ΔBUF).  
H1a: The speed of adjustment coefficient (δ) is positive, such that capital 
adjustment costs (L.BUF) is positively related to a change in bank capital 
buffer (ΔBUF). 
7.4.2. Financial Distress Costs 
Estrella (2004) explains that a key determinant of target capital ratios is a bank’s expected 
cost of financial distress. Expected costs of financial distress relate to the likelihood of bank 
failure and three variables are chosen to best account for these costs. The first variable is 
RISK, calculated as the ratio of total risk-weighted assets to total assets51. The variable is 
chosen based on previous literature (Francis and Osborne, 2010) to control for the riskiness 
of the bank’s business model from the perspective of the regulator. This ratio is closely 
followed by APRA supervisors when making ADI risk assessments. The RISK variable will 
vary between 0 in the limiting case that all assets in a bank’s portfolio are risk-weighted at 0 
                                                 
50 Note, the expected sign of the coefficient in equation 7.4 (−δ) is negative. However the results which are 
reported in this study for the speed of adjustment coefficient are in the form of δ and so are positive in all cases, 
with 0 ≤ δ ≤1.  
51 The General Method of Moments (GMM) model used in this study removes potential endogeneity (since the 
dependent variable’s denominator is RWA) by using an instrumental variable weighting matrix. This is 
discussed further in section 7.7 on econometric issues. 
 140 
percent, and 1 if all assets are risk-weighted at 100%, with the unlikely potential for RISK > 
1 since risk-weightings greater than 100% exist for certain exposures. The average RISK for 
Australian ADIs in this study’s sample is 53 per cent. The expected sign of RISK is 
ambiguous with respect to outcome. A positive sign would imply banks with riskier 
portfolios hold higher capital, above that suggested by regulators. On the other hand, a 
negative association is consistent with moral hazard behaviour52. The null and alternative 
hypotheses for RISK are as follows: 
H2: The inherent risk of a bank’s portfolio (RISK) has no relationship with the 
change in total capital buffer (ΔBUF).  
H2a1: The inherent risk of a bank’s portfolio (RISK) is positively related to a change 
in bank capital buffer (ΔBUF) indicating banks raise capital buffers to account 
for greater inherent portfolio risk. 
H2a2: The inherent risk of a bank’s portfolio (RISK) is negatively related to a change 
in bank capital buffer (ΔBUF) indicating moral hazard. 
The second variable used to account for expected costs of financial distress on the bank is the 
variable IMP, calculated as the ratio of total impaired assets to total assets. This variable 
reflects the credit risk of the bank at the current point in time, accounting for potential losses 
in the bank’s portfolio. Impaired facilities reflect bank exposures for which there is doubt as 
to whether the full amount due will be repaid in a timely manner. The expected sign for IMP, 
like RISK, is ambiguous. The null and alternative hypotheses for IMP are as follows: 
                                                 
52 The ambiguous relationship between risk and capital is discussed in greater detail in the literature review 
section. 
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H3: The level of credit risk in a bank’s portfolio (IMP) has no relationship with the 
change in total capital buffer (ΔBUF).  
H3a1: The level of credit risk in a bank’s portfolio (IMP) is positively related to a 
change in bank capital buffer (ΔBUF) indicating banks raise capital buffers to 
account for greater portfolio credit risk. 
H3a2: The level of credit risk in a bank’s portfolio (IMP) is negatively related to a 
change in bank capital buffer (ΔBUF) indicating moral hazard. 
Finally, the variable SIZE is the third and final variable used to account for expected costs of 
financial distress. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. Previous studies have found 
evidence of a size effect on bank capital buffers (Stolz and Wedow, 2011; Jokipii and Milne, 
2008, Francis and Osborne, 2010). The expected sign of SIZE is negative. Large firms have 
better access to funding, more advanced monitoring techniques to screen risky borrowers and 
better diversification of portfolio risk. Past literature argues that this allows larger banks to 
hold lower levels of target capital buffers than smaller banks. In addition, theory regarding 
the too-big-to-fail hypothesis argues larger banks will hold lower capital buffers given there 
is a higher probability that larger banks will be bailed out by the government in the case of 
financial distress because of the threat of systemic effects on the wider economy. The null 
and alternative hypotheses for SIZE are as follows: 
H4: SIZE has no influence over the change in total capital buffer (ΔBUF).  
H4a: SIZE is negatively related to a change in bank capital buffer (ΔBUF). 
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7.4.3. Financing costs 
Past literature has identified an important determinant of banks target capital ratios to be the 
cost to banks of holding capital (Berger et al, 1995; Estrella, 2004)53. Following previous 
empirical literature, these costs are accounted for using banks’ return on equity (ROE). ROE 
is the ratio of bank after-tax earnings to total equity. ROE is selected because it represents the 
return the bank could have expected to earn if capital that is held by the bank were invested 
instead in profitable bank exposures. In other words, a bank’s ROE represents the opportunity 
cost of holding capital. Under this interpretation, the expected sign of ROE is negative. 
However, as noted by Stolz and Wedow (2011) since raising capital is costly, banks rely on 
retained earnings to bolster capital when needed54. This would imply a positive relationship is 
conceivable. Thus, past literature implies the relationship is ambiguous. The null and 
alternative hypotheses for ROE are as follows: 
H5: A bank’s return on equity (ROE) has no relationship with the change in total 
capital buffer (ΔBUF).  
H5a1: A bank’s return on equity (ROE) is positively related to a change in bank 
capital buffer (ΔBUF) indicating an opportunity cost of holding capital is 
present. 
H5a2: A bank’s return on equity (ROE) is negatively related to a change in bank 
capital buffer (ΔBUF) indicating retained earnings are relied on directly to 
increase capital. 
                                                 
53 The ROE variable reflects banks ability to finance their capital base with retained earnings. 
54 This is consistent with the pecking order approach to capital. 
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7.4.4. Basel II 
A dummy variable is included (BASEL2) to account for the regulatory capital regime change 
from Basel I to Basel II on the 1st of January, 2008 in the Australian banking system. As 
mentioned, the move to Basel II had the objective of greater risk-sensitivity. The sign is 
expected to be positive, given Australian ADIs are thought to benefit from the new 
requirements which reduce risk-weighting for residential mortgage exposures that make up a 
significant proportion of Australian ADI portfolios. Additionally, the move to Basel II 
provided supervisors with new tools for assessment of bank risk, such as the ICAAP. This 
might have caused banks to respond by increasing capital ratios. The null and alternative 
hypotheses for BASEL2 are as follows: 
H6: The implementation of the Basel II framework (BASEL2) has no relationship 
with the change in total capital buffer (ΔBUF).  
H6a1: The implementation of the Basel II framework (BASEL2) is positively related 
to a change in bank capital buffer (ΔBUF). 
7.4.5. Economic Cycle 
Finally a business cycle variable is included to account for economic conditions. Past 
literature has argued that the economic cycle impacts on a bank’s ability or willingness to 
raise capital or alter its balance sheet. Two variables are used; the change in gross domestic 
product (GDP) and a one quarter lagged rate of unemployment (L.UR). A positive sign 
(negative for L.UR) suggests that banks increase capital ratios during upturns, potentially due 
to greater earnings and lower business risk. This also suggests that banks are building up 
capital in upturns to help withstand economic downturns. This essentially suggests that banks 
are exhibiting the capital management practices of a countercyclical capital buffer, due to be 
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enforced by regulation under Basel III from 2013. A negative sign (positive for L.UR) would 
suggest that bank capital management practices are procyclical and that banks are short-
sighted, reducing capital buffers during upturns by increasing exposures, such that during 
downturns there is less capital on hand to withstand losses. As already discussed this has the 
effect of amplifying the business cycle, and causing deeper and longer recessionary periods. 
The null and alternative hypotheses for GDP and L.UR are as follows: 
H7: The economic cycle (GDP, L.UR) has no relationship with the change in total 
capital buffer (ΔBUF).  
H7a1: The economic cycle (GDP, L.UR) is positively related to a change in bank 
capital buffer (ΔBUF) indicating foresight in capital management practice. 
H7a1: The economic cycle (GDP, L.UR) is negatively related to a change in bank 
capital buffer (ΔBUF) indicating short-sightedness in bank capital 
management practice. 
7.4.6. Prudential Capital Ratio 
The PCR is used as an explanatory variable to measure the impact of individual bank 
regulatory capital requirements imposed by APRA on a bank’s total capital ratio. The PCR 
reflects the minimum requirement imposed by APRA for an individual bank’s total capital 
ratios55. A positive sign on the coefficient of PCR indicates that a change in APRA’s PCR is 
having the intended effect on banks’ capital ratios. Note that the impact of PCR is examined 
on the change in total capital ratio (ΔTCR) instead of capital buffer; this is because the Basel 
regulatory minimum is no longer important when considering individual bank capital 
requirements. The null and alternative hypotheses for PCR are as follows: 
                                                 
55 The PCR was discussed at greater length in section 7.2. 
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H8: Prudential capital ratios (PCR) have no relationship with the change in total 
capital ratio (ΔTCR).  
H8a1: Prudential capital ratios (PCR) are positively related to a change in total 
capital ratio (ΔTCR), demonstrating regulatory requirements are successfully 
influencing bank capital.  
An interaction variable B2_PCR is constructed as the interaction of BASEL2 and PCR 
variables, designed to examine whether the influence of PCR over capital ratios is 
significantly different after the implementation of the Basel II framework in Australia. Basel 
II implemented a greater focus on increased risk-sensitivity and increased emphasis on 
supervisory review. Basel II gave regulators greater powers and tools than previously 
available to assess bank risk, such as the ICAAP. As discussed, APRA formalised a link 
between PCR assessment and PAIRS and the ICAAP with the move to Basel II. A positive 
sign for B2_PCR would indicate PCRs have had a stronger influence on bank capital ratios in 
the presence of greater risk-sensitivity and regulatory powers implemented with Basel II. 
Alternatively, one explanation for a negative result could be that after the implementation of 
Basel II capital requirements, banks react more quickly to conditions influencing target 
capital ratios and update capital ratios accordingly. Since PCRs are updated relatively 
infrequently, changes in individual bank capital requirements may have already been 
compounded into bank capital ratios resulting in a more subdued relationship between PCR 
and the capital ratio under Basel II. The null and alternative hypotheses for B2_PCR are as 
follows: 
H9: The implementation of Basel II does not significantly influence the 
relationship between PCR and the change in total capital ratio (ΔTCR).  
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H9a1: The implementation of Basel II has a positive influence on the relationship 
between PCR and the change in total capital ratio (ΔTCR) indicating the more 
formalised and stronger supervisory review powers under Basel II have 
increased the influence of PCRs on bank capital.  
H9a1: The implementation of Basel II has a negative influence on the relationship 
between PCR and the change in total capital ratio (ΔTCR) indicating the Basel 
II framework has resulted in a more subdued relationship between PCR and 
TCR.  
Two interaction variables are included to examine the influence of PCRs during an upturn 
(UPTURN_PCR) compared to a downturn (DOWNTURN_PCR). The downturn period is 
defined as the period of the global financial crisis, widely documented to begin in 2007:q3 
and assumed to finish at the end of 2009. All other periods are classified as upturn periods. 
The interaction variables are designed to test whether the influence of PCRs on bank capital 
ratios differ between upturn and downturn periods in the economic cycle.  
Past literature has found a significantly different relationship between individual bank capital 
requirements and capital ratios during downturns. Francis and Osborne (2010) find a negative 
relationship, suggesting that changing capital requirements during more favourable times has 
a greater effect on capital ratios than during a downturn. Alternatively, during a downturn 
banks may be more aware of capital positions, due to greater market discipline and regulatory 
intervention. If this is the case, DOWNTURN_PCR may be significantly larger than 
UPTURN_PCR. Thus, no expectation is assumed on the differences between the interaction 
terms, and the hypothesis is left to empirical investigation. The null and alternative 
hypotheses for the PCR interactions with UPTURN and DOWNTURN are as follows: 
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H10: A downturn (upturn) does not significantly influence the relationship between 
PCR and the change in total capital ratio (ΔTCR).  
H10a1: A downturn (upturn) has a significant influence on the relationship between 
PCR and the change in total capital ratio (ΔTCR).  
The definitions of variables used in the empirical investigation and their expected signs are 
summarised in Table 7.1. The dependent variable used in the base model for the determinant 
analysis is capital buffer (BUF). The dependent variable used for models examining the 
impact of individual bank PCRs is the total capital ratio (TCR). 
  
Table 7.1 
    Variable Definitions and Expected Sign 
  
     This table presents the variables used in empirical estimation and the expected signs of their corresponding 
coefficients. 
Variable 
 
Description 
 
Expected 
Sign 
BUF 
 
Ratio of excess regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets 
  TCR Risk-based total capital ratio 
L.BUF  Lagged regulatory capital buffer  + 
L.TCR  Lagged risk-based capital ratio  + 
IMP  Ratio of impaired assets to total assets  + / - 
RISK  Ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets  + / - 
SIZE  Natural logarithm of total assets  - 
ROE  Return on equity (ratio of net income to total equity)  + / - 
BASEL2  Dummy variable: 0: Basel I and 1: Basel II  + 
GDP  percentage change in Gross Domestic Product  + / - 
L.UR  Lagged unemployment rate  + / - 
PCR   Prudential capital ratio   + 
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7.5. Data and Descriptive Analysis 
The initial dataset used in this study consists of a sample collected from quarterly regulatory 
returns for Australian ADIs between 2004:q1 and 2012:q4. ADIs with average capital ratios 
greater than 40% were removed from the sample, resulting in the removal of 18 ADIs. 
Foreign branches are not subject to capital adequacy regulation in Australia and therefore 
were removed from the sample. The final sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 216 
ADIs over the 36 quarterly periods, with a total of 5602 quarterly-ADI observations. 
Macroeconomic data variables used in this study were sourced from the Reserve Bank of 
Australia (RBA) statistics tables. 
The second dataset used in this study was based on Australian banks which are subject to 
individual bank prudential capital requirements. As explained, prudential capital ratios 
(PCRs) were implemented in Australia with the Basel II reforms in January, 2008. However, 
prior to this, supervisors could require individual banks to hold minimum capital 
requirements above the Basel imposed minimum 8 per cent. Despite not being termed 
prudential capital ratios, these individual-bank capital requirements are here referred to as 
PCRs to reduce complexity. 
The dataset was collected from APRA, providing a history of updates in the PCR for all 
Australian banks. Where a bank had less than four total observations in the sample, it was 
excluded, resulting in the removal of 2 Australian banks. Where no PCR was reported for an 
Australian bank over the entire sample period, the bank was excluded from the sample, 
resulting in the removal of an additional 5 banks. The final sample consisted of an 
unbalanced panel of 21 Australian banks over 36 quarterly time periods, with a total of 715 
quarterly-bank observations.  
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Table 7.2 
          Descriptive statistics for sample bank-observations 
     This table presents the summary statistics for Banks, Credit Unions and Building Societies (CUBS) in Panel A, 
and for the sample of only Australian Banks in Panel B. The sample period is March 2004 to December 2012. 
Banks with average total capital ratios exceeding 40% of risk-weighted assets over the sample period were 
removed. Impaired facilities are calculated as a percentage of total assets  
Panel A:  Banks and CUBS Sample (March 2004 to December 2012), N=5602 
 
Data item 
 
Mean 
 
Standard 
deviation 
 
Lower 
quartile 
 
Median 
 
Upper 
quartile 
           Total assets $mil 
 
13,683 
 
70,224 
 
50.33 
 
175 
 
768 
           ROE % 
 
1.75 
 
3.61 
 
0.82 
 
1.60 
 
2.48 
Impaired facilities % 
 
0.30 
 
0.50 
 
0.04 
 
0.14 
 
0.35 
RWA (% total assets) 
 
53.01 
 
13.20 
 
44.70 
 
51.60 
 
58.50 
GDP growth % 
 
0.67 
 
0.50 
 
0.43 
 
0.69 
 
0.84 
UR % 
 
4.97 
 
0.48 
 
4.59 
 
4.99 
 
5.33 
           Tier 1 capital ratio % 
 
16.67 
 
5.92 
 
12.45 
 
15.65 
 
20.30 
Total capital ratio % 
 
18.13 
 
5.44 
 
14.03 
 
17.06 
 
20.99 
                      
Panel B: Australian Banks (March 2004 to December 2012), N=715 
  
Data item 
 
Mean 
 
Standard 
deviation 
 
Lower 
quartile 
 
Median 
 
Upper 
quartile 
           Total assets $mil 
 
103,926 
 
171,258 
 
3,914 
 
20,434 
 
79,378 
           ROE % 
 
2.93 
 
8.85 
 
1.23 
 
2.47 
 
3.64 
Impaired facilities % 
 
0.68 
 
0.95 
 
0.11 
 
0.33 
 
0.79 
RWA (% total assets) 
 
65.87 
 
24.51 
 
52.40 
 
61.58 
 
72.67 
GDP growth % 
 
0.67 
 
0.50 
 
0.43 
 
0.69 
 
0.84 
UR % 
 
4.97 
 
0.48 
 
4.59 
 
4.99 
 
5.33 
           Tier 1 capital ratio 
 
10.86 
 
4.08 
 
8.18 
 
9.70 
 
12.20 
Total capital ratio 
 
13.76 
 
3.70 
 
9.05 
 
12.59 
 
15.08 
 
Table 7.2 reports descriptive statistics for the two samples used in this study. Panel A 
provides statistics for variables included in the full sample of ADIs (Banks and CUBS), 
whilst Panel B reports statistics for variables included in the Australian bank only dataset. 
There is significant variation within and between banks for all variables. Comparing the two 
datasets, mean bank assets are significantly larger for the Australian bank only sample as 
expected, since the average Australian bank is almost 9 times the magnitude of the average 
ADI. Capital ratios are significantly smaller for the Australian bank sample, with average tier 
 150 
1 ratios of 10.86% compared to 16.67% for the average ADI, and total capital ratios of 
13.76% compared to 18.13% for the average ADI. This suggests a size effect may exist, 
providing an argument for rejection of hypothesis 4. Summary statistics are not reported for 
PCRs due to privacy disclosure requirements.  
Table 7.3 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients for the key variables used in this study. 
Coefficient signs can be misleading, given simple correlations are unable to take account of 
ADI fixed effects56. Capital ratio variables showed a negative relationship between the 
variables used as a proxy for financial distress costs (IMP, RISK, SIZE), and a negative 
relationship with ROE used as a proxy for the opportunity cost of holding capital. PCR had a 
positive relationship with capital ratio variables, providing some indication that regulatory 
capital requirements may have had their intended impact. In addition, there was significant 
cross correlation between explanatory variables. In section 7.7 these econometric issues are 
examined, detailing the dynamic model specification and GMM estimation procedure used to 
circumvent these problems. 
                                                 
56 These simple correlations are correlations across banks and time for each variable. 
  
Table 7.3 
                    Pearson correlation coefficients for key variables of the sample bank-observations 
 
                      IMP is impaired facilities divided by average total assets. RISK is total risk-weighted assets divided by total assets. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. 
ROE is net profit after tax divided by total shareholders’ equity. T1R is the Tier 1 capital ratio. TCR is the total capital ratio. PCR is the prudential capital 
ratio.  ** indicates significance at the 5% level. 
Panel A:  Banks and CUBS Sample (March 2004 to December 2012), N=5602   
                      
  
IMP 
 
RISK 
 
SIZE 
 
ROE 
 
T1R 
 
TCR 
  
                      IMP 
 
1.00 
                   RISK 
 
0.27 ** 
 
1.00 
                SIZE 
 
0.13 ** 
 
0.06 ** 
 
1.00 
             ROE 
 
-0.03 ** 
 
0.04 ** 
 
0.19 ** 
 
1.00 
          T1R 
 
-0.08 ** 
 
-0.22 ** 
 
-0.48 ** 
 
-0.13 ** 
 
1.00 
       TCR 
 
-0.06 
  
-0.45 ** 
 
-0.45 ** 
 
-0.13 ** 
 
0.94 ** 
 
1.00 
 
  
                                        
   Panel B: Australian Banks (March 2004 to December 2012), N=715  
                      
  
IMP 
 
RISK 
 
SIZE 
 
ROE 
 
T1R 
 
TCR 
 
PCR 
                      IMP 
 
1.00 
                   RISK 
 
0.22 ** 
 
1.00 
                SIZE 
 
-0.06 
  
-0.43 ** 
 
1.00 
             ROE 
 
-0.07 
  
-0.03 
  
0.10 ** 
 
1.00 
          T1R 
 
0.07 
  
-0.11 ** 
 
-0.41 ** 
 
-0.06 
  
1.00 
       TCR 
 
0.00 
  
-0.10 ** 
 
-0.38 ** 
 
-0.06 
  
0.91 ** 
 
1.00 
    PCR 
 
0.22 ** 
 
0.40 ** 
 
-0.63 ** 
 
-0.10 ** 
 
0.52 ** 
 
0.48 ** 
 
1.00 
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7.6. Empirical Model Estimation 
This section provides the three empirical model specifications which are estimated in this 
study. Each model is a variation of equation 7.1. Estimation equation 7.5 is used to examine 
the speed of adjustment coefficient. Estimation equation 7.6 is used to examine the 
determinants of bank capital buffers, and finally estimation equation 7.7 is used to examine 
the impact of individual bank prudential capital requirements.  
Prior literature has modelled banks (unobservable) target ratio using variables known to be 
determinants. This study has the advantage of access to banks’ reported targeted capital 
ratios. APRA is notified intermittently, through Pillar 2 reporting57, when individual banks 
update their targeted capital ratios. The reliability of such reported banks’ targets is under 
question, as one might expect banks to have an incentive to report higher targeted capital 
ratios to the regulator. The first estimation equation is specified as follows: 
∆𝐓𝐂𝐑𝐢,𝐭 = 𝛃𝟎 + 𝛃𝟏�𝐓𝐀𝐑𝐢,𝐭 − 𝐓𝐂𝐑𝐢,𝐭−𝟏� + 𝛆𝐢,𝐭    (7.5) 
Where TCR is the total capital ratio, the tier 1 capital ratio (T1R) is also examined in its 
place. TAR is the target capital ratio (total or tier 1) reported to APRA. The specification of 
estimated equation 7.558 examines the speed of adjustment of bank capital ratios to reported 
targeted levels. As mentioned previously, where the speed of adjustment δ = −β1, a speed of 
adjustment of 0 would indicate no adjustment, whilst a speed of adjustment of 1 would 
                                                 
57 Pillar 2 reporting only came into effect with Basel II, however prior to Basel II supervisors were also given 
reported target capital ratios intermittently. 
58 No explanatory variables are included in equation 7.5 because the explanatory variables are only used in the 
modelling process as a proxy for the targeted capital ratio. Since we have the reported target capital ratio, there 
is no need in this particular model to include explanatory variables for the determinants of the target capital 
ratio. 
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indicate full adjustment of banks capital ratios to targets in one period (one quarter in the 
study) 59. Finally 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 represents the idiosyncratic error component.  
Estimation equation 7.6 is specified in the form of equation 7.4 presented in the methodology 
section. As discussed, the model treats the target capital ratio as unobservable, implementing 
key determinants in its place. The estimation equation is specified as follows: 
∆𝐁𝐔𝐅𝐢,𝐭 = 𝛃𝟎 + 𝛃𝟏𝐁𝐔𝐅𝐢,𝐭−𝟏 + 𝛃𝟐𝐈𝐌𝐏𝐢,𝐭 + 𝛃𝟑𝐑𝐈𝐒𝐊𝐢,𝐭 + 𝛃𝟒𝐒𝐈𝐙𝐄𝐢,𝐭 + 𝛃𝟓𝐑𝐎𝐄𝐢,𝐭 +
𝛃𝟔𝐁𝐀𝐒𝐄𝐋𝟐𝐢,𝐭 + 𝛃𝟕𝐂𝐘𝐂𝐋𝐄𝐢,𝐭 + 𝛆𝐢,𝐭       (7.6) 
Where ∆BUFi,t is the total capital buffer or the tier 1 capital buffer. CYCLEi,t is an economic 
cycle variable entering the equation as either GDP or L.UR as described in section 7.4. All 
other variables have been described previously. For ease of interpretation, the speed of 
adjustment coefficient (δ) is reported in the results section instead of β1. 
The final estimation equation 7.7 is used to examine the impact of individual bank-specific 
capital requirements by including the prudential capital ratio (PCR) as an explanatory 
variable. The dependent variable is the total capital ratio (TCR), with the estimation equation 
specified as follows: 
∆𝐓𝐂𝐑𝐢,𝐭 = 𝛃𝟎 + 𝛃𝟏𝐓𝐂𝐑𝐢,𝐭−𝟏 + 𝛃𝟐𝐑𝐈𝐒𝐊𝐢,𝐭 + 𝛃𝟑𝐑𝐎𝐄𝐢,𝐭 + 𝛃𝟒𝐁𝐀𝐒𝐄𝐋𝟐𝐢,𝐭 + 𝛃𝟓𝐆𝐃𝐏𝐢,𝐭 +
𝛃𝟔𝐏𝐂𝐑𝐢,𝐭 + 𝛃𝟕𝐁𝟐_𝐏𝐂𝐑𝐢,𝐭 + 𝛃𝟖𝐔𝐏𝐓𝐔𝐑𝐍_𝐏𝐂𝐑𝐢,𝐭 + 𝛃𝟗𝐃𝐎𝐖𝐍𝐓𝐔𝐑𝐍_𝐏𝐂𝐑𝐢,𝐭 + 𝛆𝐢,𝐭    (7.7) 
Variables in equation 7.7 have already been defined in section 7.4. The three models 
presented above include a lagged transformation of the dependent variable as a regressor. 
This causes a violation of ordinary least squares and panel regression assumptions. It is for 
this reason that a dynamic difference and system Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) 
                                                 
59 See section 7.3, equation 7.1. 
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model is used to estimate variable coefficients. A discussion of econometric issues and the 
GMM estimation framework is provided in the following section. 
7.7. Econometric Issues and Estimation Framework 
Three econometric models are used for estimation. A fixed-effects panel regression is used to 
provide a benchmark60. In addition, two variations of the GMM procedure are used for 
estimation, the ‘difference GMM’ estimation approach of Arellano and Bond (1991) and the 
‘system GMM’ estimation of Blundell and Bond (1998). The GMM procedure overcomes 
estimation problems associated with independent variables that are not strictly exogenous, 
where they are correlated with past and potentially present error realisations. GMM is able to 
account for fixed effects and heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within panels. 
In this study, a one period lagged capital buffer (or capital ratio) is included as an 
independent variable in the estimation equation. This is in line with past literature which 
models capital buffers as a partial adjustment model. However, given a lagged dependent 
variable is included as an independent variable, a ‘dynamic panel bias’ exists, also referred to 
as the Nickell bias (Nickell, 1981). It can be shown that the fixed-effects (FE) estimator will 
be biased downward whilst the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator will be biased 
upwards61. Thus, there is concern for the consistency of coefficient estimates under these 
estimators. 
The ‘difference GMM’ estimator uses lags of t-1 and deeper for levels of the dependent 
variable and other endogenous variables as instruments for the equation in first differences. 
                                                 
60 The choice of fixed-effects over random-effects is made based on the Hausman test. 
61 We observe this effect for the speed of adjustment coefficient (coefficient of the lagged dependent variable), 
such that FE estimator < GMM estimator < OLS estimator. Results are not reported for OLS.  
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Under difference GMM, persistence in instrumental variables leads to weak instruments, 
potentially causing downward bias and less efficient parameter estimates. Blundell and Bond 
solved this problem by developing the ‘system GMM’ estimator. System GMM incorporates 
lagged differences as instruments for the equation in levels, as well as the existing Arellano-
Bond instruments. This allows for more instruments and can dramatically improve efficiency 
(Roodman, 2009).  
A problem with the use of GMM is the potential for instrument proliferation. This is the 
tendency to use a large collection of instruments, which from an individual instrument 
perspective may be valid, but collectively are invalid in finite samples because together they 
overfit endogenous variables. In addition, they weaken the Hansen test for overidentifying 
restrictions, which is a common test relied upon to determine instrumental validity 
(Roodman, 2008). This particular problem is relevant to this study, which consists of a large 
sample of 36 quarterly periods, since the number of instruments is quadratic in the number of 
time periods. To circumvent this problem, this study applies the technique suggested by 
Roodman (2008) and collapses the instrument matrix to remove unique instruments for each 
time period. In addition, the number of instruments and the Hansen statistic are reported for 
each GMM model. Finally, due to downward bias in the standard errors of the relatively 
efficient two-step GMM procedure (Roodman, 2008), the Windmeijer correction 
(Windmeijer, 2005) is applied to correct the standard errors. 
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7.8. Empirical Results 
7.8.1. Speed of Adjustment Results 
In Table 7.4, results are presented for estimation equation 7.5 examining the speed of 
adjustment coefficient using a partial adjustments model which examines how banks adjust 
their capital ratios to their reported target levels. A fixed-effects panel regression is used to 
estimate the model, after considering results of the Hausman test. For Model A1 which 
examines the change in total capital ratio (ΔTCR), the sample consists of 13 banks reporting 
target capital ratios to the regulator. For Model A2 examining the change in the tier 1 capital 
ratio (ΔT1R), the sample consists of 10 banks reporting target tier 1 capital ratios to the 
regulator. 
Table 7.4 
      Speed of adjustment to Targeted Capital Buffer for Australian Banks 
       The table presents fixed-effects panel regression results for speed of adjustment coefficients of 
actual bank capital ratios to targets. Model A1 presents result for Total Capital Ratio (TCR), 
Model A2 presents the result for Tier 1 Capital Ratio (T1R). The sample period is March 2004 
to December 2012. ** indicates significance at the <0.01 level and * at the <0.05 level. 
  
Δ TCR   Δ T1R 
Independent variables 
 
(A1) 
 
(A2) 
       (TARTCR – TCR) 
 
0.2059 * 
   
  
(2.20) 
    
       (TART1R – T1R) 
    
0.1291 * 
     
(2.91) 
 
       Constant 
 
0.0072 ** 
 
0.0063 * 
  
(2.80) 
  
(3.95) 
 
       Observations 
 
278 
  
241 
 Number of banks 
 
13 
  
10 
 adj-R2 
 
0.084 
  
0.054 
           
 
Table 7.4 indicates a significant and positive speed of adjustment coefficient of 0.21 and 0.13 
percent for total and tier 1 capital ratios, respectively. This result is consistent with rejection 
of the null hypothesis H.1. The positive result indicates that Australian banks experience 
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adjustment costs which impede a complete adjustment to the target capital buffer in each 
period. The result can be interpreted as demonstrating that banks take roughly 5 quarterly 
periods to adjust their total capital ratio to target, and almost 8 quarterly periods to adjust 
their tier 1 capital ratio to target. The speed of adjustment coefficients reported here for the 
Australian banking sector are largely in line with previous literature examining other 
countries. Jokipii and Milne (2008) find an annual speed of adjustment coefficient of around 
66 per cent, Francis and Osborne (2010) report results for UK solo banks which are closer in 
magnitude to this study, finding a quarterly speed of adjustment coefficient of 23 per cent for 
the total capital ratio and Ayuso (2004) reports an average annual speed of adjustment 
coefficient of 38 per cent for the Spanish banking sector, whilst Fonseca and Gonzales (2010) 
find an average annual speed of adjustment coefficient of 31 per cent in a cross-country 
study. 
7.8.2. Capital Buffer Determinant Results 
Tables 7.5 and 7.6 present empirical results of bank capital buffer determinants for the full 
sample of Australian ADIs (Banks and CUBS). Table 7.5 reports difference and system 
GMM results for the change in total capital buffer, and Table 7.6 presents results for 
difference and system GMM for the change in the tier 1 capital buffer62. Results indicate the 
lagged capital buffer (L.BUF) is negative and significantly related to the change in capital 
buffer for both the total capital ratio and the tier 1 capital ratio. This is consistent with a 
positive speed of adjustment coefficient (δ)63, as reported in Tables 7.5 and 7.6. The 
                                                 
62 Table A1 in the appendix reports fixed-effects panel regression results. These results are presented as a 
benchmark for comparison, but suffer from the dynamic panel bias (the Nickell bias) as explained in section 7.7 
examining the econometric framework. 
63 For the average tier 1 buffer speed of adjustment, the coefficient of Model B5 is excluded due to 
insignificance. 
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magnitude of δ is 0.18 and 0.19 percent for total and tier 1 capital buffers, respectively. These 
values are in line with the results presented in Table 7.4 under reported target capital ratios. 
The result indicates banks experience adjustment costs, impeding a complete adjustment to 
the target capital buffer in each period, resulting in a rejection of the null hypothesis H1. 
Table 7.5 
            The determinants of total capital buffers for Australian authorised deposit-taking institutions (ADIs), 
GMM analysis 
The table presents the results of General Method of Moments (GMM) analysis for the determinants of 
Australian bank total capital buffers. The sample period is March 2004 to December 2012. ** indicates 
significance at the <0.01 level and * at the <0.05 level. Models B1 and B3 include GDP, whilst models B2 and 
B4 include UR as the economic cycle variable. 
  
Difference GMM 
 
System GMM 
Independent variables 
 
(B1) 
 
(B2) 
 
(B3) 
 
(B4) 
             Δ 
 
0.1943 ** 
 
0.2753 ** 
 
0.0970 * 
 
0.1444 ** 
  
(2.60) 
  
(3.02) 
  
(2.28) 
  
(3.77) 
 
             RISK 
 
0.0404 
  
0.1272 ** 
 
-0.0140 ** 
 
-0.0158 ** 
  
(0.75) 
  
(2.73) 
  
(-2.88) 
  
(-2.85) 
 
             IMP 
 
-0.1575 
  
-0.0800 
  
0.0725 
  
0.0998 
 
  
(-1.02) 
  
(-0.58) 
  
(1.13) 
  
(1.53) 
 
             SIZE 
 
-0.0195 * 
 
-0.0075 
  
-0.0012 * 
 
-0.0021 ** 
  
(-2.18) 
  
(-1.13) 
  
(-2.38) 
  
(-4.25) 
 
             ROE 
 
0.0006 
  
0.1687 ** 
 
-0.0147 
  
0.0965 * 
  
(0.04) 
  
(4.54) 
  
(-1.76) 
  
(2.49) 
 
             BASEL2 
 
0.0281 ** 
 
0.0377 ** 
 
0.0061 ** 
 
0.0074 ** 
  
(-2.18) 
  
(8.62) 
  
(3.62) 
  
(4.56) 
 
             GDP 
 
0.1488 ** 
    
0.2958 ** 
   
  
(3.28) 
     
(6.73) 
    
             L.UR 
    
-0.3911 * 
    
-0.1233 ** 
     
(-1.98) 
     
(-3.57) 
 
             Constant 
       
0.0379 ** 
 
0.0658 ** 
        
(2.76) 
  
(4.78) 
 
             Observations 
 
4725 
  
4846 
  
4923 
  
5044 
 Number of banks 
 
195 
  
195 
  
198 
  
198 
 Number of instruments 
 
11 
  
17 
  
14 
  
18 
 
             AR(1) 
 
-5.59 * 
 
-4.13 * 
 
-6.85 * 
 
-5.50 * 
AR(2) 
 
1.56 
  
1.30 
  
1.27 
  
1.86 
 Hansen J-test (p-value) 
 
0.11 
  
0.03 
  
0.17 
  
0.12 
                   
 
 159 
Empirical results for variables used as a proxy for cost of financial distress have mixed 
significance levels. The variable RISK, used to account for the inherent riskiness of a bank’s 
portfolio, is negative and significant in tier 1 and total capital buffer models. However, Model 
B1 finds an insignificant result, whilst Model B2 provides an exception, finding a positive 
relationship between RISK and ΔBUF under difference GMM. Overall, the result is 
consistent with the hypothesis regarding moral hazard, although only small in magnitude. The 
result suggests ADIs have increased inherent risk in their portfolio without a corresponding 
increase in capital ratios. Moral hazard exists if this comes as a result of banks exploiting the 
strengthening regulatory safety net in the Australian banking system. The result is a rejection 
of null hypothesis H2, and the alternative hypothesis H2a2 is accepted.  
The variable, IMP, is not significant for the change in total or tier 1 capital buffers. This 
indicates a failure to reject H3, suggesting the current level of credit risk in the bank portfolio 
is not related to the change in capital buffers of ADIs. Finally, the variable SIZE is negative 
and significantly related to ΔBUF. This suggests the larger Australian banks have advantages 
over small CUBS in better access to funding markets, and more advanced monitoring 
techniques to screen risky borrowers. The result is also in line with the too-big-to-fail 
hypothesis which argues that large banks hold smaller capital buffers given there is a greater 
chance these banks will be bailed out in the event of default because of their systemic 
importance to the economy. This results in a rejection of the null hypothesis H4, and an 
acceptance of H4a. 
The variable ROE has been used as a proxy for financing costs, specifically for the 
opportunity costs of having to hold capital. Empirical results reported in Tables 7.5 and 7.6 
are inconsistent. Of the 8 models presented, three models find a positive relationship with 
ΔBUF, one model finds a negative relationship and four models find a relationship that is not 
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significantly different from zero64. The results provide some indication that opportunity costs 
of holding capital may exist for ADIs, but not enough to confidently reject the null hypothesis 
for H5. 
The dummy variable BASEL2 is positive and significantly related to ΔBUF in all models. 
This suggests that the implementation of the Basel II framework in the Australian banking 
system has resulted in an increase in bank capital buffers. This is the case for ADIs total and 
tier 1 capital buffer, resulting in a rejection of the null hypothesis H6. To a certain degree this 
result reflects the significant proportion of ADI residential mortgage exposures. As discussed, 
the Basel II framework reduced risk-weights for residential mortgage exposures. In addition, 
the result might also be explained by ADIs preparing for the move to the Basel III 
framework. As explained, the Basel minimum capital requirements are due to be increased, 
with a focus on capital quality.  
In all models, the economic cycle variable is positively related to ΔBUF65. The relationship is 
statistically and economically significant in all specifications, resulting in a rejection of the 
null hypothesis H7 and an acceptance of the alternative hypothesis H7a1. Unlike a number of 
previous studies examining other countries, this result suggests that ADI capital buffers have 
not displayed a procyclical effect. The result indicates Australian ADIs possess a degree of 
foresight in their capital management practices, raising capital buffers during economic 
upturns to help withstand the downturn that follows in the economic cycle. The results 
presented here are in disagreement with past empirical studies that have found a negative 
relationship between the economic cycle and capital buffers in other banking sectors (Ayuso 
                                                 
64 The model which finds a positive relationship (Model B2) has a Hansen J-test statistic which rejects the null 
hypothesis of valid instruments. This result is therefore disregarded. 
65 In the case of the lagged unemployment variable it is negative, which is also indicative of a positive business 
cycle relationship with ΔBUF. 
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et al, 2004; Estrella, 2004; Jokipii and Milne, 2008; Francis and Osborne, 2010) and in 
agreement with studies examining jurisdictions in which a positive relationship is found66. 
Table 7.6 
            The determinants of tier 1 capital buffers for  Australian authorised deposit-taking institutions (ADIs), 
GMM analysis 
             The table presents the results of General Method of Moments (GMM) analysis for the determinants of 
Australian bank Tier 1 capital buffers. The sample period is March 2004 to December 2012. ** indicates 
significance at the <0.01 level and * at the <0.05 level. Models 1, 3, 5 and 7 include GDP, whilst models 2, 4, 6 
and 8 include UR. 
             
  
Difference GMM 
 
System GMM 
Independent variables 
 
(B5) 
 
(B6) 
 
(B7) 
 
(B8) 
             δ 
 
0.0800 
  
0.3919 * 
 
0.1081 ** 
 
0.0766 * 
  
(0.44) 
  
(2.15) 
  
(4.59) 
  
(2.21) 
 
             RISK 
 
-0.2145 ** 
 
-0.1958 ** 
 
-0.0116 ** 
 
-0.0012 ** 
  
(-6.67) 
  
(-7.80) 
  
(-3.20) 
  
(-3.48) 
 
             IMP 
 
0.1274 
  
-0.0089 
  
0.0374 
  
0.0764 
 
  
(0.75) 
  
(-0.07) 
  
(0.66) 
  
(1.51) 
 
             SIZE 
 
-0.0522 ** 
 
-0.0256 
  
-0.0019 ** 
 
-0.0012 * 
  
(-3.59) 
  
(-1.67) 
  
(-2.82) 
  
(-2.43) 
 
             ROE 
 
-0.0395 
  
0.0878 * 
 
-0.1058 ** 
 
0.0156 
 
  
(-0.47) 
  
(2.07) 
  
(-2.88) 
  
(0.48) 
 
             BASEL2 
 
0.0027 
  
0.0065 * 
 
0.0051 ** 
 
0.0042 ** 
  
(0.69) 
  
(2.23) 
  
(4.32) 
  
(2.96) 
 
             GDP 
 
0.1650 ** 
    
0.2504 ** 
   
  
(3.02) 
     
(6.34) 
    
             L.UR 
    
-0.6522 ** 
    
-0.0805 ** 
     
(-3.10) 
     
(-2.78) 
 
             Constant 
       
0.0546 ** 
 
0.0424 ** 
        
(3.82) 
  
(3.09) 
 
             Observations 
 
4725 
  
4846 
  
4923 
  
5044 
 Number of banks 
 
195 
  
195 
  
198 
  
198 
 Number of instruments 
 
16 
  
13 
  
19 
  
13 
 
             AR(1) 
 
-3.47 * 
 
-2.57 * 
 
-6.31 * 
 
-6.13 * 
AR(2) 
 
1.87 
  
1.65 
  
1.78 
  
2.20 * 
Hansen J-test (p-value) 
 
0.12 
  
0.11 
  
0.68 
  
0.64 
                           
                                                 
66 Fonseca and Gonzalez (2010) find seven countries have a negative relationship between the economic cycle 
and capital buffers, five countries have a positive relationship and fifty-nine have no relationship. No study, 
including their cross-country study has examined the Australian banking sector prior to this present study. 
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Finally, the difference and system GMM models presented in Tables 7.5 and 7.6 report the 
number of ADIs in the sample, and the number of instruments used by the GMM estimation 
procedure. The average number of instruments used is roughly 15, indicating the models do 
not suffer from instrument proliferation and the Hansen test for overidentifying restrictions to 
test for the validity of instruments can be relied on. The Hansen J-test is unable to reject the 
null hypothesis of valid instruments for seven of the eight models, indicating instruments are 
valid in 7 of the 8 models. As mentioned, the results of Model B2 must be interpreted with 
caution given the existence of a potential overidentification of instruments. The AR(1) test 
shows the presence of autocorrelation, which is removed under the GMM specifications 
shown by a failure to reject the null hypothesis regarding the AR(2) test for all models. The 
exception is Model B8, which may suffer from autocorrelation. Thus, caution should be 
exercised when interpreting Models B2 and B8. 
7.8.3. Individual Bank Capital Requirement Results 
Table 7.7 presents the results of system GMM estimation for the effect of bank-specific 
prudential capital ratios (PCRs) on the bank capital ratio for a sample of Australian banks. 
Three models are examined, C1, C2 and C3. Model C1 is the base model, model C2 
examines whether the Basel II framework has impacted the relationship between the PCR and 
the total capital ratio (TCR), and model C3 determines whether economic conditions impact 
the relationship between PCR and the total capital ratio. The variables used to control for 
common determinants of banks’ target capital ratio are included, with the exception of IMP 
and SIZE. IMP is excluded because of a lack of significance in previous modelling of bank 
capital buffer determinants. The variable SIZE is removed because the sample examined here 
consists of Australian banks only, and does not include smaller CUBS. 
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Empirical results in Table 7.7 suggest the PCR is a significant and positive determinant of 
banks’ total capital ratios. This suggests that individual bank capital requirements are having 
their intended effect. A 100 basis point increase in the PCR results in a 41 basis point 
increase in the TCR. This positive association is consistent with previous findings (Alfron et 
al, 2004; Francis and Osborne, 2010). The result is a rejection of the null hypothesis H8, and 
an acceptance of the alternative hypothesis H8a.  
The interaction variable B2_PCR in model C2 is negative and significant. This indicates the 
implementation of the Basel II framework has reduced the magnitude of the positive 
relationship between PCR and banks’ total capital ratio67. This leads to a rejection of the null 
hypothesis H9 and an acceptance of alternative hypothesis H9a1. The negative result for 
B2_PCR may indicate banks have reacted more quickly to regulatory and other conditions 
influencing bank capital ratios. As explained, PCRs are updated infrequently, so that changes 
in individual bank capital ratios may have already taken place by the time the PCR is 
updated. The dummy variables UPTURN_PCR and DOWNTURN_PCR are not significantly 
different in magnitude, resulting in a failure to reject the null hypothesis H10. The result 
indicates that individual bank PCRs are not more influential on banks’ capital ratios during 
downturns in the economic cycle. Instead, the effect is equally influential through the cycle. 
  
                                                 
67 A difference in means test reveals the relationship is still significantly different from zero at the 5% level of 
significance. 
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Table 7.7 
          The effect of bank-specific regulatory capital requirements on Australian bank total capital ratios, GMM 
analysis 
           The table presents the results of system General Method of Moments (GMM) analysis for the impact of bank-
specific regulatory minimum capital ratios on Australian bank capital ratios. The models examine how this 
effect changes under (1) base case, (2) the Basel 2 accord and (3) downturn versus upturn conditions. The 
sample period is March 2004 to December 2012. ** indicates significance at the <0.01 level and * at the <0.05 
level. The minimum regulatory capital ratio imposed in the Basel 2 period is known as the prudential capital 
ratio (PCR). The data is sourced from APRA. 
  
Base model   Basel 2 
 
Economic 
Conditions   
Independent variables 
 
(C1) 
 
(C2) 
 
(C3) 
 
           δ 
 
0.2462 ** 
 
0.1063 
  
0.1178 * 
 
  
(3.27) 
  
(1.80) 
  
(2.06) 
  
           RISK 
 
-0.0218 ** 
 
-0.0182 ** 
 
-0.0127 ** 
 
  
(-4.53) 
  
(-6.48) 
  
(-6.29) 
  
           ROE 
 
-0.0108 ** 
 
-0.0141 ** 
 
-0.0143 ** 
 
  
(-6.15) 
  
(-9.79) 
  
(-8.69) 
  
           BASEL2 
 
-0.0006 
  
0.0191 ** 
 
-0.0002 
  
  
(-0.28) 
  
(6.99) 
  
(-0.15) 
  
           GDP 
 
-0.0541 
  
-0.0274 
  
-0.0446 
  
  
(-0.85) 
  
(-0.64) 
  
(-0.85) 
  
           PCR 
 
0.4099 ** 
 
0.3185 ** 
    
  
(3.38) 
  
(4.13) 
     
           B2_PCR 
    
-0.2211 ** 
    
     
(-7.78) 
     
           UPTURN_PCR 
       
0.1536 ** 
 
        
(3.03) 
  
           DOWNTURN_PCR 
       
0.1745 ** 
 
        
(2.68) 
  
           Constant 
 
0.0082 
  
-0.0019 
  
0.0096 ** 
 
  
(0.98) 
  
(-0.60) 
  
(2.70) 
  
           Observations 
 
464 
  
464 
  
464 
  Number of banks 
 
21 
  
21 
  
21 
  Number of instruments 
 
19 
  
21 
  
23 
  
           AR(1) 
 
-1.97 ** 
 
-1.96 ** 
 
-1.96 ** 
 AR(2) 
 
0.58 
  
0.64 
  
0.62 
  Hansen J-test (p-value) 
 
0.19 
  
0.14 
  
0.48 
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Finally, the empirical results presented in Table 7.7 are consistent with the determinants 
results presented in Tables 7.5 and 7.6. The speed of adjustment coefficient is positive and 
significant with an average of 15.7% across the three models (C1, C2 and C3). This result is 
close in magnitude to the empirical results found for the total capital ratio in Models A1-2 of 
20.6% and in model B1-8 of 17.8%, supporting the rejection of the null hypothesis H1. RISK 
is negative and significant, supporting the decision to reject the null hypothesis H2 in the 
determinants section. ROE is negative and significant, providing additional evidence that 
opportunity costs to the bank exist for holding capital, and supporting a rejection of null 
hypothesis H5. Finally, the Basel II dummy variable is significant and positive only for model 
C2, and the economic cycle variable GDP is insignificant in the models of Australian bank 
total capital ratios.  
Interestingly, after the inclusion of PCR as an explanatory variable, the effect of the 
economic cycle on banks’ capital ratios is diminished. This suggests that individual bank 
regulatory requirements imposed by APRA through the PCR could be the impetus behind 
Australian banks holding larger capital buffers during economic upturns to draw on during 
economic downturns. This could be due to foresight on behalf of the supervision provided by 
APRA rather than banks’ own capital management practices, but this study is unable to make 
this distinction. 
With regard to the econometric validity of the models presented in Table 7.7, the number of 
instruments averages 21 across the three models, indicating no associated problems with 
instrument proliferation. The Hansen J-test indicates instruments are valid, with a failure to 
reject the null hypothesis of instrument validity. The AR(1) test reveals the presence of 
autocorrelation, which is removed as shown by the AR(2) test under system GMM 
estimation. 
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7.9. Conclusion 
This study has used a quarterly sample of regulatory returns between 2004:q1 and 2012:q4 to 
examine the capital management practices of Australian banks, credit unions and business 
societies. This empirical study provides an interesting case study into a banking system that 
emerged from the global financial crisis relatively unscathed. 
This study uses a collection of reported target ratios and a partial adjustment framework, 
finding Australian banks and CUBS seek a targeted capital ratio in excess of minimum 
regulatory requirements. The average quarterly speed of adjustment coefficient is 19 and 15 
per cent for total and Tier 1 capital ratios, respectively68. This suggests Australian banks 
experience significant adjustment costs, impeding a complete adjustment to the target capital 
buffer in each period. It takes roughly 5 quarterly periods for banks’ total capital ratio to 
adjust to target, and almost 8 quarterly periods for banks’ tier 1 capital ratio to adjust to 
target. This finding is consistent with empirical literature examining overseas banking 
systems, and theoretical literature that predicts banks face significant costs of adjusting 
capital because of a pure transaction cost component as well as information asymmetry 
between the bank and capital markets. 
Findings regarding the determinants of capital buffers for Australian banks and CUBS 
suggest inherent portfolio risk and size are negatively related to capital buffers whist ROE is 
positively related to capital buffers. These results are in line with previous literature 
examining the moral hazard hypothesis, since ADIs increase the inherent risk of their 
portfolios without an increase in capital buffers. However the magnitude of this result is 
found to be small. A negative relationship between size and capital buffers indicates that 
                                                 
68 These speed of adjustment coefficients are an average of findings reported in Table 7.4 and Table’s 7.5 and 
7.6. 
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larger Australian banks benefit from increased access to capital markets and better 
monitoring techniques. This result is also in line with the too-big-to-fail hypothesis. A 
positive relationship between ROE and ADI capital buffers suggests banks face opportunity 
costs of holding capital. Basel II has had a positive impact on the capital buffers held by 
banks.  
Findings suggest a positive relationship between the economic cycle and capital buffers, 
interpreted as a countercyclical effect. Australian ADIs possess foresight in their capital 
management practices, increasing buffers during upturns to help withstand proceeding 
downturns in the economic cycle. Such foresight may have been a determining factor which 
allowed the Australian banking sector to successfully weather global financial turmoil from 
2007 to 2009. This is in contrast to previous literature, conducted on the banking sectors of 
other countries, that finds a negative relationship and concludes a potential procyclical effect 
in banks’ capital management practices.  
Finally, results indicate bank-specific regulatory imposed PCRs are a significant determinant 
of capital ratios, indicating individual bank capital requirements are having their intended 
effect on banks’ capital management practices. 
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Chapter 7 Appendix 
Table 7.A 
            The determinants of capital buffers for Australian authorised deposit-taking institutions (ADIs), fixed-
effects panel regression analysis 
             The table presents the results of fixed-effects panel regression analysis for an investigation into the 
determinants of Australian bank, credit union and building society (CUBS) capital buffers. Models 1 and 2 
present results for the total capital buffer, whilst Models 3 and 4 present results for the tier 1 capital buffer. The 
sample period is March 2004 to December 2012. ** indicates significance at the <0.01 level and * at the <0.05 
level. 
             
  
Total Capital Buffer 
 
Tier 1 Capital Buffer 
Independent 
variables 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
             δ 
 
0.2473 ** 
 
0.2470 ** 
 
0.2149 ** 
 
0.2117 ** 
  
(13.52) 
  
(12.73) 
  
(11.78) 
  
(11.25) 
 
             RISK 
 
-0.0423 ** 
 
-0.0424 ** 
 
-0.0417 ** 
 
-0.0404 ** 
  
(-4.03) 
  
(-3.72) 
  
(-3.47) 
  
(-3.25) 
 
             IMP 
 
0.0327 
  
0.0625 
  
0.0311 
  
0.0536 
 
  
(0.53) 
  
(1.14) 
  
(0.56) 
  
(1.05) 
 
             SIZE 
 
-0.0151 ** 
 
-0.0144 ** 
 
-0.0141 ** 
 
-0.0123 ** 
  
(-8.46) 
  
(-8.02) 
  
(-6.40) 
  
(-5.22) 
 
             ROE 
 
0.0128 
  
0.0123 
  
0.0107 
  
0.0101 
 
  
(0.90) 
  
(0.82) 
  
(0.68) 
  
(0.62) 
 
             BASEL2 
 
0.0107 ** 
 
0.0099 ** 
 
0.0084 ** 
 
0.0073 ** 
  
(7.18) 
  
(6.36) 
  
(5.41) 
  
(4.64) 
 
             GDP 
 
0.2612 ** 
    
0.2679 ** 
   
  
(7.42) 
     
(8.07) 
    
             L.UR 
    
-0.2852 ** 
    
-0.2403 ** 
     
(-8.03) 
     
(-8.15) 
 
             Constant 
 
0.3333 ** 
 
0.3352 ** 
 
0.3166 ** 
 
0.2953 ** 
  
(9.47) 
  
(9.34) 
  
(7.14) 
  
(6.15) 
 
             Observations 
 
4923 
  
5044 
  
4923 
  
5044 
 Number of banks 
 
198 
  
198 
  
198 
  
198 
 adj-R2 
 
0.196 
  
0.192 
  
0.171 
  
0.159 
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CHAPTER 8 
Stress-Testing Bank Residential Mortgage Portfolios by 
Decomposing the Mean 
8.1. Introduction 
Stress-testing was first introduced into bank credit risk modelling by the International 
Monetary Fund (‘IMF’) and World Bank as part of Financial Sector Assessment Programs 
(‘FSAPs’). It is now an integral part of Basel Accord Pillar II requirements and a tool widely 
used by regulators for supervisory review. The FSAP stress tests have since generated 
widespread interest in devising macroeconomic scenarios, developing flexible and accurate 
credit risk models with macro-micro linkages, and successfully modelling bank responses to 
lending and borrowing policy. However, overshadowing such progress is the premise that 
most regulatory stress-testing to date is entirely ‘deterministic’ in an inherently ‘stochastic’ 
world. 
Stress-tests estimate the impact of a stressed macroeconomic scenario on the health of 
individual banks and the overall banking system. Continued efforts have increasingly 
emphasised the importance of incorporating multiple bank risks into stress-testing, however 
credit risk remains the main focus of bank supervisors, and is the focus of this paper. A 
crucial point in stress-testing is measuring the impact of stressed macroeconomic conditions 
on the credit risk associated with banks’ loan portfolios. The majority of advances in stress-
testing have centred on this issue. Currently, there is no unanimously accepted technique for 
making such estimates. It is well understood that a number of modelling decisions must be 
made over the course of a stress-test. The potential to introduce model risk is high and hard to 
overcome. This paper demonstrates an equally important concern, which has thus far been 
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overlooked in practice and the banking literature on stress-testing – the tendency to rely 
heavily on mean values, which introduces bias in stress-testing. The idea being that most 
stress-testing focuses on a deterministic change in key macroeconomic and credit risk 
variables, when in fact a considerable amount of variation is present. 
No bank has successfully predicted its demise using a deterministic approach to stress-
testing, yet banks have failed. Under a deterministic model, relationships are given fixed 
quantities, based on the present or past, with no allowance for variation or probabilistic 
outcome. Akin to a chemist predicting the reaction between two chemicals, a bank’s credit 
loss is deciphered based on a seemingly known relationship between loan portfolio exposure 
and some desirable stress condition.  
To illustrate the limitations of the deterministic approach, consider the case where an 
Authorised Deposit-Taking Institution (ADI) holds a portfolio exclusively consisting of 
residential mortgage loans, with an average loan-to-value ratio of 70%. Using the simplest 
deterministic approach, the ADI incurs losses only if property values decline by greater than 
30% and the bank fails only if a greater-than-30% decline in value is combined with a 
sufficiently high default rate. 
There are two distinct problems with the deterministic approach to stress-testing. Firstly, 
unlike a chemical reaction, a bank’s loss reaction to a stress event is far from a known 
quantity. In fact the stress event is itself unpredictable and consequently contains some form 
of ‘probabilistic variation’. Secondly, from a deterministic viewpoint, a bank either fails or it 
does not. And, assuming each bank in the system has an identical portfolio, when one bank 
fails, every bank fails. From a banking regulator’s perspective, such information is of limited 
assistance. What is of greater interest is admitting variation in the performance between 
banks such that an average probability of failure can be calculated given some desirable stress 
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input. Such a ‘stochastic’ approach would allow the regulator to impose supervisory policy to 
ensure that few or none of the ADIs in the system would fail, given an extreme stress-
scenario. 
In this study, a simulation experiment was constructed to examine the impact of including 
variation in stress-testing in the form of decomposing key credit risk variables from mean 
values into their empirical distributions. The experiment concentrates on the residential 
mortgage portfolio, which makes up close to 60 per cent of all Australian bank exposures. 
Credit risk variables that are examined include: Loan-to-Value ratio (LVR), probability of 
default (PD), and the collateral fall (CF), or in the case of the residential mortgage portfolio, 
the fall in property prices, a discount on defaulted exposures and an interaction between PD 
and LVR. Overall findings suggest that a reliance on mean values results in a substantial 
underestimation of loss, to the magnitude of 1.86 and 2.32 per cent of total assets for the 
average bank and worst performing group of banks in the system respectively.  
The remainder of the paper builds on past literature and current practice in stress-testing, 
reviewed in Chapter 5. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: section 8.2 
examines the Australian banking system’s exposure to the residential mortgage market. 
Section 8.3 introduces the concept of ‘decomposing the mean’. Section 8.4 introduces a 
simple bank model and the methodology used for the simulation experiment. Section 8.5 
provides the results of the simulation experiment under a stochastic approach to stress-
testing. Finally, Section 8.6 discusses results and provides the conclusions of this study. 
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8.1. Residential Mortgages Exposure and the Australian Banking System 
The Australian banking system is dominated by four major banks, the assets of which make 
up around 75 per cent of total banking sector assets and 80 percent of the residential 
mortgage market. In the wake of the financial crisis, the dominance of the larger banks has 
increased further. Smaller banks suffered a reduction in lending as a response to a reduced 
access to securitisation, a major source of their funding. Foreign banks reduced lending, 
presumably due to a greater reliance on funding from their resident countries for which 
economic conditions were more affected69. In addition, the acquisitions of St. George by 
Westpac and BankWest by Commonwealth Bank of Australia in 2008 tipped the scale of 
bank assets further in the direction of the four major banks. The relatively large size of the 
four major banks places greater systemic importance on their potential risks and their 
resilience to shocks.  
Australian banks’ high exposure to residential mortgages (greater than 55 per cent of total 
loans) has resulted in significant attention as a potential source of risk if economic conditions 
deteriorate. Despite this, Australian banks have relatively low exposures to high-risk 
mortgages. Less than 10 percent of owner-occupiers hold mortgages with LVRs higher than 
80 percent combined with debt service ratios greater than 30 percent (Debelle, 2010). In 
addition, the IMF reports, in a 2012 release on Australian bank capital adequacy, that 
household debt is mainly held by higher income brackets. The top two income quintiles hold 
almost three quarters of household debt (IMF, 2012).  
Australian banks have proven resilient under severe stress-tests targeted specifically at a 
significant downturn in the residential property market. In the IMF’s report, Australian banks 
                                                 
69 A working paper by the Bank of England finds foreign banks operating in the UK pulled back lending 
substantially as a result of a shock to funding. The result is found to be significantly greater for foreign banks 
operating in the UK than for UK-resident banks (Aiyar, 2011) 
 173 
were stress-tested subject to a scenario mimicking Irish banks’ risky exposures in 2010. 
Again, results confirmed the resilience of Australian banks, with the IMF reporting “that 
major Australian banks could withstand sizable shocks to residential mortgages”. The IMF 
concluded that APRA “may want to consider a more severe downside scenario together with 
funding risk and a longer risk horizon when conducting stress testing next time” (IMF, 2012, 
pg. 16). Instead of a more severe downside scenario, this study argues that equally more 
severe and realistic conditions can be achieved by properly accounting for variation around 
the key stress-testing inputs. The next section introduces the concept of decomposing the 
mean. 
8.2. Decomposing the Mean 
8.2.1. The Importance of Loan-to-Value Ratios for Residential Property Portfolio Losses 
The Loan-to-Value Ratio (LVR) is a key determinant in projecting portfolio losses on 
residential mortgage loans. For a given decline in property values, the LVR on each loan 
determines the potential loss the bank is subject to in the event of a default. The concept can 
be explained in terms of ‘negative equity’. A loan is in negative equity when the value of an 
asset used to secure the loan (in this case residential property) is less than the outstanding 
balance on the loan. In general terms, a bank is subject to loss if a borrower defaults on a loan 
from a position of negative equity. 
Figure 8.1 shows that the LVR (horizontal access) determines the loss incurred on a defaulted 
loan, for a given decline in the underlying property value. The black line shows the loss 
profiles for loans with LVR’s of 90% and 80% LVR respectively. The horizontal grey dashed 
lines represent the amount of loss the bank is subject to. If we assume a 30% decline in 
property value, we can see the loans incur losses of 20% and 10% respectively. 
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Figure 8.1: Losses at 30% Property Value Decline 
Continuing to assume all property values fall by a fixed amount, in this case 30%, each loan 
in the portfolio has a distinctive loss profile, dependent only on its LVR. Portfolio losses can 
be thought of as the sum of these losses (Figure 8.2, left) or visualised as the sum of the 
products of the losses at each LVR and the proportion of the portfolio which that LVR 
represents – the ‘LVR density’ (Figure 8.2, right). This is shown by the grey dashed lines, 
connecting the loss (intersection of grey and black) with the LVR density it represents (black 
dotted curve) for the two loan example. 
 
Figure 8.2: Portfolio Losses at 30% Property Value Decline 
The ‘portfolio loss function’ (PLF) is constructed by calculating the aggregate loss at each 
decline in collateral value. The PLF represents the profile of portfolio losses at each decline 
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in property value. The PLF is calculated with reference to either the sum of losses, or the 
product of loss and density (Figure 8.3). 
 
Figure 8.3: Portfolio Loss Function 
The black line representing the portfolio loss function (Figure 8.3, right) is marginally 
increasing (and so is a non-linear) function, over the decline in property value (x-axis). A 
greater decline in property value results in more loans falling into negative equity. This 
means that as the decline in property value increases, more loans will accumulate loss per 
unit decline (in the case of the loan defaulting). This results in an asymmetry in the portfolio 
loss function. For each unit decline in property value, all loans already in negative equity 
accumulate loss, but also loans with lower LVRs, that previously were not in negative equity, 
begin to fall into negative equity and accumulate additional loss (assuming a constant portion 
of loans default at each collateral decline). This gives rise to the marginally increasing (non-
linear) portfolio loss function shown in Figure 8.3 (right). 
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8.2.2. Decomposing the Mean: Loan-to-Value Ratio 
When determining bank losses on mortgage loans in regulatory stress-testing, a given decline 
in property values is commonly specified as part of a stress scenario. For a given default rate, 
simply relying on the average portfolio LVR produces unrealistic and inaccurate results. To 
illustrate, if average portfolio LVR is 70%, an ADI will incur no loss unless property values 
decline by more than 30% (Figure 8.4, left). 
 
Figure 8.4: Stress of 30% Fall in Property Index 
However by decomposing the mean LVR, Figure 8.4 (right) shows a significant proportion of 
loans fall into negative equity. We consider a stylised portfolio LVR distribution, not 
dissimilar to many Australian ADIs. The stylised portfolio has an average LVR of 65%, with 
30% of the portfolio in high LVR loans (above 80% LVR, which attracts higher risk-
weighting under Basel II’s standardised approach to credit risk). Figure 8.5 (left) compares 
the PLF for the stylised portfolio LVR distribution (black) with the PLF of a fixed LVR 
distribution equal to the average of the stylised portfolio of 65% (grey).  
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Figure 8.5: Portfolio Losses – Decomposing the mean LVR 
Figure 8.5 indicates that if a stress-test is conducted on the average-LVR loan as a proxy for 
the entire portfolio, losses are understated by an amount represented by the gap between the 
black and grey lines. For the LVR profile shown, the largest discrepancy is at the average 
LVR value (vertical dashed line). Using the above distribution, the difference peaks at over 
9% of the original property value, or over 11% of the aggregate amount lent. The above 
results can be visualised in terms of the asymmetrical loss function explained in the previous 
section. The stylised LVR distribution induces a marginally increasing (non-linear) PLF.  
To further illustrate, if we considered a 20% decline in property value, two 80%-LVR loans 
would incur no loss at all, avoiding negative equity. However, if we now consider those same 
two loans to have LVR’s of 75% and 85% respectively, we have the same average LVR of 
80%, but one loan is now in negative equity and susceptible to bank loss, in the event it 
defaults. If we now consider the same loans to hold LVR’s of 70% and 90%, we have an even 
greater bank loss in the event of default, but the average portfolio LVR remains 80%. In 
short, higher LVRs incur greater losses, which are not offset by lower LVRs being farther 
from harm’s way. 
The majority of bank supervisors and central banks have adequate access to the LVR 
distributions of banks’ residential property portfolio. When performing stress-tests, 
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decomposing the mean LVR is essential for calculating accurate portfolio loss distributions. 
Most internal bank and supervisory stress-testing practices already decompose individual 
bank LVR when conducting regulatory stress-testing. However regulatory stress-tests fail to 
do the same for other key variables such as the property index. In the next section, we show 
that failing to decompose the property index in a residential mortgage portfolio stress-test 
introduces similar bias. 
8.2.3. Decomposing the Mean: The Property Index 
The property value decline specified in a stress scenario is also typically a mean value. It is 
common for regulatory stress-testing exercises to specify a strict x% fall in the property 
index. In regulatory and bank stress-tests in Australia, the convention has been to stress a 
30% fall in the residential property index. However, the residential property index is 
constructed based on geographic segments and clusters of houses for which price falls can 
depart substantially from the average index value. This section demonstrates that failing to 
decompose the residential property index can generate inaccuracies of an identical type to 
that of failing to decompose the mean LVR. 
To illustrate the importance of decomposing the property index, a stylised distribution of 
property values is constructed, not dissimilar to the Established House Price Index of 
Australia’s capital cities. We consider the impact of a single bank which has made an 80% 
LVR loan on every property comprising the index. The stylised distribution is assumed to be 
symmetric, although in practice this can be calibrated to a relevant sample distribution of 
property price values. In Figure 8.6, the grey-filled areas represent properties, the values of 
which have fallen below 80% of the original property amount. The best illustration regarding 
the importance of decomposing the mean property index is the first example in Figure 8.6 
(left), examining a 10% decline. The illustration shows that, by decomposing the property 
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index, a portfolio consisting entirely of 80% LVR loans will still have some portion of loans 
in negative equity, even if we assume the average property value declines by 10%. A 
deterministic stress-test that failed to decompose the mean would find banks would avoid loss 
altogether70. 
 
Figure 8.6: Portfolio Losses – Decomposing the Property Index 
To further illustrate this result, Figure 8.7 compares the portfolio loss profiles for the average 
property price fall (grey line) and for decomposing the property index (black line). The 
similarity to Figure 8.5 is evident. The gap between the black and grey lines represent the 
amount by which losses are understated if a stress-test were conducted using the index as a 
representation of all properties.  
 
Figure 8.7: Decomposing the Index 
                                                 
70 It should be noted that a housing loan falling into negative equity does not alone determine a loss to the 
lender. A loss is contingent on a borrower default and the willingness of the borrower to declare bankruptcy will 
also depend on the costs of bankruptcy.  
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The result is visualised in the same way as in the previous section where we decomposed the 
mean LVR. The greater the dispersion of actual values around the average or index value, the 
greater the disparity between actual losses and the hypothetical losses using only our average 
value.  
8.2.4. Decomposing the Mean: Default as an Index 
To generate a meaningful distribution of stress-test outcomes, it is necessary to account for 
variability in the default rate experienced by each bank in a system. The global financial 
crisis demonstrated that different banks can experience significantly different levels of loss, 
despite being similarly situated before entering into a crisis period. Variability in the default 
experience of a bank is often attributed to a bank’s business model. For example, APRA 
recently sought assurances from the largest bank mortgage-loan originators that they had in 
place measures to control for risks associated with certain borrowers such as first-home 
buyers, product characteristics such as low-verified loans (low-doc loans), principal use 
(investment or owner-occupied), and the origination channel (broker or branch).  
If different characteristics of loans experience different loss rates, each bank is likely to 
experience a unique default rate reflective of its business mix. Variability can also be 
attributed to factors such as the geographic distribution of the loan portfolio. In Australia, 
different geographic regions experience different default rates, ensuring that each bank’s 
default rate is a function of its market share in each state or territory. These factors can be 
modelled from a financial institution’s perspective, however for the purposes of this paper a 
top-down regulatory approach is the focus. 
In order to quantify variation between banks’ default experience, a simple experiment is 
conducted to investigate banks’ total credit losses as a substitute for default rates. The sample 
consists of bank regulatory reporting between the period of September 2003 and March 2012. 
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The credit loss variable chosen for the investigation is bad and doubtful debts expense 
(BDD), as reported by banks to the regulator at quarterly intervals as part of the statement of 
financial performance. For each quarter, aggregate credit losses and the aggregate portfolio 
balance is calculated for each bank in the sample (BDD as a percentage of total assets). The 
sample of credit losses consists of 639 bank-quarter observations with an average of 0.089% 
and standard deviation of 0.132%. 
Table 8.1 
    Distribution of Bank Credit Losses (Sept 2003 - March 2012) 
     The table presents the distribution fitting and goodness-of-fit test results for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and 
Anderson Darling statistics. The empirical dataset consists of 639 bank-quarters of Australian bank bad and 
doubtful debts expense. The data is sourced from APRA. Distributional fits are presented in order of best to 
worst fitting distribution. 
Empirical Distribution N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
 Bad and Doubtful Debts Expense 639 0.0889% 0.1323%   
Distribution Fitting Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov 
Anderson-
Darling 
Lognormal 0.0966% 0.1969% 0.048  1.522  
Beta (α=0.6, β=5.7) 0.1097% 0.1249% 0.150   
Normal 0.0889% 0.1323% 0.251  72.864  
 
Table 8.1 shows descriptive statistics, distributional fitting and the goodness-of-fit results. 
Findings suggest a lognormal distribution fits the empirical distribution the best, based on the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Anderson-Darling statistics. The results of the simple investigation 
demonstrate that considerable variation exists in the credit losses experience of Australian 
banks over the sample period.  
To investigate variation in bank default rates around the banking system average, the next 
experiment investigates the distribution of credit losses during periods of larger average 
system credit loss compared to periods of subdued system credit losses. Table 8.2 and Figure 
8.8 report the descriptive statistics, distributional fitting and results of goodness-of-fit tests. 
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Average quarterly credit loss for the Australian banking system was 0.086% with a standard 
deviation of 0.041%.  
Seeking to quantify the variation, the gamma distribution is found to fit the empirical 
distribution the best. An interesting result is shown by the simple regression and scatter plot 
presented in Figure 8.9. A positive relationship is found between standard deviation in credit 
loss and mean credit loss. The finding indicates that during periods of larger credit losses in 
the Australian banking system, there is significantly greater variation in the credit loss 
experience of individual banks within the system. A more robust analysis would investigate 
the frequency of defaults rather than reported credit losses71. However, this simple 
experiment demonstrates that variation in the default rate experience of banks exists and 
becomes particularly relevant during periods of stress. 
Under a deterministic approach to stress-test it is common to estimate losses as if the entire 
portfolio were to default, and then multiply the resulting losses by a stipulated default rate. 
However, a more accurate approach is to subject each loan in the portfolio to a probability of 
default at the stipulated rate. In this way, each loan has an equal percentage chance of default. 
In a practical sense this is not a concern. At a default rate of d (between 0 and 1), the 
distribution of actual default in a portfolio of N loans will be centred on dN, with a standard 
deviation proportional to 1/√𝑁.  
For a large portfolio, the standard deviation is minimal. Accordingly, there is little 
information loss where an ADI multiplies the PLF by a given default rate – a deterministic 
approach – rather than applying a probability of default on an individual loan basis to the 
portfolio. From a practical sense, there is no asymmetrical effect on the PLF and so 
                                                 
71 Among other things, reported credit losses may reflect endogenous factors such as different provisioning 
strategies in addition to current-period defaults. 
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decomposing the mean default rate will only have the effect of contributing to wider 
confidence intervals around the loss function. 
Table 8.2 
    Distribution of Quarterly Average Bank Credit Losses (Sept 2003 - March 2012) 
     The table presents the distributional fitting and goodness-of-fit test results for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and 
Anderson Darling statistics. The empirical dataset consists of 35 quarters of bad and doubtful debts expense, 
averaged across the Australian banking sector. The data is sourced from APRA. Distributional fits are 
presented in order of best to worst fitting distribution. 
Empirical Distribution N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
 Bad and Doubtful Debts Expense 35 0.086% 0.041%   
     
Distribution Fitting Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov 
Anderson-
Darling 
Gamma (α=4.487514) 0.086% 0.041% 0.135 0.647 
Lognormal 0.087% 0.049% 0.130 0.701 
Beta (α=1.97, β=2.64) 0.090% 0.044% 0.182 1.544 
Normal 0.086% 0.041% 0.189 1.245 
     
     
     
 
 
    
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
Regression Results (Dependent = Quarterly standard deviation) 
  Variable Coefficient Std Error T-stat P-value 
Intercept -0.0000763 0.000104 -0.7308 0.4701 
Quarterly Mean 1.3604 0.1101 12.3509 < 0.001 
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8.2.5. Decomposing the Mean: Combining the Effects 
Section 3 has shown that if the mean LVR and Property Value Decline are not decomposed, 
inaccuracies are generated of the same type in the stress-test. However, when combining the 
two effects it is easy to see that the inaccuracies are not additive. In other words, the loss 
estimate error from failing to decompose the mean LVR and Property Index together is not 
just simply the error from failing to decompose the mean LVR added to the error from failing 
to decompose the Property Index. Decomposing the mean LVR and Property Index 
simultaneously makes it extraordinarily difficult to calculate the PLF in closed form. A more 
sensible approach is to use simulation techniques.  
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8.3. Methodology: Simulating the Effect of Decomposing the Mean 
8.3.1. Specifying a Default-Loss Model 
The methodology uses a simple banking system and default-loss model. A simulation is used 
to examine the impact of decomposing the variables in the default-loss model: LVR, property 
index and default rate. The banking system is assumed to consist of banks holding a portfolio 
consisting entirely of residential mortgage loans. Each loan is risk-weighted at 50%. The 
performance of each loan is driven by two factors: (1) a default rate impacting the ability of 
borrowers to pay debt service, and (2) a recovery factor based on property values which are 
anchored by an observed average, i.e. an index. Each ADI holds initial capital of 4% (a risk-
weighted 8%) of the aggregate portfolio balance. A ‘bank failure’ occurs when losses reach 
2%, thereby halving capital to a risk-weighted 4%72. 
This study has assumed no bank earnings. Average 10-year Return on Assets (ROA) in the 
Australian banking sector is close to 1.36%, and this would counterbalance a significant 
proportion of the losses underestimated by not decomposing the mean for key stress-testing 
variables. In addition, during periods of stress, correlation between defaults is usually high 
and such correlation can lead to significant loss to a bank, as witnessed by the ongoing global 
banking sector turmoil since 2008. The credit risk literature has developed a number of 
advanced models in an attempt to account for default correlation under stress. In this study it 
was decided to omit earnings and default correlation components in favour of a simpler 
demonstration illustrating the importance of properly decomposing mean values for key 
stress-testing inputs.  
                                                 
72  Risk-weighted capital is calculated by reference to end-of-period risk-weighted assets.  As defaults 
both generate losses and reduce the portfolio size, it is more accurate to say that net losses of approximately 2% 
trigger a bank failure. 
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For a mortgaged residential property, bank loss (if any) equals the amount by which the loan 
balance exceeds the proceeds when a foreclosed property is sold. Thus, if a borrower is 
identified as prone to default, no loss is incurred if the value of the property exceeds the loan 
balance (i.e., no amortisation) at a single end-of-period index value. Given a portfolio’s LVR 
distribution, the default-loss model calculates portfolio loss and end-of-period capital under 
the following set of equations: 
𝚲𝐏𝐎𝐑𝐓 = ∑ 𝐏𝐃𝐢 × 𝐦𝐚𝐱(𝟎, 𝐋𝐕𝐑𝐢 − (𝟏 − 𝐂𝐅𝐢))𝐍𝐢=𝟏 , where (8.1) 
ΛPORT = losses on the portfolio, 
PD = the probability of default (DR deterministic), 
LVRi = LVR from distribution of the portfolio, and 
CF = decline in the property index for loan i 
N = number of loans in the portfolio; 
𝐂𝐄𝐍𝐃 = 𝐂𝐁𝐄𝐆 − 𝚲𝐏𝐎𝐑𝐓, where (8.2) 
CBEG = capital as at the beginning of the period (8% of RWA),  
CEND = capital as at the end of the period. 
 
Equation 8.1 generates portfolio losses as the product of the default rate and the loss (if any) 
calculated using the portfolio LVR and the ending index value. Equation 8.2 generates the 
ADI’s end-of-period capital, equal to the beginning capital minus portfolio losses. To 
illustrate, assume the default process is parameterised by a default rate (DR) of 10%.  
Consider a $100 loan with an LVR of 70%, in which the property securing the loans is 
deemed to be worth $142.86 ($100 ÷ 70%).  Finally, assume that the recovery process 
reflects a 35% decline in the property index (CF), and that the value of the mortgaged 
property mirrors the index.  The realisation value of the property would therefore equal 
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$92.86 ($142.86 × 65%).  The potential loss would therefore equal $7.14 ($100 – $92.86), 
and the expectation of loss would equal one-tenth of this amount. 
8.3.2. Simulation Approach 
This section details the experimental setup of the simulation approach. Once portfolio LVR, 
default rate and the fall in the property index move from mean values to a stochastic 
distribution, it makes it difficult to calculate bank loss in the closed form examples provided 
in section 8.2. A simulation experiment was used to examine loss and capital position for a 
theoretical banking system under the following six approaches. As such it allowed for a 
determination of whether the computations of bank loss and capital ratio differed between the 
following six approaches: 
a. Deterministic case: Average LVR, fixed DR, fixed CF. 
b. Stochastic case 1: Calibrated LVR distribution, fixed DR, fixed CF 
c. Stochastic case 2: Calibrated LVR distribution, stochastic PD, fixed CF 
d. Stochastic case 3: Calibrated LVR distribution, stochastic PD, calibrated CF 
distribution. 
e. Stochastic case 4: Additional discount on defaulted properties 
f. Interaction effect: Additional effect of correlation between PD and LVR. 
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Figure 8.10: Simulation Design 
The design of the simulation experiment is shown in Figure 8.10. As in all Montecarlo 
simulation experiments, a large number (100,000) of iterations were drawn from the 
simulation engine. The resulting empirical distribution was used as a proxy for the theoretical 
distribution of loss (after computing central tendency and 95% confidence intervals). To 
compute the Portfolio Loss Function (PLF) under each approach, the property index decline 
was varied between 0 to 50 per cent at a fixed 10 per cent PD. As introduced earlier, the PLF 
shows total bank loss across varying levels of collateral fall, in this case the property index 
decline. Using the simulation framework, PLF’s were compared under each of the six 
approaches. A Line of Failure (LOF) was constructed for each approach. The LOF shows the 
PD, CF pairs that result in regulatory default for the average bank (with the worst performing 
LVR
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bank in the system assumed to be represented by the 95 per cent confidence interval). 
Regulatory default is defined to occur when bank losses are significant enough to cause the 
bank to fall under the required minimum regulatory capital level of 4% of RWA. 
8.4. Simulation Results 
8.4.1. Deterministic Case 
The simplest model is completely deterministic. Here, the default rate applies the same 
probability of potential loss to every loan in the portfolio, and the amount of loss is calculated 
using the average beginning-of-period LVR and the end-of-period index value. This is 
equivalent to assuming the LVR of each loan is identical, and that each property securing a 
loan has the exact same change in value over the period. As simple and unrealistic as this 
deterministic approach may be, there is evidence that it has been used by regulated entities to 
perform mandated stress testing73. For construction of the PLF in the following simulation 
experiments, a stressed default rate of 10 per cent is assumed. 
                                                 
73 LVR of 63%, used for comparison, is the average LVR of Australian banks’ residential mortgage portfolios 
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The PLF shown in Figure 8.11 shows the portfolio loss over a collateral fall (CF) of 0 to 50 
per cent for a probability of default of 10 per cent. No loss is made unless CF is greater than 
37%. This comes from relying on the average portfolio LVR (63%). Once CF falls above the 
1-LVR threshold, bank loss builds up at an excessive pace. The Line of Failure (LOF) is 
presented in Figure 8.12, identifying the default rate (DR) and collateral fall (CF) pairs that 
result in regulatory default in the simulation experiment. In other words, the LOF details the 
DR, CF pairs that result in a sufficiently large enough bank loss to reduce the Tier 1 capital 
ratio from its initial value of 8% to the regulatory minimum of 4%, which constitutes 
regulatory default.  
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The first observation from Figure 8.12 is that the LOF sits sufficiently far from the origin to 
not warrant any serious concern for regulatory failure under this scenario. The second 
observation is the downward sloping nature of the LOF, illustrating that as the portfolio’s DR 
increases, the CF required to cause regulatory failure becomes less. Another observation is 
that the LOF begins to flatten as it approaches a CF of 40 per cent. The reason is due to the 
simple scenario whereby LVR is fixed for all loans at 63 per cent. The CF must be 
sufficiently larger than 37 per cent to result in sufficient loss to reduce bank capital below the 
regulatory minimum of 4 per cent. 
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8.4.2. Decomposing the Mean LVR 
Figure 8.13 presents the PLF after decomposing the mean LVR. The LVR distribution is 
calibrated to the actual aggregate portfolio LVR distribution of the four major Australian 
banks’ residential property loan portfolios from information provided by APRA. Simulation 
results are consistent with those anticipated from Figure 8.5. We see bank loss is non-linear 
and a marginally increasing function on CF, once mean LVR is decomposed. The difference 
is largest when the property value decline is 1 – LVRavg (37 percent). At this point, losses are 
underestimated by 1.2% of total assets. Note that a severe ‘stressed’ default rate is assumed 
for the purpose of the PLF. 
 
Under a particularly severe stress scenario of a 30 per cent fall in property prices, Figure 8.13 
reveals that failing to decompose the mean LVR causes an underestimation of bank loss by 
0.71% of total assets. Figure 8.14 compares the LOF for the deterministic case (average 
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LVR) and the stochastic case (decomposed LVR). The first observation is that it takes 
smaller pairs of DR, CF to cause regulatory default, given enough loans are in default (DR > 
10%). The second observation is that regulatory default occurs even if CF is less than 1 – 
LVRavg (37 per cent) when DR becomes sufficiently large. 
 
As previously explained, the majority of regulatory authorities have access to information at 
the LVR granularity. Current practice in residential mortgage stress-testing adequately 
decomposes the mean LVR. The simulation findings demonstrate the significance of failing 
to decompose the mean LVR for a stress-test of the residential mortgage portfolio, setting up 
a framework to test the significance of failing to do so for the default rate and property index. 
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8.4.3. Simulation: Decomposing the Mean Default Rate 
In the deterministic case, a given DR = x% would always result in an x% proportion of 
defaulted asset value. In this section we introduce random variation through a stochastic 
default rate PD = (PD1, … ,PDm), a vector of random variables, corresponding to the default 
state of each loan in the portfolio, that follows a Bernoulli distribution. 
 PDi  ~  B ( 1;  DR ) (8.3) 
Here a loan either defaults or it does not, subject to a random draw from a Bernoulli 
distribution with parameter DR = x%, our deterministic default rate notation used in the 
previous section. As a result, each observation at t = 1 in our model can contain a realised 
percentage of loan defaults, ∑ Ψi
m
1
m   
that departs from x%. However, it would be expected that 
on average, given a sufficiently large number of iterations, the simulation average percentage 
of loan defaults would approximate the input parameter, x%. Figure 8.15 shows the 
frequency histograms for ‘default rate’ and ‘bank loss’ under a simulation of 10,000 iterations 
with PDi  ~  B (1; 10%) and CF = 30%. 
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Under a decomposed mean default rate, total loss becomes a random variable. There is no 
change to mean loss at a total of $705 or ≈ 0.71% of total assets, however the variation 
around the default rate creates the need for a confidence interval in the PLF, shown in Figure 
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8.16 below. In a banking system consisting of 20 banks, the worst performing bank can be 
thought of as representing the upper 95 per cent confidence interval.  
 
Figure 8.16 reveals that in the case of a particularly severe 30 per cent fall in average 
property prices the average bank loses 0.71% of total assets, while the worst performing bank 
(upper 95% confidence interval) loses a greater share at 0.93% of total assets. Decomposing 
the mean default rate does not cause an asymmetric impact on bank loss. As a result, the 
‘deterministic’ and ‘decomposed DR’ PLF (Figure 8.16) and lines of failure (Figure 8.17) are 
indistinguishable in the simulations. Whilst it is a fairly trivial result, it is presented here to 
distinguish the shift in regulatory concern from the average bank to the worst performing 
group of banks when conducting a stress-test. The next section builds on this concept by 
decomposing the property index. 
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8.4.4. Simulation: Decomposing the Property Index 
During stressful conditions, underlying collateral acting as security for loans can experience 
considerable declines in value. In addition, the variation in collateral declines can vary 
considerably both between banks and within a bank’s residential mortgage portfolio. Here, 
the effect of modelling such random variation on banking system loss is examined using the 
simulation experiment. A stochastic collateral fall Δ = (Δ1, … , Δm)  is introduced into the 
simulation experiment by fitting a distribution to empirical Australian property returns. 
8.4.4.1. Investigating the Australian Property Index 
Hometrack Australia has been using actual property sales data since 2009 to construct a 
proprietary automated-valuation model (AVM). The AVM updates monthly estimated values 
for more than nine million residential properties, representing all properties in the Australian 
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property index. For the benefit of this research, Hometrack has generously provided a dataset 
consisting of all individual property prices for two periods, September 2010 and September 
2011. This allows for the construction of annual property price returns for all individual 
properties making up the Australian property index. Extreme outliers are excluded if 
individual returns are found to be greater than 50 per cent or less than -50 per cent. The 
dataset was investigated based on the full sample of individual property returns, and based on 
geographical segmentation. Average returns are examined for 60 Statistical Divisions (SD) 
and 201 Statistical Sub-Divisions (SSD) making up the Australian index. The dataset is 
characterised by the following descriptive statistics shown in Table 8.3: 
Table 8.3 
     Descriptive Statistics for Australian Property Price Returns  
      The empirical dataset consists of 9,601,498 values sourced from Hometrack for the period of September 2010 
and September 2011. Values represent the output of Hometrack's automated valuation modelling which models 
house price valuations for all properties in the index, based on reported residential sales. An annual return is 
calculated for each property using the change in value over the year. SD refers to statistical divisions, SSD 
refers to statistical sub-division. Means are unweighted. 
     
 
  N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Max Min 
Full Sample 9,601,498 1.752% 9.583% -0.500 0.500 
SD 60 0.726% 4.448% -0.191  0.091 
SSD 201 1.469% 4.881% -0.191 0.165 
 
The 2010-2011 full sample reveals that the Australian residential property market was 
characterised by fairly stagnant, slightly positive growth of 1.75%. The Australian property 
market performed well relative to other countries that were impacted by the global financial 
crisis of 2008, however the period was characterised by high levels of interest rates, causing 
subdued growth. Considerable variation exists between properties with standard deviation 
close to 9.6% over the full sample. Geographically, the average SD returned 0.73%, whilst 
the average SSD returned 1.47% over the period.  
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8.4.4.2. Calibrating the Property Index 
For the purposes of the simulation experiment, the distribution of property price declines 
inputted into the simulation engine is calibrated to Australian property price returns for the 
full sample. Distributional fitting techniques and goodness-of-fit testing is performed to find 
the probability density function which best represents the empirical distribution which is then 
selected to be used in the simulation experiment. A beta distribution with parameters α = 
10.97 and β = 10.20 is found to represent the best fit based on the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and 
Anderson-Darling goodness-of-fit tests. The results of these tests and the distributional fitting 
results are shown in Table 8.4. 
In addition to the distributional fitting of the full sample, Appendix Table 8.A shows the 
results of such analysis on the distribution around the geographical segment means by SD and 
SSD. A normal distribution is the best fit under geographical segmentation.  
Table 8.4 
    Australian Property Price Returns (Sep 2010 - Sep 2011) 
     The table presents the distributional fitting and goodness-of-fit test results for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
and Anderson Darling statistics. The empirical dataset consists of 9,601,498 values sourced from 
Hometrack for the period of September 2010 and September 2011. Values represent the output of 
Hometrack's automated valuation modelling which models house price valuations for all properties in the 
index, based on observed residential sales. An annual return is calculated for each property using the 
change in value over the year. Distributional fits are presented in order of best to worst fitting distribution. 
     
Empirical Distribution N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
 Yearly House Price Return 9,601,498 1.75% 9.58%   
 
  
  
Distribution Fitting Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov 
Anderson-
Darling 
Beta (α=11, β=10.2) 1.82% 10.61% 0.1107 149503 
Normal 1.75% 9.58% 0.0800 163886 
Gamma (α=23.73) 1.75% 10.62% 0.1130 267523 
Lognormal 2.06% 12.31% 0.1430 423849 
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     Note: The original dataset contained 9,753,739 observations. House prices with returns greater than 50 
per cent, or less than -50 per cent were removed. The final dataset used for distributional fitting contained 
9,601,498 observations. The distributional fitting is conducted using maximum likelihood estimation to 
determine the best parameters of fit for each distribution. The Beta distribution is chosen based on its 
relatively low K-S and it having the lowest A-D statistics, since the A-D statistic lends more weight to the 
tails. 
Source: Hometrack 
          
 
8.4.4.3. Simulation: Decomposing the Property Index 
The following simulation experiment uses the beta distribution fit from the full sample of 
returns as shown in Table 8.4. The distribution of property price returns is as follows; 
 Δ ~ Beta (α = 10.97, β = 10.20) (8.4) 
Figure 8.19 shows the frequency histograms for ‘bank loss’ under a simulation of 10,000 
iterations with only the default rate decomposed (grey) PDi  ~  B (1; 10%) and CF = 30% and 
with the property index decomposed (black) PDi  ~  B (1; 10%) and CF ~ Beta (α = 10.97, β 
= 10.20). The beta distribution calibrated for the property price decline is adjusted to reflect 
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Observed Yearly House Price Returns: Fitted Distributions 
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the CF under stress (as in the case of Figure 8.16 this is 30%), so that the variation around the 
average decline remains that of the fitted empirical distribution.  
 
The assumption that variation will remain the same in a stress scenario compared with a 
relatively stagnant period of growth for residential house prices is conservative. It might be 
expected that during periods of stress, variation in individual property prices would be 
significantly larger. The findings of the simulation shows banking system losses are 
significantly impacted, despite a decomposition of the property index during a non-crisis 
period.  
The first observation from Figure 8.19 is that mean bank loss has increased under the 
decomposed property index. The average bank loses $842.68, almost $140 (19.5%) greater 
than under only a decomposed default rate. The second observation from Figure 8.19 is the 
increase in the standard deviation of bank loss. The inclusion of variation around the property 
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Figure 8.19 
Loss Histogram: Decomposed Property Index 
Decomposed Default Rate Decomposed Property Index 
Decomposed PI 
Iter  10,000 
Mean   842.68 
Std Dev  150.18 
Min    349.96 
Max  1538.18 
 
 Decomposed DR 
Iter  10,000 
Mean  705.0 
Std Dev 116.81 
Min   1183 
Max  310.3 
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index causes standard deviation to increase from 116.81 to 150.18, the impact of which is 
most clearly illustrated by the confidence intervals in the PLF, shown in Figure 8.20. 
 
Figure 8.20 shows the impact of decomposing the property index on bank loss across all 
desired levels of collateral fall governing a stress scenario. The black line representing the 
average bank in the system under a decomposed property index has shifted considerably 
higher in loss. In addition, the 95 per cent confidence interval has widened. At a 30 per cent 
fall in property prices, the worst performing bank in the banking system loses 1.14% of total 
assets. This represents a significant magnitude of loss, especially when considering that prior 
to decomposing mean LVR, a 30 per cent fall in property prices resulted in no loss to the 
banking system at all. 
Similar observations are made with regards to the Line of Failure, illustrated in Figure 8.21. 
The LOF under a decomposed property index has shifted considerably closer to the origin. 
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Figure 8.20 
Portfolio Loss Function: Fitted Property Distribution 
Fitted Property Distribution Decomposed DR Upper CI95 Lower CI95 
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The result indicates that it takes lower probability of default (PD) and collateral fall (CF) 
pairs to induce regulatory failure. In the simple banking model, at an assumed PD = 10%, the 
worst performing bank incurs regulatory failure if average collateral fall reaches 47%. Prior 
to decomposing the property index, the average bank was able to withstand a 51% fall in 
collateral value and remain solvent.  
 
8.4.5. Simulation: Adding a Discount on Defaulted Sales 
Credit professionals have recognised a link between equity and default for some time. In the 
case of a residential mortgage portfolio, it is widely accepted that lower equity values 
increase defaults. However, default also tends to reduce equity, or more generally, reduce 
property values leading to a negative asset price spiral. Borrowers struggling to make 
monthly mortgage-loan payments find it increasingly difficult to conduct basic maintenance 
and repairs, thus mortgaged properties are often in a state of disrepair when repossessed. 
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Figure 8.21 
Line of Failure: Fitted Property Distribution 
Decomposed DR Decomposed Property Index Upper CI95 Lower CI95 
 204 
Furthermore, the probability of default is not homogeneous across all economic, sociological, 
and geographic cross-sections. Because of this, defaults are often clustered, which in turn 
depresses re-sale values. 
In an attempt to quantify this ‘default discount’ in Australia, a small investigation of property 
values conditioned on distressed sale was undertaken using data generously provided by RP 
Data. The data provided contained a complete listing of properties sold in the greater Sydney 
region from July 2011 to June 2012. RP data is a provider of property information, analytics 
and risk management services in Australia and New Zealand. A proprietary automated 
valuation model (AVM) is used by RP Data to provide model valuations of all properties’ 
values in the index, updated monthly. Using the data, realised sale proceeds were compared 
with modelled property values to investigate differences under ordinary sale as compared to a 
distressed sale74. Table 8.5 presents a summary of the data provided; 
Table 8.5 
    Default Discount in Australia 
     The table presents summary statistics for a sample of Australian residential property sales between 1 July 
2011 and 30 June 2012. Realised sales proceeds are compared with modelled property value (discount at sale) 
for distressed sales and compared to ordinary sales. The data is sourced from RP data. A property sale is 
classified as distressed where a key word relating to property distress is mentioned in the sale description. The 
data consists of 150,201 property sales. Observations are removed where the sales premium/discount is greater 
than 50% or less than -50%. The final dataset consists of 145,902 observations. 
Ordinary and Distressed Sales 
All 
Properties 
Ordinary 
Sales 
Distressed 
Sales 
 Number of sales           145,902            145,451                   451    
Discount to modelled value -1.83% -1.82% -3.04%  
Standard deviation 5.64% 5.64% 5.18%  
 
   
 
Note: 4,299 observations were excluded where the realised price differed from the modelled value ±50%. 
A two-sample comparison of means test, assuming equal variance in the two sub-populations, returned a t-stat 
= 4.579, indicating a probability that the means are equal of < 0.0001. 
 
                                                 
74 If the sales notice included one or more of the following key words, the sale was deemed to be under distress; 
repossession, foreclosure, foreclosed, forced, forces, mortgagee, receiver, distress, trustee.  
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The difference between realised values and modelled values on sales in the ordinary course of 
business is a reflection on the general state of the property market for a given period of time. 
During the sample period presented here, the market was characterised by a ‘vendor 
discount’. The modelled value can therefore be interpreted as the offer price, and the vendor 
discount as a tendency for sellers to accept the bid price. The sample discount is found to be 
1.82% for ordinary sales, and 3.04% for distressed sales, giving an average default discount 
of 1.22%. The discount may incorporate general market sentiment, but clearly includes a 
separate component attributed to distress. A two-sample t-test confirms a difference in means 
for discount to modelled values between ordinary sales and distressed sales. Results confirm 
a relationship between distress and property value in the Australian residential property 
market. Figure 8.22 shows the impact of including the added default discount in the 
simulation experiment at a PD and CF of 10 and 30 per cent respectively. Figures 8.23 and 
8.24 show the PLF and LOF after implementing the default discount of 1.22%. The impact is 
only marginal, but it must be noted that this experiment was constructed using a sample of 
one year in a relatively benign environment. Further research is needed to calibrate this 
relationship over a full business cycle in the Australian context. 
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Figure 8.22 
Loss Histogram: Added Default Discount 
Decomposed Default Rate Decomposed Property Index Added Default Discount 
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Figure 8.23 
Portfolio Loss Function: Fitted Property Distribution with Default Discount 
Decomposed Property Index Added Default Discount 
Upper CI95 Lower CI95 
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 8.4.6. Simulation: Adding an interaction between PD and LVR 
Thus far we have not accounted for any interaction effects between credit risk variables. In 
this section we implement an interaction effect between PD and LVR and examine the effect 
on our portfolio loss profile and line of failure. To account for this interaction effect, a 
formula developed by Standard and Poor’s (S&P) linking loan LVR and PD was incorporated 
into the simulation. Whilst some banks internally update LVR’s dynamically to account for 
revaluations in property value and updated loan balances, the more common practice is a 
reliance on LVR at the origination date as a proxy for the homeowner’s equity. LVR at 
origination is used by ratings agencies to incorporate the equity/default interaction into 
models used to evaluate pools of residential mortgage loans. The original methodology used 
by ratings agencies was based on specifying a frequency of default associated with a given 
rating, and a given decline in the property index. The latest methodology comes from 
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Figure 8.24 
Line of Failure: Fitted Property Distribution with Default Discount 
Decomposed Property Index Added Default Discount 
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Standard & Poor’s (S&P) where a continuous function is used, such that an adjusted 
probability of default is determined as a function of the associated probability of default of 
the loan and its LVR. This function is used for the purposes of this simulation exercise, 
shown in Equation 5. 
 PDadj = 0.45 + exp (-6.6 + 100 x 0.08 x LVR) (8.5) 
Incorporating the interaction effect into the simulation experiment substantially inflates bank 
system losses. Figure 8.25 shows the additional impact on bank loss once the interaction 
effect has been included for the stress scenario of a 10 per cent PD and a 30 per cent CF.   
 
The first observation regarding Figure 8.25 is that the magnitude of the mean bank loss is 
substantial. The inclusion of the interaction effect has the effect of more than doubling 
average bank loss from $896.80 to $1834.15. The standard deviation also increases from 
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Figure 8.25 
Loss Histogram: Added Interaction PD-LVR 
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$151.97 to $223.47. The effect is best shown by Figure 8.26, showing a significant vertical 
shift of the PLF for the mean bank and the worst performing bank in the system (95% 
confidence interval). 
 
Figure 8.26 shows that at a CF of 30 per cent, average bank loss increases from 0.85% to 
1.76% as a percentage of total assets, with the worst performing bank in the system 
registering losses of 2.20% of total assets. The second observation is that after accounting for 
the interaction effect, the PLF is a steeper function, characterised by a larger first derivative. 
The LOF shown in Figure 8.27 has moved considerably closer to the origin indicating that it 
takes lower PD, CF pairs to induce regulatory default. At a PD of 10%, Figure 8.27 shows it 
takes a CF of only 36.45% to induce regulatory default for the average bank in the system, 
and in the case of the worst performing bank in the system, a CF of 31.4% will result in 
regulatory default (Lower CI95). 
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Portfolio Loss Function: Added PD-LVR Interaction 
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8.5. Discussion and Conclusion 
It is well understood that current stress-testing practice suffers from numerous limitations: 
model misspecifications, poor out-of-sample forecasting, contagion and spill-over effects are 
only a few of those widely publicised by the literature. Current stress-tests tend to result in 
little to no bank failures, yet history shows banks are failing during periods of stressful 
macroeconomic conditions. This study identifies a potential reason for this. Variation in bank 
performance is not properly accounted for in regulatory stress-testing. Differing risk appetites 
and strategies cause unique loss reactions for an individual bank in a system. Whilst current 
regulatory stress-tests have failed to predict which bank fails. If instead the focus is shifted to 
properly account for variation in the performance between banks, a regulator would be in a 
better position to assess the number of banks likely to fail, given an extreme yet plausible 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
80 
90 
100 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 
C
ol
la
te
ra
l F
al
l (
C
F)
 %
 
Probability of Default (PD) % 
Figure 8.27 
Line of Failure: Added PD-LVR Interaction 
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macroeconomic scenario. As a result, a regulator can focus on whether banking system 
capital levels are adequate overall to prevent the worst performing bank from failing. 
A summary of these findings is presented in Table 8.6 and Figure 8.28 under the considerably 
severe stress-testing scenario of a 10% default rate and a 30% fall in the property index. The 
table shows the incremental impact of each stochastic scenario (a-f) presented in this study 
for the average, the best, and the worst performing bank in the system. Results showed a 
compelling difference in the magnitude of bank loss once variables were made stochastic. 
Under a fixed LVR of 63%, no bank loss was accumulated. This is not surprising given a 
fixed fall of 30 per cent on each property in the index would not result in any negative equity 
loans. As a result, it is expected the bank would recoup the full amount on a defaulted loan, 
with some minor legal and re-sale costs.  
Stochastic scenario (b) analysed the effect of decomposing the mean LVR on bank loss. 
Using the data provided by APRA, this study analysed the empirical distribution of portfolio 
LVRs for Australian bank residential mortgage exposures. The simulation experiment shows 
that a reliance on mean portfolio LVR in a stress-test results in an underestimation of bank 
loss by 0.71% of total assets. The magnitude of the underestimation is considerable, but only 
mildly concerning given the majority of regulators have access to the distribution of LVRs of 
their regulated entities and so are adequately able to decompose mean LVR when conducting 
regulatory stress-tests.  
Stochastic scenario (c) examined the impact of decomposing the default rate on each loan 
into a probability of default (PD). The simulation experiment is based on a simple random 
draw in the form of a Bernoulli distribution. Results are trivial with no change in the central 
tendency. Table 8.2 and Figure 8.8 report the results of a sample of Australian bank bad and 
doubtful debts expense. Results indicate variation across banks is substantial, increasing with 
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average quarterly bank loss. Supervisors in regulatory and central bank organisations 
conducting stress-testing must be aware that loan default and bank loss variation around the 
mean increases substantially under extreme conditions.  
Table 8.6 
   Simulation Results for Regulatory Stress-Testing after Decomposing the Mean 
The table presents the simulation results for a regulatory stress-test of a 30% fall in the property index, and a 10% 
default rate. The table shows the effect of decomposing the mean on total loss/total assets for the average, best and 
worst performing banks in the sample. The additional impact of decomposing banks LVR, Default Rate and Property 
Index from mean values is examined. Finally results are presented after accounting for a discount of defaulted 
properties and the interaction between PD and LVR. 
      Mean Bank Best^ Worst^ 
a. LVR fixed at mean, 63% 0 - - 
b. Decomposed LVR 0.705% - - 
c. Decomposed LVR, DR 0.705% 0.476% 0.933% 
d. Decomposed LVR, DR, Property Index* 0.845% 0.547% 1.143% 
e. Decomposed LVR, DR, Property Index, Default Disc 0.908% 0.602% 1.214% 
f. Decomposed LVR, DR, Property Index, Default Disc,  PD~LVR** 1.860% 1.404% 2.316% 
    * Table 8.A details distribution fitting and goodness-of-fit results, property index decline sourced from Hometrack 
using property price information collected between September 2010 and September 2011 
**The correlation between PD and LVR is implemented using Standard & Poor’s interaction formula. 
^ Best and Worst represent the Upper and Lower 95 per cent confidence intervals on the portfolio loss functions. The 
example is likened to the best and worst performing bank of a banking system of 20. 
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Figure 8.28 
Simulation Results for Decomposing the Mean 
Decomposed LVR Decomposed DR Decomposed Property Index 
Added Default Discount Added PD-LVR Interaction 
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Constructing a distribution of Australian house price returns over a period of one year 
demonstrates the importance of decomposing the mean property index. It is common for 
regulatory stress-tests to concentrate on the property index value only, and at best segment 
the property index by high level geographical regions. The simulation experiment presented 
in this study allowed for a complete decomposition of the property index into individual 
property returns. The simulation experiment under stochastic scenario (d) shows that a failure 
to do so results in an additional underestimation of loss by 0.14% and 0.21% of total assets 
for the mean and worst performing group of banks in the system respectively.  
The magnitude of the underestimation appears only mild. However it is important to note that 
the distribution fitting around the property price index was conducted during a relatively 
benign period in the Australian property market. It would be expected that under a severe 
macroeconomic scenario characterised by a fall in property prices of 30 per cent, variation 
around the property index would be substantially greater. With no such decline in property 
prices over the past 30 years in Australia, determining the precise magnitude of such 
variation becomes difficult. The findings of the experiment are presented here to demonstrate 
that despite conservative conditions, failure to decompose the property index still results in a 
material underestimation of banking system losses. This study argues that regulatory stress-
tests should endeavour to incorporate the full distribution around the mean for property prices 
movements to more accurately assess the resilience of the financial system.  
During periods of financial distress, an oversupply of assets is common. As borrowers 
default, lenders seize the underlying asset and attempt to sell the asset in the market relatively 
quickly to recoup losses on the loan. These actions have the effect of further depressing 
prices in the form of asset price spirals. In an attempt to quantify the default discount in the 
residential mortgage portfolio, stochastic scenario (e) shows the mean and worst performing 
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bank have losses underestimated by 0.063% and 0.071% of total assets respectively. The 
magnitude of this loss underestimation is only mild, however again it must be made clear that 
the period for which these default discounts were empirically determined was characterised 
by benign conditions. Findings demonstrate that variation in bank performance is 
significantly underestimated despite conservative condition. Finally, the simulation 
experiment implements a well-known interaction between PD and LVR. Stochastic scenario 
(f) shows that failing to account for this interaction effect results in an additional 
underestimation of bank loss for the mean and worst performing bank in the system by 0.95% 
and 1.10% respectively.  
The Australian banking sector has been resilient, in most part being unaffected by the recent 
turmoil in overseas economies. This is in part due to sound supervision and regulation as well 
as the concentration of four large and profitable banks holding capital well above regulatory 
minimums. Regulatory stress-tests performed by APRA have resulted in no bank failures 
despite sizable shocks to residential property prices. In addition, an IMF (2012) study reports 
results of a stress-test calibrated on the Irish crisis experience which finds Australian banks 
are largely able to withstand sizable shocks to residential mortgage exposures.  
The present study has taken a different approach, by examining empirical distributions of 
LVR, default rates, residential property returns and default discounts over a relatively 
conservative sample period and implementing PD-LVR interactions. Findings suggest current 
regulatory stress-testing has the potential to underestimate a considerable amount of 
intolerable loss in the banking system. Regulators conducting stress-testing are advised to 
consider taking measures to account for variation between banks and within important credit 
risk inputs by decomposing the mean. 
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Chapter 8 Appendix 
Table 8.A 
    Australian Property Price Returns by Geographical Division 
     The table presents the distributional fitting and goodness-of-fit test results for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and 
Anderson Darling statistics. The empirical dataset consists of average returns for 60 statistical divisions (SD) 
and 201 average returns for statistical sub-divisions (SSD) values sourced from Hometrack for the period of 
September 2010 and September 2011. Values represent the output of Hometrack's automated valuation 
modelling which models house price valuations for all properties in the index, based on observed residential 
sales. An annual return is calculated for each property using the change in value over the year. Average returns 
are then calculated by SD and SSD over the period. Distributional fits are presented in order of best to worst 
fitting distribution. 
Empirical Distribution N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
 Statistical Division (SD) 60 0.726% 4.448%   
Statistical Sub Division (SSD) 201 1.469% 4.881%  
 
   
 
SD Distributional Fitting Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov 
Anderson-
Darling 
Normal 0.73% 4.45% 0.0960 1.0384 
Beta (α=4.84, β=2.29) 0.37% 4.91% 0.1372 1.8434 
Gamma (α=9.74) 0.73% 6.64% 0.2043 4.7454 
Lognormal 1.71% 10.12% 0.2637 7.8786 
     
SSD Distributional Fitting Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov 
Anderson-
Darling 
Normal 1.47% 4.88% 0.0522 1.1605 
Beta (α=7.12, β=6.23) 1.33% 5.27% 0.0770 2.7382 
Gamma (α=12.58) 1.47% 6.05% 0.1020 5.8402 
Lognormal 1.90% 7.82% 0.1495 11.4621 
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Figure 8.A1 
Average House Price Returns by Statistical Division (SD) 
Observed* Normal Lognormal Gamma Beta 
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Average House Price Returns by Statistical Sub-Division (SSD) 
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CHAPTER 9 
Conclusion 
This thesis focused on issues relating to the credit risk management practices of Australian 
banks. The prevailing regulatory framework requires banks to hold adequate regulatory 
provisioning and regulatory capital, and submit to periodic stress-testing both internally and 
by regulators to account for expected, unexpected and intolerable credit losses in banks’ loan 
portfolios. Chapter 2 reviewed the relevant banking literature, demonstrating that if left 
unregulated, banks typically hold a positive capital ratio, but one that falls short of that which 
is socially desirable. Capital regulation is the means for correcting this market failure, 
properly aligning banks’ capital ratios to levels that are socially optimal. 
Chapter 3 examined expected losses, the accounting and regulatory frameworks for bank 
provisioning in Australian, and the past literature regarding the quality of provisioning in the 
banking sector. An important research question raised by past literature is whether banks use 
loan-loss provisions to manage their regulatory capital positions. In Chapter 6, this thesis 
examined this issue in a study of regulatory provisioning in Australia and the effect of the 
new Basel II regulatory framework.  
Findings suggested that the regulatory capital position of Australian banks was a determining 
factor in bank management’s discretion over setting regulatory loan-loss provisions. During 
the Basel I period, Australian banks were found to use regulatory provisioning for the 
purpose of capital management, banks with relatively lower regulatory capital positions were 
found to time provisioning to a period when capital position had been sufficiently rebuilt. In 
the Basel II period, standardised banks used regulatory provisions for capital management 
incentives, however IRB banks did not, choosing instead to report regulatory provisions 
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consistent with the expected loss estimates of internal capital models as intended under the 
Basel II framework. Finally, the study found no evidence of earnings management by 
Australian banks using regulatory provisions. These findings have implications for Australian 
bank supervisors, suggesting there is potential for banks to under-provision when faced with 
pressure to raise capital ratios. This finding encourages supervisors, when assessing capital 
adequacy, to ensure sufficiency in the regulatory provisioning practice of the bank. 
Chapter 4 examined unexpected losses, outlining the prevailing regulatory framework in 
Australia, and the relevant empirical literature which examines the determinants of banks’ 
regulatory capital positions and the potential for procyclicality. No prior research has 
examined these issues in the Australian banking system. Chapter 7 presented this study, 
investigating the following three previously unexamined questions in the Australian banking 
system: firstly, do Australian banks target a level of risk-weighted capital above the Basel 
imposed minimum capital ratio? Secondly, what determines the level of capital buffers 
Australian banks hold? And finally, what is the impact of bank-specific prudential capital 
ratios (PCRs) on Australian bank capital buffers?  
This study found that Australian banks targeted a level of capital above the regulatory 
minimum, with quarterly speed of adjustment coefficients of 19 and 15 per cent for total and 
tier 1 capital ratios, respectively. Bank risk and size were found to be negatively related to 
capital buffers, whilst ROE was positively related. The implementation of Basel II increased 
the capital buffers held by Australian banks. In addition, findings of this study suggested a 
positive relationship between the business cycle and Australian bank capital buffers, 
interpreted to be a countercyclical effect. Finally, results indicated bank-specific regulatory 
imposed PCRs are having their intended effect on capital ratios.  
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Findings have implications for bank supervisors seeking to determine how fast banks will 
adjust regulatory capital ratios to targeted levels and understand the bank-specific and system 
characteristics which influence the regulatory capital ratios banks hold. The findings provide 
a positive affirmation to supervisors that regulatory imposed bank-specific capital 
requirements are having their intended effect by positively influencing banks’ regulatory 
capital ratios. 
Chapter 5 examined intolerable losses, regulatory stress-testing, and the relevant past 
literature. Chapter 8 built on such literature by examining an important concept arguably 
overlooked by current stress-testing practice, the proper measurement of variation in the 
performance between banks. It would be unrealistic to assume all banks suffer an identical 
default rate, or the same fall in collateral value during times of stress. Instead, differing risk 
appetite and strategies cause unique loss reactions to each bank. Regulatory stress-tests 
seldom predict bank failures, yet banks do fail, and Chapter 8 has proposed a possible 
explanation. Instead of relying on mean estimates for portfolio default rate, LVR and 
underlying property values, a simulation experiment was conducted to ‘decompose the 
mean’, providing a more realistic setting by allowing for variation between banks.  
Chapter 8 found that once key variables were decomposed from mean values into their 
distributions, the increase in average banking system losses was substantial. Both the average 
bank and the worst performing group of banks suffered a significantly greater magnitude of 
loss. Under a severe stress scenario of a 30 per cent decline in the property index and a 10 per 
cent default rate, failing to decompose the mean resulted in an underestimation of average 
bank losses of 1.86 per cent of total assets. The worst performing group of banks, defined at 
the 95 per cent confidence interval had losses underestimated by a total of 2.32 per cent of 
total assets, a substantial amount of loss which should not be overlooked by supervisors. 
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With Basel III regulatory capital requirements being implemented in Australia from 2013, 
further research is needed in evaluating its impact on bank credit risk management. Since the 
onset of the first Basel capital accord, the Australian banking sector has not experienced a full 
economic cycle. Future research will be better placed to determine the effect of the economic 
cycle on Australian bank credit risk management practices. 
This thesis provides insights into the credit risk management practices of a banking sector 
which, in recent times, has outperformed global counterparts. The final implication of the 
findings of this thesis is relevant for all authorities with vested interest in the resilience of 
worldwide banking systems. For proper management of credit risk, regulatory provisioning, 
regulatory capital and regulatory stress-testing cannot be assessed in isolation, a simultaneous 
assessment is essential. This thesis provides an essential step in promoting a greater 
awareness of the interrelations between these three components in the Australian banking 
system.   
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